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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOYCE ALLEN,
Petitioner,

v.

i

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,

]
]i

Case No. 920197

Priority 14

Respondent.
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION
This is not an appeal from a final agency order. This case is
before the Court on Doyce Allen's original petition for certiorari
to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Allen v.
Utah Dep't of Health. 829 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1992) [Addendum A],
which affirmed the final order of respondent Utah Department of
Health,

Division

of

Health

Care

Financing

["Division"].

Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (Supp.
1992).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The

following

statutes

determination of this case:

and

rules

are

relevant

to

the

42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992); 42 U.S.C. S

1396a(a)(10) (1992)? 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17) (1992); 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(34) (1992); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1201, 416.1205, 416.1210
(1992); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.831, 435.840-435.852 (1991); Utah Code

Ann. § 26-18-1 to -48 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Utah Admin. Code R455-11 to 455-1-48 (1991); and Utah Admin. Code R810-304-400, R810-304403, R810-304-411 (1991). The full texts of these are set forth in
Addendum B to this brief.
ISSUES PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW
Petitioner Doyce Allen misstates the issue before this Court.
Because this is not an appeal of final agency action, the issue
presented on certiorari is not whether the Division "erred in
finding that [Allen] could not 'spend down' his assets to become
eligible for Medicaid"

(Brief of Petitioner at 1).

Properly

framed, the issues before this Court are:
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly conclude that

federal law, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) and (34) (1992),
does not require the Division to use a "resource spend down"
methodology

in

determining

Allen's

eligibility

for

Medicaid

coverage under Utah's optional Medically Needy Program?
2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the

use of a fixed asset limit does not violate the federal requirement
in section 1396a(a)(17) that eligibility standards for Utah's
optional Medically Needy Program be reasonable?
Whether an administrative agency's policy or rule conflicts
with an authorizing statute is a question of law, on which this
Court reviews the conclusions of the Utah Court of Appeals for
correctness. See Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1128
(Utah 1990); see also Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676,
679 (Utah 1990).

2

679 (Utah 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Allen's February 1991 application for payment of over $40,000
in incurred medical bills under Utah's Medicaid program for the
"medically needy" was denied by the Division because his total
nonexempt assets were $7,745.90 more than the $3,000 asset limit
for his two-person household (R. 113). After this determination of
ineligibility was affirmed

through the administrative

appeals

process (R. 78-79; 94-99), Allen sought review of the Division's
final order in the Utah Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
agency's determination in Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, 829 P.2d
122 (Utah App. 1992).
In his petition for certiorari, Allen claimed the Utah Court
of Appeals erroneously held that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992)
does not require the Division to use a "resource spend down"
methodology in determining whether an applicant with resources
above the applicable limit is eligible for coverage under the
optional Medicaid program for the "medically needy."

This Court

granted certiorari on June 22, 1992, to review the Utah Court of
Appeal's decision on this question.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Allen

worked

for

many

years

as

a

truck

driver

for

Intermountain Farmers Co-op until December 1988, when he retired at
age 61 because of arthritis (R. 34, 36, 88, 98). While a fulltime
employee there, he was covered by a group health insurance policy

3

issued by Blue Cross/Blue Shield (R. 98). After retirement, he
continued group coverage as a former employee until June 30, 1990,
when it expired

(R. 5, 36, 98).2

He worked part-time in an

Intermountain Farmers Co-op store beginning in the spring of 1990
to save money for premiums on an individual health insurance policy
when his extended coverage under Intermountain Farmers' group
policy expired (R. 33, 68). 2
Allen applied to Blue Cross/Blue Shield in June 1990 for
coverage under such an individual health insurance policy, but his
application was denied due to pre-existing medical problems,
including heart disease and open heart surgery in 1980 (R. 5-6, 3334, 37, 98). Allen inquired about health insurance coverage from
other insurance companies, but chose not to pursue it and apply for
coverage when told such a policy would cost from $400 to $600 per
month with a $500 deductible (R. 37).

In Allen's words, "So we

figured that we had a year and a half to go [until Medicare
coverage at age 65] and we hadn't been in the hospital for ten
years, so we'd just have to chance it." (R. 37).

According to

Allen, money saved for health insurance premiums was instead kept
as a "nest egg" (R. 68).
Thus, after July 1, 1990, Allen had no health insurance

federal law, referred to as COBRA, requires large employers
to continue group health insurance coverage of former employees for
up to eighteen months after they cease working due to disability.
2

Allen was not eligible for health insurance coverage through
the federal Medicare program until he reached age 65 on January 24,
1992.
4

coverage (R. 6/ 78).

Allen ended his part-time employment at

Intermountain Farmers Co-op in October 1990 (R. 102). On January
23/ 1991/ the day before his sixty-fourth birthday/ Allen suffered
a heart attack while in Arizona, where he lives several months of
the year (R. 5, 7, 97, 98, 112). He was transported to Utah, where
he lives the remainder of the year, and underwent heart-bypass
surgery at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center (R. 98). Medical
bills

incurred

as a result

of his emergency

treatment, air

evacuation, and heart surgery exceeded $40,000 (R. 11, 98).

On

February 4, 1991, at the suggestion of the hospital, Allen applied
for

Medicaid

coverage

under

the

Medically

Needy

Program,

retroactive to January 1, 1991 (R. 11, 88, 90, 145).
In January and February 1991, Allen's household had $967 in
monthly income in Social Security benefits (R. 18, 25, 27, 106).
On the first moment of those months, Allen and his wife owned, in
addition to exempt household effects and an unencumbered house
worth $65,000, a savings account containing $3,029.86, a checking
account containing about $100, a Lincoln automobile valued at about
$600, a

1983

Ford

pickup

truck worth

about

$2,500, and an

unencumbered 1981 travel trailer valued at about $7,000 (R. 7-8,
31, 33, 50, 52-53, 98, 103, 105). The Division's Office of Family
Support determined that, even after excluding as exempt the value
of the pickup truck and the home, Allen exceeded the applicable
$3,000 limit on nonexempt assets based on the cash in his savings
account alone; therefore, it denied Allen's application

5

(R. 14,

98, 113).3
After a formal hearing at Allen's request, Hearing Officer
Cornelius Hyzer recommended that the determination of Allen's
ineligibility due to excess nonexempt assets be affirmed:
The applicant was unable to demonstrate his assets were
below the asset limit and, therefore, he failed to meet
his burden of proof. Many alternatives were explored to
try to determine that a correct decision was made by the
Office of Family Support. After careful review with the
applicant of regulations requiring that his assets be
determined as of the first moment of each month, the
applicant understood that his savings account alone
exceeded the limit. Therefore, the value ascribed to his
motor vehicles and the travel trailer were not necessary
to sustain a denial.
(R. 99).

Upon further administrative review by the Division's

director, the hearing officer's findings and conclusions were
adopted, and the determination of ineligibility due to nonexempt
assets in excess of the $3,000 limit was affirmed (R. 94-96).
Allen's request for reconsideration was denied (R. 78), with the
Division noting that there is no "resource spend down" rule that
would allow Allen to become eligible for Medicaid by subtracting
from the total nonexempt assets he held in January and February
1991 the amount of unpaid medical bills he had incurred in those
months (R. 79).

3

Allen contended that the entire value of the unencumbered
travel trailer was exempt as a "medical necessity," but this issue
was never ruled upon at the administrative level because the cash
available to Allen in his savings and checking accounts was alone
sufficient to sustain the determination of ineligibility. (R. 79).
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Congress created optional Medicaid coverage for the "medically
needy" in 1965, to be paid for with federal and state funds.

It

sought to encourage states to pay the uninsured medical bills of
its

citizens

who,

though

poor,

were

less

needy

than

the

"categorically needy," whose incomes and resources are both below
amounts

essential

for

their

maintenance.

In

section

1396a(a)(17)(D), Congress required states to provide this optional
coverage to persons whose incurred medical bills are greater than
the amount by which their monthly incomes exceed the income level
considered essential. There is no express or implicit requirement
that states provide this optional coverage to persons who also have
accumulated substantial assets.
appropriately

left

by

Congress

Instead, this choice has been
to

the

state

legislatures

themselves, as has the setting of reasonable eligibility criteria
for the medically needy program.
Consistent with Congressional objectives and the Medicaid
statute, the Division determines who will receive assistance as
"medically needy, " based on the relative need of all who are
potentially eligible. Need is measured by applicants' incomes and
resources.

It is reasonable for the Division to distribute scarce

public funds by rendering ineligible all those who have accumulated
substantial assets from which they could provide for the costs of
their own medical care even if, like Allen, they do not actually do
so.

It is thus also reasonable for the Division to treat excess

7

income differently from accumulated resourcesf by not allowing an
applicant to spend down excess resources against incurred medical
bills even though it allows such a spend down of excess income
because required by Congress to do so.
Contrary to Allen's representations to this Court and the
mistaken belief of the dissenting judge on the Utah Court of
Appeals, an

applicant's

eligibility

is based

on

accumulated

resources held at the first moment of the month for which Medicaid
coverage is sought, not those held at the time of application for
retroactive Medicaid coverage. Accordingly, it is not possible for
a person to "spend down" excess resources by paying incurred
medical bills before applying and thereby become eligible for
retroactive Medicaid coverage.

It is, therefore, reasonable for

the Division not to allow "spend down" of excess resources at or
after the time of application for retroactive coverage.
This Court should affirm the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals

and

decline Allen's

invitation, under

the

guise of

statutory interpretation of "implicit" Congressional purpose or
intent, to

rewrite

the

federal Medicaid

statute

and

impose

"resource spend down" as a method of determining who is eligible in
Utah for optional Medicaid coverage as "medically needy."
ARGUMENTS
Introduction
The only issue before this Court is whether the Utah Court of
Appeals correctly determined that federal law, specifically 42

8

U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) and (34), does not require participating
states to use a "resource spend down" methodology when measuring
the nonexempt assets held by an applicant for the medically needy
program.
Allen advances

four separate arguments

opposite conclusion about what

for reaching the

federal law demands:

1) the

Division's failure to use a "resource spend down" methodology in
calculating

eligibility

for

the

medically

needy

program

is

inconsistent with the purposes of the Medicaid program, contrary to
section 1396a(a)(17)(A); 2) Congressional intent to require a
resource

spend

down methodology

is

implicit

in

the

express

requirement in section 1396a(a)(17)(D) that participating states
allow applicants for the medically needy program to "spend down"
their excess income; 3) Congressional intent to require a resource
spend down methodology is implicit in the provision in Medicaid
law, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992), which creates a three-month
retroactive application period; and 4) failure of the Division to
adopt a resource spend down methodology creates an unreasonable
eligibility standard, contrary to section 1396a(a)(17).

In order

to evaluate these claims, a basic understanding of the history and
operation of the Medicaid program is necessary.
Overview of the Medicaid Program and "Income Spend Down"
Medicaid was established by Congress in 1965 as Title XIX of

9

the Social Security Act4 "for the purpose of providing federal
financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain
costs of medical treatment for needy persons."
448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).

Harris v. McRae.

It is a program designed "to make

medical services for the needy more generally available," S. Rep,
No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 2014 (1965) [hereinafter
1965 Senate Report, Addendum Item D].

To this end, Congress

appropriates funds
[f]or the purpose of enabling each State, as far as
practicable under the conditions in such State, to
furnish . . . medical assistance on behalf of families
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient
to meet the cost of necessary medical services . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992). Medicaid reimburses participating States
a percentage of the cost of medical care provided to these types of
eligible individuals and families. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S.
154, 156-57 (1986).

The federal government reimburses Utah at a

75% rate, and the State pays the remaining 25% of the cost of the
Medicaid program.
In order to obtain reimbursement, a participating state must
develop a plan that complies with the Medicaid statute and federal
implementing regulations, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396; Atkins, 477 U.S. at
157, and it must select a single agency to administer the plan. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1992).

The state plan must be approved by

the Department of Health and Human Services, the federal agency

^Public Law No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at
42 U.S.C. S§ 1396 et seq. (1992)).
10

that oversees implementation of the Medicaid program.

42 U.S.C. §

1396 (1992); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981).
A participating

state must provide Medicaid

coverage to

"categorically needy" persons, 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(10)(A) (i)
(1992), but it may choose whether or not to provide Medicaid
coverage to "medically needy" persons "who meet the income and
resources requirements of the appropriate State plan. . . . "
U.S.C-

§

1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)

(1992);

see

Schweiker

v.

42
Gray

Panthers, 453 U.S. at 37.
The "categorically needy"—a group that includes dependent
children as well as aged, blind, or disabled adults—receive both
cash payments and Medicaid coverage; however,* in order to be
eligible for this assistance, their incomes and resources must both
be below limits set by the Department of Health and Human Services.
Significantly, a person applying for Medicaid coverage is not
permitted to "spend down" excess resources against incurred medical
bills in order to become eligible as "categorically needy."

See 20

C.F.R. §§ 416.1201, 416.1205, 416.1210 (1992) [Addendum B].
At the time Medicaid was enacted, these "categorically needy"
persons were considered by Congress as the "most needy in the
country," thus making it "appropriate for medical care costs to be
met, first, for these people."

H.R.R. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st

Sess., 66 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Report, Addendum Item C].
Persons who would qualify as "categorically needy" except for
incomes or resources over the fixed dollar limits could still

11

qualify for Medicaid coverage as "medically needy" in a state
opting to provide such coverage, but this latter group was deemed
"less needy" by Congress.
2017.5

Id.; see also 1965 Senate Report, at

The basis for distinguishing between these two subgroups

of the poor in this country was explained in Schweiker v. Hoqan,
457 U.S. 569, 590, 102 S.Ct. 2597, 2609 (1982):
Congress has differentiated between the categorically
needy—a class of aged, blind, disabled, or dependent
person who have very little income—and other persons
with similar characteristics who are self-supporting.
Members of the former class are automatically entitled to
Medicaid; members of the latter class are not eligible
unless a State elects to provide benefits to the
medically needy and unless their income, after
consideration of medical expenses, is below state
standards of eligibility.
Utah chose to participate in Medicaid with the adoption of the
Medical Assistance Act in 1981. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 to 11 (1989 and Supp. 1992).
agency

responsible

The Division is the designated Utah

for administering

the Medicaid

program in

accordance with federal and state law requirements. Utah Code Ann.
§ 26-18-3(1) (Supp. 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1989). The
Utah Legislature has given the Division broad authority to develop
policies

to

implement

the

Medicaid

program

and

to

develop

eligibility standards consistent with federal requirements.

5

Utah

If a state opts to provide medical assistance to the
"medically needy," it may not provide Medicaid coverage that is
greater in amount, duration, or scope than that provided to the
"categorically needy."
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(ii) (1992).
This provision was included "in order to make sure that the most
needy in a State receive no less comprehensive care than those who
are not as needy." 1965 House Report at 67.
12

Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) (1989); Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3(2) (Supp.
1992).

The state has complied with conditions set by federal law

by creating a state Medicaid plan, found at Utah Admin. Code R4551-1 to -48 [Addendum B], which has been approved by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services.
Federal law requires a state plan for medical assistance to
(17) . . . include reasonable standards . . .
for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical
assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent the
the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking
into account only such income and resources as are . . .
available to the applicant or recipient . . . (C) provide
for reasonable evaluation of any such income or
resources, and (D) . . . provide for flexibility in the
application of such standards with respect to income by
taking into account . . . the costs . . . incurred for
medical care or for any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992). This provision underlies several
of Allen's claims that the Division's failure to use a "resource
spend down" method of determining his eligibility for Medicaid as
a "medically needy" person is contrary to federal law.
Utah's Medically Needy Program
Unlike its neighboring states in the Intermountain West, Utah
has elected to make the optional medically needy program available
to some of its neediest citizens.6
(1991).

Utah Admin. Code R455-1-17

As required by federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34)

(1992), a person can apply for Medicaid coverage under the program
6

In a state such as Colorado that offers Medicaid only to the
categorically needy, Allen would be ineligible for any Medicaid
coverage because his $967 monthly household income is too high,
even if his assets were below the $3,000 limit.
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retroactively to three months before the month of application.
Utah Admin. Code 455-1-11 (1991).

In FY 1991, this optional

program payed the uninsured medical bills of over 5,000 eligible
Utahns at a cost of $19.7 million in federal and state Medicaid
funds.

MEDSTAT H.C.F.A. 2082 Report for Utah (Dec. 20, 1991).

As noted above, the "medically needy" are persons who have
characteristics of the categorically needy (i.e., as aged, blind,
or disabled adults, or as dependent children), but who also have
too much income or assets to meet the federal eligibility standards
for those programs. Winter v. Miller, 676 F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir.
1982).

Eligibility for the optional medically needy program

likewise depends on:

a) the total of the applicant's nonexempt

resources7; and b) the applicant's monthly income.
The applicable limit on allowable nonexempt resources, in this
case $3,000 for a two-person household,8 is set by the federal
Social Security Administration. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205(c) (1992)
[Addendum B] .

For purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility

during a specific calendar month, countable assets are those held
on the first moment of that month.

Utah Admin. Code R810-304-403

7

"Resources" are "cash or other liquid assets or any real or
personal property that an individual (or spouse, if any) owns and
could be converted to cash for his or her support and maintenance."
20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a) (1992). Exempt resources include, among
other things, a home, household goods, a vehicle, property
essential for self-support, allotted Indian lands, life insurance,
burial space and funds, and housing assistance. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.1210 (1992); Utah Admin. Code R810-304-411 (1991).
8

Utah Admin. Code § R810-304-403 (1991) [Addendum B];' see R.
13, 98.
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[Addendum B].

"The case is ineligible for the entire month if

countable assets exceed limits on the first moment of the month.
Id.

Under these eligibility standards, a person like Allen with

nonexempt assets above the fixed $3,000 limit, measured at the
first moment of the months
ineligible for Medicaid.

for which he seeks coverage, is

Utah Admin. Code. R810-304-403.

An applicant for the medically needy program whose nonexempt
resources are below the fixed dollar limit must also meet the
"income"

eligibility

criterion

by

having

income

below

the

applicable dollar limit, a figure set by the Social Security
Administration based on federal poverty guidelines. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1205(c) (1991).

However, in calculating an applicant's

income for a specific month, the Division is required by 42 U.S.C.
§

1396a(a)(17)(D),

quoted

above,

and

implementing

federal

regulations to use an "income spend down" methodology.9
Under income spend down, an applicant must be allowed to

9

See, e.g., Atkins, 477 U.S. at 158; 106 S.Ct. at 2459 ("the
spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) "allows the
medically needy to spend down "the amount by which their income
exceeds" the eligibility level); Foley v. Coler, No. 83-C-4736,
1986 WL 20891 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 1986) ("42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down")
[Addendum E]; Harriman v. Commissioner, No. 90-0046-B, 1990 WL
284515 (D. Me. Nov. 9, 1990) (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (D)
"specifically requires the state to have an income spend-down
rule") [Addendum F]; Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs., 301 Ark.
285, 783 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1990) ("Under the 'medically needy'
procedure, applicants are permitted to 'spend down' their excess
income for medical expenses."); Haley v. Commissioner of Public
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985) (42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17) "provide[s] for application of the spend down
principle to income eligibility determinations").
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deduct from income any medical expenses incurred in that month that
are not subject to payment by a third party.10

42 C.F.R. §

435.831(c) (1991); Utah Admin. Code R810-303-331 (1991).

After

such a set-off, an applicant will meet the income eligibility
criterion if the incurred medical costs reduce income to or below
the applicable monthly income standard. 42 C.F.R. § 435.831(d)
(1991).
To see the federally mandated "income spend down" provision in
operation, consider the following simplified hypothetical.

Sara

Johnson, disabled by emphysema, lives with her husband Sam, who
earns minimum wage as a watchman at a small company with no health
insurance benefits. She incurs $10,000 in uninsured medical bills
in January 1991 during an emergency hospitalization for severe
pneumonia, so she applies for the medically needy program.

If

Johnson has only $1,000 in total nonexempt cash and other assets on
January 1, 1992, she satisfies the $3,000 resource eligibility
criterion for her two-person household.
The income limit for that two-person household, an amount
considered minimally necessary for basic life maintenance, is $430.

10

According to the legislative history, the "income spend down"
provision was inserted into section 1396a(a)(17)(D) to insure that
the measurement of an applicant's income in any month, as part of
the Medicaid eligibility determination process, took into account
the applicant's costs of medical care incurred during that month.
1965 House Report, at 68 [Addendum C]. There is no parallel
language in the federal statute requiring states to set off an
applicant's nonexempt resources held in any month, as part of the
Medicaid eligibility determination process, against the costs of
medical care incurred during that month.
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If, like Allen and his wife, Johnson's countable income is $967 in
January, she would

be

$537 over the income

limit

and thus

ineligible as a "categorically needy" person. However, due to the
federally mandated

"income spend down" method of determining

eligibility as a "medically needy" person, Johnson will be allowed
to deduct from this countable income the amount of incurred medical
bills, thereby bringing herself to the $430 income limit. She will
thus be eligible in January under both the resources and income
eligibility criteria for the Utah Medically Needy program, and
Medicaid

will

cover all but

$537 of

the medical

bills

she

incurred.11
If, on the other hand, Johnson incurred only $500 in medical
bills in January she would not be eligible as "medically needy"
under the income criterion of eligibility.

Even after the "income

spend down" methodology was applied to deduct her incurred medical
expenses from her gross income ($967-$500), she would be ineligible
because her net income of $467 would be $37 more than the $430
household income limit.
As previously noted, the federally mandated eligibility
guidelines for Medicaid coverage do not allow a person to become
u

The amount of the income spend down, $537 in this
hypothetical, remains the responsibility of Johnson to pay. But
she need not actually pay the $537 toward a medical bill in Utah to
become eligible for Medicaid under the Utah Medically Needy
Program.
In sharp contrast, the state plans in Massachusetts,
Arizona, and North Carolina, discussed below at pages 23-26,
required an applicant to actually expend assets on incurred medical
bills in order to decrease resources to be counted in determining
eligibility.
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eligible as "categorically needy" by spending down excess resources
against incurred medical bills. The eligibility standards for the
medically needy program in Utah's approved state Medicaid plan
likewise do not include a methodology for measuring available
resources that permits the applicant to

"spend down" excess

nonexempt resources by setting them off against incurred medical
bills.
Allen contends that federal law requires the Division to adopt
such a resource spend down methodology and thereby provide Medicaid
coverage through this optional program to persons with substantial
nonexempt resources in excess of fixed resource limits.

He has,

however, failed to demonstrate any error by the Utah Court of
Appeals in rejecting his statutory claims.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT FEDERAL
LAW, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) and (34) (1992), DOES NOT
REQUIRE THE DIVISION TO USE "RESOURCE SPEND DOWN" WHEN
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR OPTIONAL MEDICAID COVERAGE AS
"MEDICALLY NEEDY."
1. Use of a fixed asset limit, without resource spend
down, is consistent with the objective of the Medicaid
statute, which is to help states provide medical
assistance to persons least able to meet the costs of
medical care from their own income and resources.
Allen's first argument is that the Division's failure to use
a resource spend down methodology in determining eligibility is
inconsistent with the legislative purpose and intent behind the
Medicaid program.

Section 1396a(a)(17) requires a state plan to

use reasonable eligibility standards consistent with the objectives
of the Medicaid statutes in Title XIX of the Social Security Act.
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In the appropriations provision at the beginning of that title,
Congress stated that it was appropriating funds for Medicaid
for the purpose of enabling each State, as far as
practicable under the conditions in such State, to
furnish medical assistance [to dependent children and
aged, blind, or disabled individuals] whose income and
resources are insufficient to meet the cost of necessary
medical services . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992) (emphasis added).
Nothing in Title XIX or its legislative history suggests that
the

financial

assistance

provided

through

Medicaid

to

the

categorically needy or to the medically needy was intended by
Congress to be national health insurance coverage for all persons
whose income and resources are "insufficient" in the sense that
they are less than incurred medical bills.12

This Congressional

"purpose" ascribed by Allen to Medicaid is created out of thin air.

12

Contrary to Allen's assertion at page 12, the mere creation
of a public assistance program for categorically needy and
medically needy does not, by definition, preclude limiting
participation to those whose assets are below fixed dollar limits.
See Harriman, 595 A.2d at 1057; see also Ramsey, 783 S.W.2d at 364
(federal Medicaid statute does not even permit states to use
resource spend down methodology for medically needy applicants).
Congress itself has dictated that a person with excess resources
cannot spend down that excess against incurred medical bills to
become eligible for Medicaid as "categorically needy."
See 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.1201, 416.1205, 416.1210 (1992).
Furthermore, the fact that the federal statutory scheme and
the state plan allow applicants to retain a certain amount of
nonexempt resources and still be eligible for Medicaid as
categorically needy or medically needy does not mean Congress
impliedly intended that all persons with medical bills larger than
their resources must be deemed eligible. Instead, allowing assets
below the resource limit merely indicates Congressional intent that
persons need not have zero in accumulated assets to be eligible for
Medicaid, either as categorically needy or as medically needy.
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Allen is really arguing, with no supporting authority, that
Congress intended the optional medically needy program to be a
national

health

insurance

program

paying

the

uninsured,

catastrophic medical bills of all persons who otherwise qualify,
notwithstanding the amount of assets they hold. If Congress had so
intended, it could have compelled states that opt to provide
medically

needy

coverage

to

use

the

"resource

spend

down"

methodology of determining eligibility, one Allen is asking this
Court to impose by judicial legislation.

Congress could have

restricted states in this manner by merely enacting statutory
language like that in section 1396a(a)(17)(D), which compels the
"income spend down" methodology of determining income eligibility,
but it did not.
statutory

See Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 757 (application of

construction

rule,

"express

mention

and

implied

exclusion," would lead to the conclusion that section 1396a(a) does
not impose resource spend down methodology on states because it
does not mention such a requirement among the express enumerations
of what state* Medicaid plans must contain).
Instead, Congress stated in the Medicaid statute its purpose
to help a participating state provide medical assistance to as many
of its needy citizens as possible, i.e., "as far as practicable
under the conditions in such State[.]"

42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992).

In permitting the medically needy program to be optional, Congress
left it up to each participating state to decide whether it could
afford to provide medical assistance to any medically needy persons
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at all.

Congress also left it to each state choosing to provide

this optional assistance to set its own income and resource
eligibility standards, subject to the requirement

in section

1396a(a)(17) that these standards be reasonable.
As the Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded, although
section 1396a(a)(17) permits a state to choose to provide Medicaid
coverage to a larger group of needy citizens through the use of a
"resource

spend

down"

methodology

of

calculating

resource

eligibility, it does not compel a state do so. Allen, 829 P.2d at
126.

Every court that has addressed this issue has reached the

same conclusion.

E.g.,

Harriman v. Commissioner/ Medicare and

Medicaid Guide f 39,089 (D. Me. Nov. 9, 1990) (1990 WL 284515)
("The federal statute specifically requires the state to have an
income spend-down rule.

. . . But there is no similar requirement

in the federal statute for a resource spend-down rule.") [Addendum
Item F ] ; Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 (Me.
1991) (court adopts prior district court holding that resource
spend down is permitted but not required by section 1396a(a)(17));
Foley v. Coler, No. 83-C-4736, slip op. at 9 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1,
1986) (1986 WL 20891) ("42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states
to use income spend-down but is silent regarding resource spenddown . . . .

Resource spend-down is thus permitted, but not

required, by the Medicaid statute and regulations") [Addendum Item
E]; Hession v. Illinois Dep't of Public Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544
N.E.2d 751, 757 (1989) ("Simply stated, we perceive nothing in
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section 1396a(a) (17) which precludes a State that participates in
the Medicaid program from using the resource spend down methodology
if it chooses to do so."), affirming Hession v. Illinois Dep't of
Pub. Aid, 163 111. App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987); Haley
v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 578
(1985) (federal Medicaid statute does not require resource spend
down methodology);13 see also Westmiller by Hubbard v. Sullivan,
729 F.Supp. 260, 263 (W.D. N.Y. 1990) ("Although the Medicaid Act
does not expressly mention a resource spend-down, it is clear from
other sections of the Act and from the legislative history that the
states have discretion in utilizing such a [resource] spend-down in
determining eligibility."); Matarazzo v. Aronson, No. CV91-0388251,
2 Medicare and Medicaid Law Rptr., para. 90. at 379-80 (Conn.
Superior Court, June 30, 1992) (federal Medicaid law permits
resource spend-down, but state statute prohibits it) [Addendum G ] .
Congress does not allow use of resource spend down to become
Medicaid eligible as categorically needy. With regard to Medicaid
eligibility as medically needy, Congress has left it to each
participating state to determine how many needy citizens it can
afford to provide medical assistance to out of the larger class of
persons whose extraordinary uninsured medical expenses are greater

13

In Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs., 301 Ark. 285, 783
S.W.2d 361, 364 (1990), the Arkansas Supreme Court likewise held
that federal Medicaid law does not require states to use a resource
spend down methodology, but it went even further to conclude that
states are not authorized by federal law to allow applicants to
spend down resources to become eligible for Medicaid.
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than their assets.1*

This flexibility granted by Congress is

consistent with its express intent to encourage states to choose to
assist as many of the "less needy" as practicable within local
conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992), including burgeoning state
expenditures for mandatory "categorically needy" Medicaid coverage
and state budgetary constraints in these recessionary times. The
interpretation of section 1396a(a)(17) urged on this Court by
Allen, which would dramatically increase the costs of the medically
needy program by expanding eligibility through mandated "resource
spend down," would eliminate this flexibility and would itself
defeat the purposes of the medically needy program by discouraging
states from offering this optional program to anyone.
As the Utah Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the state
supreme courts in Hession and Haley, in decisions mistakenly relied
upon by Allen, ultimately concluded that their respective state
Medicaid agencies were required by clear manifestations of state
legislative intent, not Congressional intent, to use a "resource
spend down" methodology of calculating an applicant's eligibility
for the medically needy program.

Allen, 829 P.2d at 126-28.

In

Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 757, the Illinois Supreme Court pointed out
that Illinois statutes defined those eligible, required disregard
of a fixed

dollar amount of assets in determining

1A

Medicaid

Here, that larger group of potentially eligible would consist
of the 192,000 Utahns with no medical insurance, Deseret News, Feb.
1, 1992, at Bl, as well as the uncounted numbers of Utahns who are
underinsured for catastrophic health care costs.
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eligibility, and specifically noted the special importance of
preserving recipients' limited resources. Thus, the court phrased
the issue before it as whether the lower "appellate court correctly
concluded that the Illinois Public Aid Code (Code) requires the
application of a resource spend down."

Id.

Similarly, in Haley, 476 N.E.2d at 579, the court addressed
whether the Massachusetts Legislature "intended to require the use
of

a

resource

spend

down."

The

court

identified

numerous

provisions in the state laws about the medically needy program that
strongly evinced the state legislature's intent that its medically
needy

program

use

a

resource

spend-down

methodology.

Significantly, these included provisions allowing medically needy
applicants to dispose of excess assets by actually paying incurred
medical bills before applying for retroactive coverage15 and to
establish eligibility without depleting assets below an exempted
amount. Furthermore, the state legislature had explicitly required
a resource spend down methodology when applicants had assigned or
transferred away assets before application in order to render
themselves eligible for medical assistance.

Id., at 578-79 & nn.8,

9. Based on these state statutory provisions, the court concluded

15

The court stated that under the Massachusetts scheme, without
resource spend-down, a person aware of the Medicaid agency's asset
limit could use his excess assets to actually pay incurred medical
bills and then become retroactively eligible, while the person
unaware of the policy or unable to actually spend excess assets on
medical bills before applying would be found ineligible. Haley,
476 N.E.2d at 578-79 n.8. As discussed more fully at page 30-32,
such a disparate result is not possible in Utah.
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that use of resource spend down by the Massachusetts Medicaid
agency was required by state law. Jxi. at 579-80,
Similar statutory provisions regulating eligibility for the
medically needy program in North Carolina led the court there to
likewise conclude that resource spend down, which allows applicants
to set off accrued medical bills against assets held at the time of
application,

was

implicitly

required

by

state

legislation

permitting applicants for the program to actually spend those
assets

on

themselves

medical

bills

before

under applicable

asset

applying
limits.

and

thereby

Kempson

bring

v. North

Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 482, 397 S.E.2d
314, 316-18 (1990), aff'd by divided court, 328 N.C. 722, 403
S.E.2d 279 (1991)16; accord Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hospital,
Inc. v. Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d 878, 882 (1986)
(involving same provisions in a state created medical assistance
program, not Medicaid).
Thus, in all the cases relied on by Allen, the state agency's
failure to use resource spend down was considered contrary to
express state legislative intent, as well as unfair to "blindsided"
applicants who were unable (or unaware of the need to) use excess
assets to actually pay medical bills before application.

Haley,

476 N.E.2d at 578-79 & n.8; Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 757; Kempson,

16

The Supreme Court of North Carolina was careful to point out
that the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision it was
affirming, because of an equally divided court, nonetheless has "no
precedential value." 403 S.E.2d at 279.
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397 S.E.2d at 316-17; Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hospital, 714 P.2d
at 881-82.

See note 15, supra.

However, as Allen now concedes, Utah's legislature has enacted
nothing on which to conclude that the Division's failure to allow
resource spend down is contrary to state law or state legislative
intent.

Instead, the Utah Legislature has given the Division

complete authority and broad discretion to administer and implement
the Medicaid program, including authority to adopt policy and
eligibility standards consistent with federal law. Utah Code Ann.
§ 26-18-3 (1991).

The Utah Legislature could have, but has not,

directed the Division to use a resource spend down methodology, a
change which would necessarily expand the pool of potentially
eligible persons and thereby increase the cost of offering any
medically needy program.

See Harriman, 595 A. 2d at 1057 n.6.

On

the contrary, by continuing to fund the medically needy program
without taking such preemptive action, the Utah Legislature has
tacitly adopted the Division's policy of not using resource spend
down.
As a matter of sound and humane public policy, it may be
desirable for the government to make catastrophic health insurance
coverage accessible to all Americans so no one must spend a life's
savings

to

pay

exorbitant

costs

of

necessary medical care.

Nonetheless, this is a matter for legislative consideration and
action. The policy determination of whether to offer the optional
medically needy program and how many needy persons Utah can afford
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to

subsidize

has

properly

been

left

determination of the state legislature.

by

Congress

to

the

As the Court of Appeals

recognized, it is not for the courts to rewrite eligibility
criteria for public assistance programs.
n.18; accord

Allen, 829 P.2d at 128

Harriman, 595 A. 2d at 1057 (court not justified in

imposing on Medicaid agency a resource spend down methodology where
state

legislature has clearly refrained

from requiring one);

Bemowski v. Comm. , Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 582 A.2d 103, 106 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1990) (where state plan does not use resource spend down,
"such a change in the eligibility criteria for . . . the medically
needy category must be made legislatively or by regulation, not
judicially").
For these reasons, this Court should conclude that failure to
use a resource spend down methodology when measuring resources held
by an applicant for the medically needy program is not inconsistent
with Congress's objectives in creating the Medicaid program.
2. The federal requirement in section 1396a(a)(17)(D)
that a state use income spend down does not impliedly
require a state to use resource spend down since, in
setting criteria for public assistance eligibility, it is
rational to treat income differently from accumulated
resources.
Characterizing

resources as merely unspent

income, Allen

suggests that it is unreasonable for the Division not to use a
resource spend down methodology since it is required by federal
Medicaid

law

to

use

an

income

spend

down

methodology

when

determining eligibility for the medically needy program. However,
as noted above, Congress itself has expressly required income spend
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down in section 1396a(a)(17)(D), but has not required resource
spend down.

This is itself a strong indication of Congressional

intent not to make resource spend down mandatory.
As the Arkansas Supreme Court recently explained in a decision
rejecting a claim that states must use resource spend down, there
are quantitative differences between the two that justify such
disparate treatment.
labor.

Income "is accrued day to day in return for

On the other hand, resources in place, or acquired, are

viewed as wealth in hand that increases the recipient's wellbeing."

Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs., 301 Ark. 285, 783

S.W.2d 361, 364 (1990).
As discussed more fully below under point 4, a state can
reasonably

conclude that persons able to put money away and

accumulate substantial assets are in a better position to provide
for their own health care costs.

Harriman v. Commissioner, 1

Medicare and Medicaid Law Rptr., para. 318, at 1418 (D.Me. March 4,
1992) [Addendum H].

Indeed, Congress itself has already reached

this same conclusion by declining to allow applicants for Medicaid
coverage as categorically needy to use resource spend down and set
off incurred medical bills against excess resources, even if their
incomes are below poverty level income limits and even if they have
incurred medical bills far greater than their excess resources.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1201, 416.1205, 416.1210 (1992) [Addendum B].
It would be highly irrational for Congress to require states to
provide optional Medicaid coverage to a "medically needy" person
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through resource spend down when federal law does not allow
resource spend down when determining if a person is eligible for
mandatory categorically needy assistance.
If a state chooses to use resource spend down in its medically
needy program, it is rendering eligible for public assistance all
applicants with substantial assets if they also have even more
substantial uninsured medical bills.

Recognizing this, Congress

has not statutorily required states to use resource spend down,
since such a requirement would force some states to choose between
providing coverage to this huge pool of potentially medically
needy, or to no one at all.
Furthermore, there are considerable administrative problems
(and attendant costs) not posed by income spend down that would
accompany use of resource spend down.

In most cases, it is simple

to measure an applicant's regular monthly income stream, so income
spend down is merely a computational matter.

If an applicant has

minimal nonexempt assets, the administrative burden on the state to
evaluate them is slight.

But if persons with substantial assets

are to be eligible under a resource spend down methodology, the
state will have to evaluate many more assets, including assets
difficult to value like collectibles and stock not publicly traded.
The state would also have to put in place a tracking system for
assets to insure that they were not used repeatedly from month to
month for resource spend down purposes.
These additional administrative burdens provide added support
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for the conclusion that it is rational to draw the line between
income and resources for purposes of applying the spend down rule
when determining eligibility for the optional medically needy
program•

Harriman v. Commissioner, 1 Medicare and Medicaid Law

Rptr., para, 318, at 1418 (D.Me. March 4, 1992) [Addendum H].

As

the Harriman court noted, use of a fixed asset limit instead of
resource spend down represents a choice by the state to spend
scarce Medicaid dollars on needy persons with assets under that
limit,

instead

administrative

of

spending

those

dollars

on

the

increased

costs entailed in using a resource spend down

methodology::
The State should not be compelled to use its limited
budget to hire more people to apply a different rule
where the alternative is to direct the funds to people in
need even though not all people in need can be reached.
Id.
This Court should, therefore, reject Allen's argument that
Congress impliedly required resource spend down when it expressly
required income spend down,
3. Because an Applicant Cannot Spend Excess Assets to
Pay Incurred Medical Bills before Applying for
Retroactive
Medicaid
Coverage,
the
Three-Month
Retroactive Application Period in Section 1396a(a)(34)
Does Not Impliedly Require Use of Resource Spend Down.
Next, Allen contends that resource spend down is impliedly
required by Congress's mandate, in section 1396a(a)(34), of up to
three months of retroactive Medicaid coverage prior to the month of
application. Relying on Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 318, he claims that
applicants for such retroactive coverage in Utah are "blindsided"
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by the resource limit if they are either unable to (or unaware of
the need
coverage.

to) spend

their excess assets

before

applying

for

This is the same unfair scenario envisioned by Judge

Bench in his dissent below, in which he states erroneously that an
applicant "savvy enough to spend down his or her assets before
applying for Medicaid would be eligible, while the applicant who
applies for benefits before spending down is not eligible." Allen,
829 P.2d at 128-29 (Bench, J., dissenting).
for Allen

should

However, as counsel

know even if Judge Bench does not, it is

impossible for this scenario to take place in Utah.
The applicants for medical assistance in Kempson were unfairly
"blindsided"

because

state

law

setting

out

medically

needy

eligibility standards allowed them to actually use excess assets to
pay accrued medical bills and thereby bring their total assets
below the resource limit by the time of application for retroactive
coverage.

Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 316-318.

Under such a state

eligibility system, which was also present in Haley, 476 N.E.2d at
578-79, and Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hospital, 714 P.2d at 882,
it is patently unreasonable to not permit resource spend down at
the time of application by those who were unable to (or were
unaware of the need to) do so before application.
In contrast, under current Medicaid law and Utah's Medicaid
eligibility standards, an applicant may not make himself eligible
by using excess assets to pay incurred medical bills prior to
applying for coverage. Allen's representations to the contrary at
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pages 15 and 18 of his brief are simply not true.
Section

1396a(a)(34)

requires

a

state

to

provide

for

retroactive Medicaid coverage for medical bills incurred up to
three months before the month of applicationr but only "if such
individual was (or upon application would have been) eligible for
such assistance at the time such care and services were furnished."
In accordance with this directive, eligibility is determined based
on the resources held by an applicant at the first moment of the
month for which he seeks Medicaid coverage.

See Utah Admin. Code

R810-304-403. Resources are not, as Judge Bench believed, measured
as of the date a person applies for retroactive Medicaid coverage.
Thus, Allen could not have spent down his excess resources after
incurring his hospital bills and thereby rendered himself eligible
for Medicaid coverage retroactive to January and February 1991 when
he applied on February 4, 1991.
Because Utah's medically needy eligibility standards do not
allow a "savvy" applicant to become eligible while an ignorant or
unable

applicant

cannot,

the

federally

mandated

three-month

retroactive application process does not impliedly require resource
spend down.
4. It is Reasonable for the Division to Base Eligibility
for Medicaid Coverage under the Optional Medically Needy
Program on Need, as Measured by the Amount of an
Applicant's Accumulated Resources.
Finally, Allen contends that the Division's failure to allow
resource spend down is contrary to the requirement in section
1396a(a)(17) that a state's eligibility criteria be "reasonable."
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As support for this argument, he refers the Court only to the 1965
Senate Report at page 2019 [Addendum D].

Significantly, that

Report

the

expressly

acknowledges

earlier

in

same

section,

captioned "Determination of need for medical assistance," that
"States may

set a

limitation

on income

and

individuals may hold and be eligible for aid."
subsequent

resources which
Id. at 2018. The

language Allen apparently relies on, with emphasis

added, is:
The State may require the use of all the excess income
of the individual toward his medical expenses, or some
portion of that amount.
In no event, however, with
respect to this provision . . . may a State require the
use of income or resources which would bring the
individual's income below the amount established as the
test of eligibility under the State plan.
As the Utah Court of Appeals recognized, this section merely
explains that section 1396a(a)(17)(D), i.e., "this provision,"
requires income spend down in determining whether one is eligible
as medically needy. Allen, 829 P.2d at 126 n.10. The 1965 Senate
Report emphasizes that states can require applicants to use all
excess income (i.e., that above the applicable monthly income
limit) toward medical bills, but states cannot require applicants
to so use the protected amount of income (i.e., that below the
applicable monthly income limit).

The cited passage provides no

support for a conclusion that it is unreasonable to exclude persons
with substantial assets from participation in an optional program
designed to encourage state assistance to the neediest citizens.
Indeed, it is eminently rational for the Division to delineate
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\rt\o is most in need of medical assistance by taking into account
the level of applicants' accumulated resources.

Harriman v.

Commissioner, 1 Medicare and Medicaid Law Rptr. para. 318, at 1418
(D.Me. March 4, 1992) [Addendum H ] .

In applying a fixed asset

limit as an eligibility criterion for the Medically Needy Program,
the Pivision has reasonably concluded that persons with assets
above the resource limits are generally more able than those with
assets below the resource limits to be able to meet the costs of
their own medical care:
[T]he State could rationally believe that [people with
accumulated resources over resource limits] 'generally
are better able to provide for their medical needs,' than
people who have been unable to accumulate resources. In
other words, people with accumulated resources, as a
group, are likely to have greater flexibility in making
alternative arrangements for their medical needs, whether
it be by previous purchase of insurance, arranging for
loans, family assistance, etc.
Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Hoqan, 457 U.S. at 590).
The facts in this specific case demonstrate the reasonableness
of the Division's conclusion about the general class of persons to
which Allen belongs, i.e., those who have accumulated assets in
excess of resource limits.

Allen and his wife owned their own

$65,000 home and held over $10,000 in cash and other assets, in
addition to other property exempted from consideration.

When

Allen's group health insurance coverage ended in June 1990, he
could have protected himself

for $400-600 per month

for the

eighteen months until he would gain Medicare coverage.

Persons

with meager or no accumulated assets have no such option.
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But

Allen decided to hold onto his "nest egg" and risk being without
health insurance, despite a history of heart disease and prior open
heart surgery. Although his nest egg and all his other assets may
now be at risk for payment of his catastrophic uninsured medical
bills, his predicament results from his own gamble, not from an
unreasonable

or unlawful

method

of determining

his Medicaid

eligibility.
Finally, quoting from the dissent below, Allen asserts it is
unreasonable not to permit resource spend down because an applicant
who is "savvy enough to spend down his or her assets before
applying for Medicaid would be eligible, while the applicant who
applies for benefits before spending down is not eligible." Allen,
829 P. 2d at 128-29 (Bench, J., dissenting).

As discussed above

under points 1 and 3, this admittedly unfair result is not possible
under the Utah Medicaid program, although it was possible under the
state eligibility standards examined in Haley, Kempson, and Boswell
Memorial Hospital.

In short, a "savvy" Allen could not have spent

his excess assets in January and February 1991, prior to applying
for Medicaid, and thereby made himself eligible for coverage for
those months. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992); Utah Admin. Code §
455-1-11 (1991).
Because

it is reasonable

for the Division

to establish

eligibility standards for a public assistance program that take
into account an applicant's accumulated resources, this Court
should reject Allen's argument that failure to use resource spend
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down contravenes section 1396a(a) (17) ,17
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject Allen's
claims and affirm the Utah Court of Appeals' holding that federal
law does not require the Division to use a resource spend down
methodology

when

determining

eligibility

for Utah's

optional

Medically Needy Program.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of September, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
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17

Allen also mentions, for the first time on appeal, an
unsupported claim that the Division's failure to allow him to spend
down his excess resources against incurred medical bills
constitutes an unreasonable overvaluation of his available
resources, contrary to section 1396a(a)(17)(C).
(Brief of
Petitioner) at 17-18.
Although this belated, alternative
"unreasonableness" argument should not even be addressed, Espinal
v. Board of Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990), it lacks merit
for the same reasons set forth by the Division in point 4.
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OPINION
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Division of Health Care
Financing,

F I L E D
(March 1 7 , 1992)

Respondent.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

Steven Elmo Averett, Provo, for Petitioner
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Steven Mikita, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Doyce Allen (Allen) appeals from a final order of
respondent Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care
Financing (DHCF) denying him Medicaid benefits. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 23, 1991, Allen suffered a heart attack while in
Arizona. He was subsequently transported to Utah where he
underwent heart bypass surgery, resulting in medical costs
exceeding $40,000.00. At the time of his heart attack, Allen had
no health insurance and was ineligible for Medicare assistance
because he was not sixty-five years old.
Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991,
seeking retroactive coverage to include medical bills incident to
his heart surgery in January, 1991. Utah Medicaid guidelines
require that Allen's assets be less than $3,000.00, on the first
of each calendar month, to qualify for medical assistance. In
both January and February, Allen owned a savings account in the

amount of $3,029.86, a checking account in the amount of $100.00,
a Lincoln automobile valued at approximately $600.00, a 1983 Ford
pickup truck valued at approximately $2,500.00, and a 1981 travel
trailer valued at approximately $7,000.00.
On February 19, 1991, the Office of Family Support denied
Allen's Medicaid application, finding his resources exceeded the
$3,000.00 limit. Allen requested a formal hearing, after which a
DHCF hearing officer sustained the denial on the ground that
Allen's "savings account alone exceeded the limit." On April 29,
1991, the DHCF issued a Final Agency Action and Order on Review,
adopting the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer.
Allen then filed a Request for Reconsideration which was denied.
On appeal, Allen alleges the DHCF erred in denying his
Medicaid application because: (1) The savings account funds are
designated for burial expenses and, thus, exempt from
consideration for Medicaid eligibility; (2) the travel trailer,
modified to accommodate his wife's disabilities, is a medical
necessity or personal effect and, thus, exempt from consideration
for Medicaid eligibility; and (3) he should have been permitted
to "spend down" his assets, by applying them to medical bills, in
order to become eligible for Medicaid.
I.

THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AS A BURIAL FUND

Allen contends that his $3,029.86 savings account should not
be included for purposes of Medicaid eligibility because it is
exempt as a burial fund.1 In support of this claim, Allen points
to a statement in his will directing that the savings account be
used "to bury Doyce Allen and Lilly Allen." Allen alleges the
will is properly before this court on appeal because it was
submitted to the DHCF with his Request for Reconsideration. The
DHCF responds that it is inappropriate for us to consider Allen's
will as part of the record on review because it was never
introduced as evidence at Allen's formal administrative hearing.
A review of the record reveals that a copy of Allen's will
was first presented to the DHCF as an attachment to a letter from
Allen's counsel, dated June 3, 1991, requesting a transcript of
1. Under the Utah Administrative Code, "a $1,500 burial or
funeral fund exemption for each eligible household member" is
permitted only if these funds "are separately identified and not
commingled with other funds. They must be clearly designated so
that an outside observer can see that these funds are
specifically for the client's burial expense." Utah Code Admin.
P. R810-304«411(9)(e)(1) (1991).

on nooi-n*

Allen's administrative hearing. The DHCF did not receive the
will until June 10, 19912, after the hearing officer's
Recommended Decision, the DHCF's Final Agency Action and Order on
Review, and the DHCF's Response to Request for Reconsideration
had already been signed and dated. Because there is no
indication that Allen's will was ever included as evidence before
the DHCF, it is not properly a part of Allen's record on appeal.
However, even if we were to consider the general language in
Allen's will, the result would not be different. Allen clearly
and unequivocally testified the account was to pay for insurance
premiums, not burial expenses. Allen did not specify the account
as a burial fund on his original Medicaid application. During
his formal administrative hearing, Allen did not argue or present
any evidence indicating his savings account was designated for
burial expenses. In fact, when the hearing officer specifically
asked if the savings account might be a burial fund, Allen
replied that "we earned it last summer for our insurance
premiums, and they didn't go through, so we had this money for a
nest egg, you might say. You have to have a little bit of
something in case--.,t3 Therefore, considering only the savings

2. Allen argues the will "was submitted at a time when the
record was still open," pointing out that the letter to which the
will was attached was mailed on June 3, 1991. The letter,
nevertheless, clearly bears a "Received June 10, 1991" stamp.
3. Allen testified that, after the DHCF denied Medicaid
benefits, Allen, in fact, did not maintain the account as a
burial fund. The following exchange occurred at the
administrative hearing:
HEARING OFFICER: What did you do with the
$3,000 in February which you pulled out of
the savings account?
MR. ALLEN: Well, we paid bills that was
accrued during our heart attack deal here,
and transportation to and from.
HEARING OFFICER: So, that money was spent on
medical things?
MR. ALLEN: Bills again.
Contrary to his argument, Allen apparently neither
considered nor used the savings account as a fund "separately
identifiable" which was set aside "specifically" for burial
expenses.
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account for purposes of affirming on appeal4, Allen's savings
account alone surpassed the $3,000.00 Medicaid limit.
II.
A.

MEDICAID "SPEND DOWN11

An Overview of the Medicaid Program

Allen alternatively argues that he should have been
permitted to spend his assets on medical bills in order to
qualify for Medicaid. We look to both federal and Utah Medicaid
regulations to resolve this question.
In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program as Title
XIX of the Social Security Act.3 Medicaid is a cooperative
federal-state program providing federal funds to assist
individuals "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C, § 1396
(1992). States choosing to participate in this optional program
are reimbursed for a portion of their costs in providing medical
treatment to needy persons. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154,
156-57, 106 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1986); Weber Memorial Care Ctr,,
Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Health, 751 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
Participating states must develop a plan that complies with
all federal Medicaid regulations. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396; Atkins,
477 U.S. at 157, 106 S. Ct. at 2458; Weber Memorial, 751 P.2d at
832. Each state must also select a single agency "to administer
or to supervise the administration of the plan." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(5) (1992). In determining eligibility for its
program, a state must provide benefits to the "categorically
4. Allen also argues that his travel trailer, equipped with
oxygen, and his truck, both used to transport Allen and his wife
to a warmer climate during winter because of his wife's ill
health, should be excluded from Medicaid eligibility
consideration because they are exempt either as personal effects
or medical necessities. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411(4),
(5)(b) to (d) (1991). Furthermore, Allen asserts that, because
his wife requires the truck and travel trailer for health
reasons, neither vehicle is "available" to him, as contemplated
by federal statutory Medicaid requirements. See 42 U.S.C. S
1396a(a)(17)(B) (1992). We find it unnecessary to reach these
issues in view of our determination that Allen/s savings account
alone exceeded the Medicaid eligibility limit.
5. Pub. L. No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 42
U.S.C. SS 1396, et seq. (1992)).
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needy"6 but may provide benefits to the "medically needy"7 at its
discretion.8
B.

The Concept of "Spend Down" in Federal Medicaid Statutes

When a "medically needy" applicant's income or resources
exceed the applicable state's Medicaid eligibility limits, the
"spend down" rule may apply. Under this rule, the applicant may
be able to "spend down" excess income or assets, by applying them
to outstanding medical bills, to become eligible for Medicaid.
In determining whether the federal Medicaid program requires
states to adopt the "spend down" rule, courts have focused on the
following portion of the Medicaid statutes:
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must

(17) . • . include reasonable standards
• • . for determining eligibility for and the
extent of medical assistance under the plan
which (A) are consistent with the objectives
of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking
into account only such income and resources
as are . . . available to the applicant or
recipient . . . (C) provide for reasonable
evaluation of any such income or resources,
6.

See 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i).

7.

See 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii).

8. The United States Supreme Court explained this distinction in
Schweiker v. Hocran, 457 U.S. 569, 102 S. Ct. 2597 (1982):
Congress has differentiated between the
categorically needy—a class of aged, blind,
disabled, or dependent persons who have very
little income—and other persons with similar
characteristics who are self-supporting.
Members of the former class are automatically
entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter
class are not eligible unless a State elects
to provide benefits to the medically needy
and unless their income, after consideration
of medical expenses, is below state standards
of eligibility.
I£., 457 U.S. at 590, 102 S. Ct. at 2609.
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and (D) . . . provide for flexibility in the
application of such standards with respect to
income by taking into account . . . the costs
. . . incurred for medical care or for anv
other type of remedial care recognized under
State lav.
42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(17) (1992)(emphasis added).
recognize section 17(D) as the "income spend down
that state plans must permit a Medicaid applicant
or deplete excess income to comply with a state's
standards•9

Courts
rule," finding
to "spend down"
eligibility

The question in the present case, however, is whether the
federal Medicaid regulations also require states to allow an
applicant to "spend down" excess resources in the same manner.
Allen contends that the federal Medicaid program requires states
to implement "resource spend down" because it is necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the Medicaid program and is reasonable.
The DHCF responds that federal Medicaid regulations mandate
"income spend down" but merely permit states to incorporate
"resource spend down" within their plans at their discretion.

9. See, e.g., Atkins. 477 U.S. at 158, 106 S. Ct. at 2459 ("the
spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(17)" allows the
medically needy to spend down "the amount by which their income
exceeds" the eligibility level); Foley v. Coler, No. 83-C-4736,
1986 WL 20891 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 1986)("42 U.S.C.
§ I396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down");
Harriman v. Commissioner. No. 90-0046-B, 1990 WL 284515 (D. Me.
Nov. 9, 1990)(42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(17)(D) "specifically requires
the state to have an income spend-down rule"); Walter 0. Boswell
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Yavapai County. 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d
878, 881 (Ct. App. 1986)("Federal regulations implementing [42
U.S.C. S 1396a(17)] expressly require deduction of incurred
medical bills from income for purposes of determining
eligibility."); Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs.. 301 Ark.
285, 783 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1990)("Under the ^medically needy'
procedure, applicants are permitted to *spend down' their excess
income for medical expenses."); Haley v. Commissioner of Pub.
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985)(42 U.S.C.
S 1396a(a)(17) "provide[s] for application of the spend down
principle to income eligibility determinations"); Kempson v.
North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources. 100 N.C. App. 482, 397
S.E.2d 314, 316 (1990)(The "explicit reference to income [in 42
U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(17)(D)] has been interpreted by the courts to
mean that %income spend-down' is allowed by the statute."),
aff'd, 328 N.C. 722, 403 S.E.2d 279 (1991).

Courts considering the issue agree with the DHCF, finding
the express statutory mandate is limited to "income spend
down."'0 Courts conclude that federal Medicaid regulations
permit, but do not require, states to employ "resource spend
down."11 We agree and conclude "resource spend down" is not
mandated by federal law.

10. Legislative history accompanying section 1396a(a)(17) points
to only "income spend down" as a mandatory federal requirement.
See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943.
11. See, e.g., Foley. 1986 WL 20891 ("42 U.S.C.
S 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down but is
silent regarding resource spend-down . . . . Resource spend-down
is thus permitted, but not required, by the Medicaid statute and
regulations"); Harriman. 1990 WL 284515 ("The federal statute
specifically requires the state to have an income spend-down
rule. • • • But there is no similar requirement in the federal
statute for a resource spend-down rule."); Hession v. Illinois
Deot. of Pub. Aid. 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751, 757
(1989)("Simply stated, we perceive nothing in section
1396a(a)(17) which precludes a State that participates in the
Medicaid program from using the resource spend down methodology
if it chooses to do so."); Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Pub, Aid.
163 111. App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987)("section
1396a(a)(17) of the Act permits a state plan to utilize resource
spend down in determining an applicant's eligibility for medical
assistance benefits"), aff'd. 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751
(1989); Harriman v. Commissioner. 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 (Me.
1991)(court adopts prior holding of district court in this case
that federal Medicaid statute "only permits, and does not
require, a state to use an asset spend-down"); Bemowski v.
Department of Pub. Welfare. 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582 A.2d 103, 106
(1990)(the provision of medical benefits "to the medically needy
by participating States is optional and may be excluded entirely
from a Stated Medicaid program").
But see Ramsey. 783 S.W.2d at 364 (court finds "no authority
in any category for a *spend-down' of excess resources that is
similar or identical to the expressly authorized *spend-down' of
excess income"); Kempson. 397 S.E.2d at 317 (court stops short of
holding "resource spend down" discretionary, stating that,
although "S 1396a(a)(17)(D) only mentions income in instructing
states to provide flexibility in their program application
standards, we note that S 1396(a)(17)(C) instructs that a state's
plan must *provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income
or resources'").

C.

Utah's Medicaid Program

Since Utah may implement f,resource spend down" at its
discretion, we must determine whether the Utah Medicaid plan has,
in fact, adopted "resource spend down11 in determining Medicaid
eligibility. Utah courts have never addressed Medicaid "spend
down" issues.
Utah chose to participate in the Medicaid program with the
adoption of the Medical Assistance Act in 1981. *2 Utah has
complied with federal requirements by creating a state plan13,
which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and designating the DHCF as the agency responsible for
Medicaid administration.14 Utah's statutes describe the DHCF's
responsibilities, in pertinent part, as follows:
[T]he division is responsible for the
effective and impartial administration of ,
this chapter in an efficient, economical
manner. The division shall establish, on a
statewide basis, a program to safeguard
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of
Medicaid services, excessive payments, and
unnecessary or inappropriate hospital
admissions or lengths of stay.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989).

12.

See Utah Code Ann. SS 26-18-1 to -11 (1989 and Supp. 1991).

13. See Utah Code Admin. P. RR455-1 to -48 (1991). Utah has
elected to provide assistance to the "medically needy." See Utah
Code Admin. P. R455-1-17 and R455-1-20 (1991). Assets Utah has
designated as exempt from Medicaid eligibility determination,
including the burial fund discussed earlier, are listed at Utah
Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991).
14. "[T]he Division of Health Care Financing . • . shall be
responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the
Medicaid program . . . in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and applicable federal law." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1
(1989)(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. S 26-18-3(1)
(Supp. 1991)("The department shall be the single state agency
responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in
connection with the United States Department of Health and Human
Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security
Act.")(emphasis added).

(2) The department shall develop implementing
policy in conformity with this chapter, the
requirements of Title XIX. and applicable
federal regulations.
Utah Code Ann. S 26-18-3 (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added).
The department may develop standards and
administer policies relating to eligibility
under the Medicaid program.
Utah Code Ann. S 26-18-4(1) (1989).
Allen points to no Medicaid statute, regulation, or rule
indicating that the Utah legislature has adopted "resource spend
down" in determining Medicaid eligibility. Rather, Allen posits
a more delicate argument which goes beyond literal statutory
language. Specifically, Allen contends that Utah will not be
following the federal requirement to use "reasonable standards••
in determining Medicaid eligibility unless it applies "resource
spend down."
Furthermore, Allen observes that Utah's Medicaid plan
designates certain assets as exempt in determining eligibility
for the "medically needy."15 Allen, thus, argues that Utah has
tacitly adopted a policy of allowing "medically needy" Medicaid
applicants to maintain a level of income and resources for the
necessities of life while still qualifying for Medicaid.
In support of these claims, Allen cites cases from other
jurisdictions which, he argues, require "resource spend down"
because, like Utah, they exempt certain assets from Medicaid
eligibility determination. We read these cases differently.
Courts in these jurisdictions have found a state mandate for
"resource spend down" based on a specific legislative directive
within their Medicaid plans, not just on the practice of allowing
exemptions.
In Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare. 394 Mass. 466,
476 N.E.2d 572 (1985), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts closely examined both federal and its own state
Medicaid laws to determine if "resource spend down" was mandated
or simply permitted. The court, first, determined that, although
the federal statutes did not require "resource spend down," it
was a reasonable method of calculating resources and "consistent
with the goals of Title XIX." I£., 476 N.E.2d at 578.
Therefore, the court concluded that it "must determine
15.

See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991).

independently whether the Legislature intended to require the use
of a resource spend down." Id. at 579. The court found a
statute "explicitly applfying] a resource spend down/1 id. n.9,
as evidence of "the legislature's determination to ensure an
individual's retention of a certain level of resources." Id. at
579. The court, thus, held that the Massachusetts Medicaid plan
required "resource spend down."
The Supreme Court of Illinois performed an analysis similar
to that of the Haley court in Hession v. Illinois Department of
Public Aid. 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989).

After

concluding that the federal Medicaid statutes permit, but do not
require, "resource spend down," the court turned its attention to
the Illinois Medicaid plan. The court recognized that the plan
included a provision whereby $1,500 in assets is exempt from
Medicaid eligibility determination. However, the court, relying
upon a specific Illinois statute, also stated: "In establishing
an assistance program for these individuals, the legislature has
noted that it is of special importance that their incentives for
continued independence be maintained and that their limited
resources be preserved." Id., 544 N.E.2d at 757 (citing 111.
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 5-1). Based on this clear
manifestation of legislative intent, the court held that the
Illinois Medicaid plan required "resource spend down."
Utah does not have such a saving, "resource spend down"
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of policy
expressing a desire to preserve the resources of potential
beneficiaries.16 Utah's statutes, particularly those outlining
16.

In fact, one commentator states:
It is not only conceivable, but a fact that
some unprepared applicants' assets are
reduced beyond the poverty level to
bankruptcy because medical bills in that
month exceed those resources which the
applicant cannot preserve under the Utah
Exemptions Act. It [is] to the applicant's
advantage to put forth any plausible argument
that a particular value should be counted as
income rather than asset, if the reverse
would result in excess assets. Excess assets
mean a denial of Medicaid eligibility; excess
income means that the applicant will be
required to shoulder more of [his or] her
health care costs for that month.
Ken Bresin, Utah's Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility
Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp. L. 1, 9 (1988)
(emphasis added)(footnote omitted).

the DHCF's authority17, seem to evince a legislative concern for
economy and efficiency in the Medicaid program# not the
preservation of applicants' assets. Jurisdictions requiring
"resource spend down,11 on the contrary, appear concerned about
preserving the limited assets of Medicaid applicants.
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot say it was
unreasonable for the DHCF to choose not to adopt "resource spend
down11 in an otherwise completely optional state benefit plan.
The expressed legislative concern is for economy and efficiency
in implementing a Medicaid program, and we cannot see how this
line-drawing offends the legislative delegation of power.
Utah's statutory scheme is more similar to that of Maine,
recently reviewed in Harriman v. Commissioner. 595 A.2d 1053 (Me.
1991). In Harriman. the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
recognized that its state plan does not include "resource spend
down." "If the assets of applicants exceed the specified dollar
limit, they are ineligible for assistance under the medically
needy program, regardless of the amount of their medical
expenses." Id. at 1056. Noting that "[t]he overall effect was
to restrict as much as possible the number of eligible Medicaid
recipients," the court stated: "For whatever reason—whether to
achieve cost containment or to comply only with the federal
mandate or through simple oversight—the legislature stopped
short of enacting an asset spend-down." !£. at 1057 (footnote
omitted).
We, therefore, conclude there is nothing in the Utah
Medicaid plan or its regulations that requires the utilization of
"resource spend down."u Allen had $3,029.86 in his savings
17.

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) quoted above.

18. We agree with most courts which have considered the issue
and believe the adoption of "resource spend down" is good public
policy. See e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 (a state resource spenddown provision furthers the general purpose of the Medicaid
program); Harriman, 1990 WL 284515 ("Clearly, if the goal of
Medicaid is to assist individuals who are medically needy—
defined as having insufficient income or resources to meet the
cost of necessary medical services—the sensible solution is the
spend-down rule."); Hession, 516 N.E.2d at 823 (a state's
adoption of resource spend down "would be in conformity with the
purpose and spirit of the Act"); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 318 ("Our
review of the case law reveals a pattern where Medicaid
applicants are blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply
because it is so illogical. Applicants who otherwise qualify are
(continued...)
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account at the time he applied for Medicaid. The DHCF, thus,
correctly determined he was ineligible for Medicaid benefits as
Utah has not adopted a "resource spend down" system.

Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in
part):
I concur with part I of the main opinion and dissent from
part II.
Whether a "medically needy" applicant may have been eligible
for Medicaid by spending down his or her assets is a policy
decision delegated in Utah to DHCF by Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1)
(1989). We review for reasonableness an agency's policy based on
a legislative grant of discretion to interpret a statute. See
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d
581 (Utah 1991).'

18.(...continued)
denied coverage because they have several hundred dollars above
the reserve asset limit while at the same time they are liable
for tens of thousands of dollars worth of medical bills.").
Nevertheless, a determination of the eligibility criteria
for Medicaid benefits is not one for the courts to make.
1. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of Utah Code
Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989) as an expression of intent to limit
coverage. The Legislature's concern for economy and efficiency
in the administration of the program simply does not have any
logical relationship to the intended coverage of the program.
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I do not believe the policy adopted by DHCF is reasonable
since eligibility is determined by when the medically needy
applicant applies for benefits. Under DHCF's policy, the
applicant who is savvy enough to spend down his or her assets
before applying for medicaid would be eligible, while the
applicant who applies for benefits before spending down is not
eligible. Because that agency policy is not reasonable, I would
allow Allen to spend down his assets before his eligibility is
determined.
I would therefore reverse and remand the case for further
proceedings.

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
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Federnl medical assistance percentage to 105 percent of the Federal
*hare of medical expenditures for 1965 will obviate certain inequities
in the \jirious formulas and will enable a few States which might not
otherwise do so to receive some additional Federal funds as an incentive for an improved program.
Provisions relating to the availability of Federal sharing in the cost
of medical assistance for persons C>5 years of age or older who are
patients in mental or tuberculosis hospitals specify that the States will
receive additional Federal funds only to the extent that a showing is
made to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the additional funds
being received are being used to extend and improve the mental health
program of the States. Comparable provisions appear in title II, part
l\ of the bill, and are explained more fully in that part of this report
relntingtotitle II.
The provisions of title IV, section 405 of the bill, described elsewhere in this report are designed to assure that the additional Federal
funds which are to accrue to the States under the operation of the
formula described above, shall l>e used directly in the public assistance
program and may not be withdrawn from the program by the States.
The bill sets forth provisions comparable to those which are in other
of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act describing
the procedure by which the State submits its estimates of the funds it
will need and receives payments under its approved plan, and the
procedures to be followed in the event it should become necessary to
question the continued receipt of Federal funds under the new title.
There is also a new provision limiting payments made under
the new title toAStates making a satisfactory showing of efForts
toward broadening the scope of care ami services made available under
the plan. This showing must be such that the Secretary is reasonably convinced the program of medical assistance will have such
liberalized eligibility requirements and comprehensive care and services, including needed social services to achieve independence or setfcare that by July 1, 1075, assistance and services needed will be available to substantially all individuals who meet the State's eligibility
standards with respect to income and resources. This provision wn«
included in order to encourage the continued development in the States
of a broadened and more liberalized medical assistance program so
that all persons who meet the State's test of need, whose own resources,
and the resources available to them under other programs for medical
care, including those established for Federal matching under this bill,
are insufficient, will receive the medical care which they need by 1075.
(h ) M isrcHi iwovx pror h icm M
Title X I X would under the provisions'^ ynur rnnmnlhM* bill Iteconif
effective January 1, 10(U>. No payments may be made to a State under
title I, IV, X , X I V , or X V I with respect to aid or assistance in the
form of medical or other types of remedial care for any period for
which such State receives payment under title X I X or for any |>eriod
after June W), 10C>7. Thus, under the provisions of your committee bill,
a State is permitted to implement title X I X at any time it wishes
commencing January 1, 19C>f>, but must do so by July 1, 1007, if it
wishes to receive Federal participation in vendor payments for medical care. When a title X I X plan has gone into ri\vv\ pursuant to the
bill, all vendor medical payments made on or after the effective date

_-
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(nnd administrative costs on or after the effective date, which are
related to vendor medical payments) will IM» accounted for under title
X I X , nnd not under the of her titles.
The hill also makes technical nnd conforming amendments.
(/) Cost of msdical a^nistance
As the accompanying table shows, if all States took full advantage
of provisions of the proposed title X I X , the additional Federal participation would amount to $238 million. However, because all States
cannot he expected to act immediately to establish programs under the
new title ana because of provisions in the bill which permit States to
receive the additional funds only to the extent that they increase their
total expenditures, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
estimates that additional Federal costs in the first year of operation
will not exceed $200 million. Since the new title woidd be effective
only for the last (» months of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1060, expendituies in that fiscal year are not expected to exceed $100 million.
Public a**i*tancc: Increased Federal fund8 available for medical payment*
under title XIX x
fin thousands of dollar*)

Missouri
Montana..
Nebraska .
Nevada
Now Hampshire
N e w 'entry
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina."
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma..
Oregon
r-onnayvlanla" ' "
Rhode Inland
South Carolina "
Bouth Dakota """
Tennessee
Texas.
Utah_._.*\~~
Vermont
Virginia.
""
Washington... '
w
r f s t Virginia... ~
Wisconsin..
Wyoming
~.lll~_

Alabama

*!••*•.;;;
**1«ona_.

Arkansai"
CaWurnla
Coiormdo.:
Connecticut

£*•*»*- —

{ £ * * * of Columbia.
0«nri« ";
Havall.
Mabo

1
••**!on expenditures for vendor medical payment* from State and loeal funds for all programs combined
> January 1064. 1/ Htate and local expenditures were reduced, the Federal expenditure would l>e cor
napnfidlngl) lower, while Increases In Alafe and locul exi»endltures would also result In Increases in the

H. CHILD HEALTH AMENDMENTS
1. S U M M A R Y

OF COMMITTEE

ACTION

Your committee he lie yes that the proposals embodied in part 1, title
IIof its bill will help to improve the health care of many low-income
jrwehool and school a^e children and youth.
Your committee's hi 11 won hi—
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under the age of 21—whether or not they are attending school
or taking a program of vocational training—who would otherwise he within the scope of eligibility of a dependent child as
defined under title IV of the Social Security Act. This provision was
included in order to provide assurance that children under the age
of 21 will have their medical needs met if they are either a member
of a family receiving a money payment under title I V of the Social
Security Act or a member of a family which has the need and other
characteristics described under title I V .
The Secretary woidd be prohibited from approving any plan which
imposed a residence or citizenship requirement that ^oes beyond those
now in title I and title X V I as they relate to the medical assistance for
the aged program. In addition, the Secretary is directed not to approve any State plan for medical assistance if he linds that the approval and operation of the plan will result in a reduction in the level
of aid or assistance provided for eligible individuals under title 1, IV,
X , X I V , or X V I . An exception is provided allowing States to reduce
such aid to the extent that assistance now provided under titles I, I V ,
I X , X I V , and X V I is to be provided under title X I X . The reason
your committee recommends the inclusion of this provision is to make
certain that States do not divert funds from the provision of basic
maintenance to the provision of medical care. If the Secretary should
find that his approval of a title X I X plan would result in a reduction
of aid or assistance for persons receiving basic maintenance under the
public assistance titles of the Social Security Act (except as specified
alnwe) he may not approve such a plan under title X I X . Your committee recognizes the need and urgency for States to maintain, if not
improve, the level of basic maintenance provided for needy people
under the public assistance programs. The provision is intended to
prevent any unwarranted diversion of funds from basic maintenance
to medical cure.
((/) Financing of medical axnixtaiice
Your committee bill provides for payments under title X I X , beginning with the quarter commencing January 1, 19(>f>. States with approved plans would receive an amount equal to the Federal medical assistance percentage of the total amount expended during a quarter as
medical assistance under the State plan. This percentage is described
below. The amount expended as medical assistance for purposes of
Federal matching include expenditures for premiums under part B
of title X V I I I for individuals who are recipients of money payments
under one of the Federal-State public assistance programs. This
may include payment of premiums for those individuals covered under
agreements between the State and the Secretary, and also for other
money pavment recipients who are eligible under part B of title
X V I I I . In addition, expenditures for other insurance premiums for
medical or any other type of remedial care or the cost thereof are
malehable as medical assistance. (The definitions of assistance in the
public assistance titles of the Social Security Act would also be
amended to include similar provisions.)
In addition, the States are to receive 75 percent of so much of
the sums expended during the quarter as found necessary by the Secretary for the proper and efficient administration of the State plan as are
attributable to the compensation of skilled professional medical person-
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nel and staff directly supporting such personnel of the State agency or
the local agency administering the plan in the political subdiv ision.
This provision was included in order to provide adequate Federal
financial support for the stalling of the Slate and local public welfare
departments by such skilled professional medical personnel and si nil
directly supporting such personnel as may be necessary. Such statf
will include physicians, medical administrators, medical social work
personnel, and other specialized personnel necessary to assure an adequate number of persons to do a quality job as well us the clerical statf,
directly associated with the professional statf, and the necessary travel
and other closely related expenditures. It is very likely that some people in need of medical assistance will need related social services in
order to receive the full benefits of the program. Under the 196^ public welfare amendments, States may receive 75 percent Federal sharing
in the cost of services provided to persons receiving aid under titles I,
IV, X, X I V , and X V I to former recipients of assistance under these
titles and persons likely to become recipients of aid under these titles.
Thus adequate provisions are already available to help the States finance the provision of social services to those receiving medical assistance or the cost of training stuff to provide such services and no such
provision is included in the new title.
In addition, the States ane to receive one-half of all other expenditures found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and efficient, administ rat ion of the State plan.
The Federal medical assistance percentage is determined in accordance with a formula described in the bill. It provides that a State
whose per capita income is equal to the national average per capita
income shall receive 55 percent Federal matching. States whose per
capita income is 1H»IOW the national average shall receive correspondingly higher proportions of Federal funds up to a maximum of 83
percent. States whose per capita income is above the national average
shall receive correspondingly lower percentages but not less than 50
percent. The medical assistance percentages for Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and Guam shall be 55 percent. The method of determining the Federal medical assistance percentage and the frequency
of its determination and promulgation are (after the initial promulgation for the period January 1, 19<>(>, to June 30,19(57) already specified
in the law.
There is a special provision for adjustment of the Federal medical
assistance percentage for any State which might not otherwise receive
full advantage from the title X I X formula. It is provided that
during the period from January 1, 1000, through June 30, 1909, the
Federal medical assistance percentage under title X I X for any State
ahull not be less than 105 percent of the Federal share of medical
cinenditures by the State during fiscal year 1905. The computation
iamade by determining the amount of Federal payments made to each
State for fiscal year 1905 under all of the public assistance titles, which
would not have been payable except for ine making of vendor medical
payments. This amount of Federal payments is compared with the
Mai amount of vendor medical expenditures under the public
•awstance plans (whether below or above the matching ceilings under
tfea Federal statutory formulas) to give the Federal share of medical
expenditures by the State during fiscal year 1965. The raising of the
tMM
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mittee bill, has l>ecn broadened so that snch an adjustment or recovery
would lie made only at a lime when there is no surviving child who is
under the age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled.
(e) Scope <ind dcfinif wn of medical xcwires
"Medical assistance' 1 is defined under the bill to mean payment of
all or part of the care and services for individuals who would if
needy, l>e dependent under title IV, except for section 400(a) ( 2 ) , and
are under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 400
(b) ( I ) w itli whom the child is living, or who are 05 years of age and
older, blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income
and resources are insuflirient to meet all their medical care costs.
The bill, as do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in
the cost of medical care provided up to *\ months before the month
in which the individual makes application for assistance. Thus, the
scope of the program includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and
dependent children as defined in State plans, but also children under
the age of 21 (and their caretaker relatives) who come within the scope
of title IV, except for need and age, even though they may not be
defined as eligible under a particular State plan.
Your committee bill contains a list of services, the first, (\ve of which
the States are required to include in their plans, if they elect to implement title X I X , and the remainder of winch are optional with the
States. The required services are:
Inpatient hospital services.
Outpatient hospital services
Other laboratory and X-ray servicer*.
Skilled nursing home servicers.
Physicians' services, whether furnished in the office, the patient's home, a hospital, or a skilled nursing home or elsewhere.
In the opinion of your committee, these are the most essential items
of service which should be included asrt.minimum if the medical assistance program is to be of significant help to the individual. These minimum items of service are to become effective July 1, 1907; until then,
the State plan must include—as now provided in titles I and X V I —
for some institutional and some noninstitutional services.
Other items of medical service which the States may, if they wish
include in their plans are:
Medical care, or any other type of remedial care recognized
under State law, furnished bv licensed practitioners within the
scope of their pract ice as defined by State law.
Home health care services.
Clinic service.
Private dut v nursing service.
Dental service.
Physical therapy and related services.
Prescribed drugs, dentures, prosthetic devices, and eyeglasses
prescribed by a physician skilled in diseases of the eye or by an
optometrist, whichever the individual may select.
Other diagnostic, screening, preventive, and rehabilitative
services.
Any other medical care, and any other ty|>e of remedial care
recognized under State law, specified by the Secretary.
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The States must pay the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services
for the number of days of care provided under the plan.
Among the items of medical services which the States may include
is medical care, or any other type of remedial care recognized under
State law, furnished by licensed practitioners within the scope of
their practice as defined by State law. Under this provision, a State
may if it wishes, include medical and remedial services provided by
osteopaths, chiropractors, optometrists and podiatrists, and Christian
Science practitioners, if such practitioners and services are licensed
by the State.
If a State chooses to provide eyeglasses as a service under the plan,
your committee believes that the individual recipient should be free
to select either a physician skilled in diseases of the eye or an optometristto provide these glasses. Many small communities do not have
qualified ophthalmologists but do have optometrists who are competent to provide, f}t^ or change eyeglasses.
In addition to the items specifically listed, the Secretary is authorized to define any other medical care or any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law which he believes might be provided by the
States and in which the Federal Government will participate
financially.
The State plan may not include any individual who is an inmate of
a public institution, except as a patient in a medical institution; nor
may it include any individual under the ace of 05 who is a patient
in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases.
Under title X I X , it will l>e possible for States to give medical assistance to persons 05 years of age and older who are in mental and
tuberculosis institutions and to otherwise eligible persons of any age
with a diagnosis of psychosis or tuberculosis and who are receiving
care in other medical institutions. Under the bill, if the plan includes
medical assistance for patients in institutions for mental diseases or
tuberculosis, various requirements are specified for inclusion in the
State plan with respect to these individuals and various other fiscal
and other provisions are included. These are identical with those included in title II, part 3 of the bill and are explained elsewhere in
this report.
Medical assistance provided under the bill may include payment for
care and services provided at any time within the month in which an
individual becomes eligible or ineligible for assistance, e.g., by attaining a specified age. This avoids the administrative inconvenience of
having to segregate bills by the day of the month on which care or services were provided and is consistent with the monthly pattern of benefits under the other public assistance titles.
(f) Other conditions for plan ap/rro val
Title X I X requires that the Secretary approve any plan which fulfills the plan requirements specified and described above and which
«loes not contain certain other conditions. Under these provisions, a
Shite plan may not include an age requirement of more than 05 years.
Effective Julv 1, 1!)07, States mav not. under the provisions of
your committee bill, exclude any individual who has not attained
the age of 21 and is, or would, except for the provisions of
Hection 400(a)(2) be a dependent child under title IV. Thus,
States will include within the scope of their plan all children
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that income may be set aside for the future needs of the children.
Other pertinent provisions for the disregard of income are found in
the Kconomic Opportunity Act and the Food Stamp Act of 11H>4.
Your committee has heard of hardships on certain individuals
by requiring them to provide support -and to pay for the medical care
needed by relatives. Youv committee believes it is proper to expect
spouses to support each other and parents to be held accountable for
the support or their minor children and their blind or permanently
and totally disabled children even though 421 years of age or older.
Such requirements for support may reasonably include the payment
by such relat ive, if able, for medical care, Beyond such degree of relationship, however, requirements imposed are often destructive and
harmful to the relationships among members of the family group.
Thus, States may not include in their plans provisions for requiring
contributions from relatives other than a spouse or the parent of a
minor child or children over 21 who are blind or permanently and
totally disabled. Any contributions actually made by relatives or
friends, or from other sources will l>e taken into account by the State
in determining whether the individual applying for medical assistance
is, in fact, in need of such assistance.
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the
weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program.
l T nder the current provisions of Federal law, some States have enacted programs which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual
w i111 an income just under the specified limit may qualify for all of
the aid provided under the State plan. Individuals, however, whose
income exceeds the limitation adopted bv the State are found ineligible
for the medical assistance provided under the State plan even though
the excess of the individual's income may be small when compared
with the cost of the medical care needed. In order that all State?
shall be flexible in the consideration of an individual's income, your
commit tee bill requires that the States standards for determining eligibility for and extent of medical assistance shall take into account, except (o the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the cost—whether in the
form of insurance'premiums or otherwise—incurred for medical care
or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law. Thus,
before an individual is found ineligible for all or part of the cost of his
medical needs, the State must be sure that the income of the individual
has been measured in terms of both the State's allowance for basic
maintenance needs and the cost of the medical care he requires.
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the individual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that
amount. In no event, however, with respect to either this provision
or that described below with reference to the use of deductibles for
certain items of medical service, may a State require the use of income
or resources which would bring the individual Ixdow the test of eligibility under the State plan. If the test of eligibilitv should be
$2,000 a year, an individual with income in excess of that amount
shall not l>e required to use his income to the extent he has remaining
less than $2,000. T h i s action would reduce the individual below the
level determined by the State as necessary for his maintenance.
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or
limit the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similiar charge,
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nor of any enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan.
No deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with
respect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This
provision is related to another provision in the bill which requires
States to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital services provided
under the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that
the hospital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full
under the provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered
and that States may not expect or require the individual to use his
income or resources (except such income as exceeds the State's maintenance level) toward that bill. Tl»*» reasonable cost of inpatient
hospital j-ervices shall be determined in accordance with standards
approved by the Secretary and included in the State plan.
JFor any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan,
a charge of any kind may l>e imposed only if the State so chooses, and
the charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his
income and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to
inpatient hospital services. The Secretary is given authority to issue
standards under this provision^ which it is expected will protect the
income and resources an individual has which are necessary for his
nonmedical needs.
The hospital insurance Iwmefit program included under other provisions of the bill provides for a deductible which must be paid in
connection with the individual's claim for hospitalization l>enefits.
Your committee is concerned that hospitalization be readily available
to needy iwrsons and that the necessity of their paying deductibles
shall not be a hardship on them or a factor which may prevent their
receiving the hospitalization they need. For this reason, your committee's bill provides that the States make provisions, for individuals
C5 years or older, of the cost of any deduct b*e imposed with respect
to individuals under the program established by the hospital insurance provisions of the bill.
A State medical assistance plan may provide for the payment in
full of any deductibles or cost sharing under the insurance program
established by pail B of title X V I I I . In the event, however, the
State plan provides for the individual to assume a portion of such
costs, such portion shall be determined on a basis reasonably related
to the individual's income or income and resources and in conformity
with standards issued by the Secretary. The Secretary is authorized
to issue standards—under this provision which, it is expected, will
protect the income and resources of the individual needed for his
maintenance—to guide the States. Such standards shall protect the
income and lvsouives of the individual needed for his maintenance and
provide assurance that the responsibility placed on individuals to
share in the cost shall not bean undue burden on them.
Titles J and X V I authorizing the medical assistance for the aged
program now provide that the States may not impose a lien against
the property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical
assistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning
incorrect payments, and prohibits adjustment or recovery for amounts
correctly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death
and that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under your com-
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uals. In such ca<=c, the portion of the title XTX plnn administered or
supervised hy each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan.
Current provisions of law requiring States to nave an agency or
agencies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for
the types of institutions included under the State plan have l>een continued under the bill. Your committee, expects that these provisions
will be used to bring about progressive improvement in the level of
institutional care and services provided to recipients of medical assistance. Standards of care in many medical institutions are not now
at a satisfactory level and it is expected that current standards applicable to medical institutions will l>e improved by the State's standardsetting agency and that these standards will be enforced by the appropriate State body.
Under provisions of your committee bill, the State plnn must include
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of
administration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision
was included in order to provide some assurance that the States will
not use unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which
have the etTcet of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on
eligibility for medical assistance or that the States will not administer
the provisions for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the quality of the care to be provided. Your committee
expects that under this provision, the States will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive policies and methods of investigation and
that they will develop such procedures as will assure the most effective
working relationships with medical facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service in order to encourage their full cooperation
and participation in the provision of services under the State plan.
(r) FligibiJity fo medical assistance
Under your committee bill, a State plan to be approved must include provision for medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid
or assistance under State plans approved under titles I, TV, X , XTV,
and X VT. These people are the most needv in the country and it is appropriate for med'cal care costs to be met, first, for these people. Thus,
under the provisions of the bill, these people will have the first call
upon the resources of the States to provide medical care. Tt is only
if this group is provided for that States may include medical assistance
to the loss needy than those who would l>e eligible for aid under the
various other categories of public assistance.
. Under vour committee bill, medical assistance made available to persons receiving assistance under title I, IV, X , X I V , or X V I must not
be less in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons
receiving aid under any other of tho*e titles. In other words, the
amount, duration, and scope of medical assistance made available
must be the same for all such persons. This will assure comparable
treatment for all of the needy aided under the federally aided categories of assistance and will eliminate some of the unevenness which
has been apparent in the treatment of the medical needs of various
groups of the needy.
The bill provides furthermore that as States extend their programs
to include assistance for persons who come within the various cate-
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gories of assistance except that their income and resources are s
cienttomeet their needs for maintenance, the medical assistance gi
such individuals shall not be greater in amount, duration, or S(
than that made available for persons who are recipients of money ]
ments. This was included in order to make sure that the most no
in a State receive no less comprehensive care than those who are
as needy.
Under the bill, if a State, extends the program to those persons
receiving assistance under titles I, IV, X , X I V , and X V I , the de
mination of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is compari
as among th«* people who, except for their income and resources, wc
be recipients of money for maintenance under the other public as?
ance programs. Thus, the income and resources limitation for
aged must bo comparable to that set for the disabled and blind
must also have a comparability for that set for families with child
who, excent for their income and resources, would be eligible
AFDC. The scope, amount, and duration of medical assistance av
able to each of these groups must be equal.
(d) Determ ination of need for medical assistance
Your committee bill would make more specific a provision now
the law that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid tin
the plan, States must use reasonable standards consistent with
objectives of the titles. Although States mav set a limitation on
come and resources which indi\ iduals may hold and be eligible for r
they must do so by maintaining a comparability among the vari<
categorical groups of needy people. Whatever level of finaw
eligibility the State determines to be that which is applicable for
eligibility of the needy <aged, for example, shall be comparable to tl
which the State sets to determine the eligibility for the needy blind a
disabled; and must also have a comparability to the standards u«
fo determine the eligibility of those who are to receive medical assj
nnce as needy children and the parents or other relatives oaring
them.
Another provision is included that requires States to take into i
count only such income and resources a,s (determined in accordar
with standards prescribed by the Secretary) are actuallv availal
to the applicant or recipient and as would not be disregarded (or
aside for future needs) in determining the eligibility for and t
amount of the aid or assistance in the form of money pavments i
any such applicant or recipient under the title of the Social Secnr
Act most appropriately applicable to him. Tncome and resources tak
into icronnt, furthermore, must be reasonablv evaluated by the Stat
These provisions are designed so that the States will not assume t
availability of income which mav not, in fact, be available or ov<
evaluate income and resources which are available Example^ of i
come assumed include support orders from absent fathers, which ha
not been paid or contributions from relatives which are not in reali
received by the needy individual. The provisions also are designed
assure that whatever is applicable under titles T, IV, X, X I V , ai
XVI for the disregarding of income or for set ting aside of income si if
ateo he applicable in evaluating the income of the individual who
applying for medical assistance under title X I X . Titles T and X no
provide for the disregarding of certain income and title I V provid
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have enough income for their basic maintenance but not enough for
medical rare costs. This program has grown to the point where 40
States and 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and 227,000 aged
were aided in December 19<>4. Furthermore, medical care as a part of
the cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the
years until, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments
for some items of medical care for at least some of the needy.
Your committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under
which States operate their medical assistance programs so as to make
medical services for the needy more generally available. T o accomplish this objective, your committee bill would establish, effective
January 1, 19G6, a new title in the Social Security Act—"Title X I X :
frrants to the States for Medical Assistance Programs." After an
interim period ending June 30, 1967, all vendor payments for medical
rare, including medical assistance for the aged, would be administered
under the provisions of the new title. Dntil June 30,1067, States might
continue operating under the vendor payment provisions of title 1
(old-age assistance and medical assistance for the aged), title I V (aid
to families with dependent children), title X (aid to the blind), title
X I V (aid to the permanently and totally disabled), and title X V I
(the combined adult program), or if they wish, they might move as
early as January 1, 1966, to the new title. Programs of vendor payments for medical care will continue, as now, to be optional with the
States.
(b) State plan
requirements
(I) Standard
provisions
The provisions in the proposed title X I X contain a number of requirements for State plans which are either identical to the existing
provisions of law or are merely conforming changes. These are:
That a plan shall lie in effect in all political subdivisions of the
State.
That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing
for any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted
upon with reasonable promptness.
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary
mav from time to time require.
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict, the use
or disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients
to purposes directly connected with the administration of the
plan.
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such
assistance shall be furnished witn reasonable promptness.
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall
be an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the
eye or by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select.
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who
are residents of the State but who are absent therefrom.
(2) Additions
to standard
provision*
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above,
your committee bill contains several other plan requirements which
are either new or changed over provisions currently in the law.
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The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the
State equal to not less than 10 percent of the non-Federal share of the
expenditures under the plan and that effective July 1, U>70, the financial
participation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This
provision was included to make certain.that the lack of availability of
local funds for financing of any part of the program not affect the
amount, scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration
set by the State. Prior to the 1970 date, your committee will be w i 11—
ing to consider other legislative alternatives to the provisions making
the entire non-Federal share a responsibility of the State so long as
these alternatives, in maintaining the concept of local participation,
assure a consistent statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy.
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance
titles of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such
methods of administration as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and efficient operat ion of the plan, with the addit ion
of the requirement that such methods must include provisions for
utilization of professional medical personnel in the administration of
the plan. It is important that State utilize a sufficient number of
trained and qualified personnel in the administration of the program
including both medical and other professional staff.
Your committee bill provides that the State or local agency administering the State plan under title X I X shall be the same agency which
is currently administering either title I (old-age assistance) or
that part of title X V I (assistance for the aged, blind, ami the disabled,
and medical assistance for the aged) relating to the aged. Where the
program relating to the aged is State-supervised, the same State agency
shall supervise the administration of title X I X . This provision was
included because of the U(HH\ to have the same agency which is most
familiar with the administration of assistance (including medical care)
to various groups of needy or nearly needy people also administer the
medical assistance program. This is an agency with long experience
and skill in determination of eligibility. Responsibility can be arranged by a welfare agency for actual provision of medical care by or
through a health agency under suitable contractual relationships as
some States have done under the MA A program.
Moreover, your committee recognizes that there are other Slate agencies with responsibilities for the provision of medical care or for various types of rehabilitative services in the States. In order to make
certain that there is no duplication of effort and that maximum utilization will be made of the resources available from such other agencies,
your committee bill provides that the State's plan must include provisions for entering into cooperative arrangements with State agencies
responsible for administering or supervising the administration of
health services and vocational rehabilitation services in the States.
Your committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1005, and
on the date a State submits its title X I X plan, the State agency administering or supervising the administration of the State plan for the
blind under title X or title X V I of the Social Security Act is dliferent
from the State agency administering or supervising* the administration
of the plan relating to the aged under title I or title X V I , such blind
agency may be designated to administer or supervise* the administration of the port ion of the title X I X plan which relates to blind individ-
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along with the matching Government contribution, have utilized
data from the experience under the Federal Kmployees Health Benefits
Act of 1959 for persons aged 65 and over, the experience under the
Connecticut 05 program, and various information obtained by the N a tional Health Survey conducted on a periodic basis by the Public
Health Service of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
The cost estimates have been made on a conservative basis—as
seems essential in a newly established program of this typo for persons
aged 65 and over, most of whom have not previously had such insurance. It is believed that the $6 total per capita income of the system
(from the premiums'of the individuals and the matching Government
contributions) will be fully adequate to meet the costs of administration and the benefit payments incurred, as well as to build up a relatively small contingency reserve. It is believed that there will be no
need to draw upon the advance appropriation that is provided from
general revenues.
Two cost estimates have been presented in regard to the possible
per capita cost. Under the low-cost estimate, the benefits and
administrative expenses will, on an accrual basis, represent about 75
percent of the contribution income, whereas under the high-cost
estimate, the corresponding ratio will be almost 100 percent.
In an individual voluntary-election program such as this, it is
impossible to predict accurately in advance what proportion of those
eligible to participate in the program will actually do so. Accordingly,
the cost estimates have been presented on two bases—an assumed 80
percent participation and an assumed 95 percent participation. Both
of these estimates assume that virtually all State public assistance
agencies will "buy in" for their old-age assistance recipients.
(2) Short-range operatwnx of supplementary
health insurance
benefits trust jund
Table D presents estimates of the operation of the supplementary
health insurance benefits trust fund for the first 2 years of operation,
1966 67. As indicated previously, four sets of estimates are given,
under different assumptions as to low-cost and high-cost estimates
and low and high participation. A significant balance in the trust
fund develops in 1966, because of the lag involved in making benefit
payments, since there are the factors of administrative processing and
of the deductible that must be met first before any benefits are payable. In this respect, it will be noted that the income from premium
payments by individuals will go into the trust fund beginning in the
early part of July 1966, and the matching Government contributions
will go into the trust fund simultaneously.
Under the low-cost estimates, the trust fund is estimated to have a
balance of about $300 to $350 million at the end of 1966, and between
$6(10 and $700 million at the end of 1967. On the other hand, under
the high-cost estimates, the balance in the trust fund at the end of
1966 will be between $200 and $250 million, and will remain at substantially this level during 19.67.

TABLE T).—Estimated progress of supplementary
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health insurance benefits trust fw

(In millions]
Contributions
Benefit
payments

Calendar year

Participants

Government

Administrative expenses

Interest
on fund

Halanco
fund at c
of year

Low cost estimate, 80-percent participation
10661
I9J7

. . ...

$275
560

$275
660

$195
765

$6
15

$

$5
20

$.

$5
10

$'-

$100

$5

no

in

$2
2

$65
76

i

Low-cost estimate, 05-percent participation
1966»
1967

$.125
66T>

$325
665

$230
905

$80
90

High-cost estimate, RO-percent participation
I96fli
1967

$275
600

$275
660

$260
1,025

$86
95

High-cost estimate, 95-percent participation
19661
1007

$326
665

$325
665

$310
1,220

• Contributions would be collected only during the last 6 months of 1966, and benefit payments won
likewise lw» payable only during that period Administrative eipcnses shown Include both those for t
full year 1966 and such ex|>en.ses as Incurred In 1965
NOTE —Not included aliove Is the advance appropriation from general revenues that Is to provide a cc
Ungency reserve during fiscal year 1966-67 (to be used only If needed and to be repayable).
6. IMPROVEMENT

A N P EXTENSION

OF KERR-MILLS

TROGRAM

(a) Background
The provision of medical rare for the needy has long been a responsi
bility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent year?
the Federal Government lias assisted the States and localities in carry
ing this responsibility by participating in the cost of thecatv provider
Under the original Social Security Act, it was possible for the State?
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they coul
buy the medical care they needed. Since 1DM), the Social Securit
Act has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provide
in behalf of the needy aged, blind, disabled, and dependent childrenthe so-called vendor payments. This method of providing care ha
proved popular with the suppliers of medical care, the agencies admin
isteringtlie prograirift, and the recipients themselves.
Several times since 11)50, the Congress has lilternlized the provision
of law under which the States administer t he State-Federal program o
medical assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment wa
in 1{)(U) when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged progran
was authorized. This legislation oilers generous Federal matching b
enable the States to provide medical care in behalf of aged persons win

ADDENDUM C

FAMILY SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION
Per A, B, and D Medicaid, exclude cash payments
loofederal,state, or local government programs if
the purpose of the payment is so the client can pay for
pedical or social services. This includes payments for
national rehabilitation. Exclude these payments
^]j for one calendar month following receipt. Do not
gofuae this exemption with reimbursements for
pedie&l or social services; money received as reimtanement must be counted as a resource the first
aooth following receipt.

R810-304-431

1. Proceeds of a sales contract other than or in addition to a lump sum shall be exempt if applied to the
purchase of replacement property. The same conditions of time and commitment as for a lump sum apply (see Sec. 421.1).
2. If proceeds from the contract are not to be used
to replace property, consider the balance remaining
on the sales contract as an asset.
3. Availability (at any amount which would result
in excess assets) is a factor. This means that if the
balance remaining on a sales contract can be dis1810404-419. When to Deem Assets.
counted to an amount which (in conjunction with any
Spouses have a legal responsibility to financially other countable assets) exceeds the asset level, the
lopport one another. Parents have a legal responsi- client is ineligible.
bility tofinanciallysupport their children until they
Example:
tre emancipated*. Because of this legal responsibilAssume a single individual has no other countable
*j, assets from a spouse or parent are counted as assets, but has a balance remaining on a sales conmilable to the eligible spouse or child. This process tract of $5,000. We would ask a financial institution
» called deeming. Because the asset is available, in- or other knowledgeable source if a market exists to
clude it in the countable assets.
assign the balance remaining to a buyer for the one419.1 Non-Nursing Home Cases
person asset limit. If the market exists, then the balDeem only from spouse to spouse or parent to un- ance remaining on the sales contract would make the
aninripated child. Deem only among people who live client ineligible.
together.
421.3 Insurance Settlements for Destroyed Prop419.12 F and C Cases
erty
Do not deemfroma parent or spouse who gets SSI.
Exempt lump sum insurance payments for de419.2 Clients Who Are Residents of Medical Insti- stroyed property if the available money is used
tutions
within ninety days to replace the destroyed property,
Do not deem to a resident of a medical institution. and the destroyed property was exempt at the time of
However, there may be persons in medical institu- loss.
tions who are not treated as medical institution cases.
1. The District Director may grant an extension
Itee cases will be set up using policy for clients who
beyond ninety days, using Form 689, Policy Decision.
are not residents of medical institutions: deeming
miy apply. Examples are:
RS10-304-425. Income Producing Property.
1. F or C Cases — Persons who are temporarily
425.1 F And C Cases
living apart from their parents or children are not
When a client owns property and has the legal
considered residents of medical institutions.
right to sell it without interference, the property is
2. All Cases — Persons are not considered residents for the month they enter the medical institu- available and we will count it in determining eligibility.
tion
425.2 A. B and D Cases
419.3 All Cases
1. Exempt income producing property when:
Exemptions for deemed assets are applied based on
a.
The equity in the property is less than $6,000
the type of asset (home, burial funds, tribal funds,
certain lump sum payments etc.), and the category of and
b. The property produces a net annual return of at
assistance to which it is being applied. Emancipated:
least 6 percent of the equity.
A child is emancipated by:
Equity value more than $6,000 counts as an asset
1. turning 18 years old, or
only if the 6 percent net annual return is met. If it is
2 getting married, or
3. getting a court order which says that the child is not, then the entire equity amount shall count.
2. If the client has the legal right to sell his share
emancipated.
of the property, and if such equity is includable as an
R810-304-421. Lump Sum Payments — All Cases. asset, and this results in the asset level being exRemember that most lump sums count as income in ceeded, close the case or deny the application.
3. The actual availability (whether a market exists
the month they are received. Count as an asset any
balance which remains the month alter receipt. All to sell the property) is not a factor in counting the
SSA and SSI lump sums are exempt for 6 months property as an asset.
after receipt.
R810-304-431. Transfer of Excess Assets.
421.1 Lump Sum Received on Sales Contract
431.1 F and C Medicaid
1. Exempt lump sum payments received on a sales
Take no sanction on the transfer of any asset.
contract for the sale of an exempt home if the money
431.2 A, B, and D Medicaid — Clients Who Are
it committed to replacement of the property sold
within thirty days and the purchase is completed Not Residents of Medical Institutions
Take no sanction on the transfer of any asset if the
within ninety days.
a. If a period longer than ninety days is required to client is not a resident of a medical institution.
431.3 A, B, and D Medicaid — Clients Who Are
complete the actual purchase, the District Director
aay grant an extension in writing, using Form 689, Residents of Medical Institutions
431.31 Apply no sanction for the transfer of the
Micy Decision.
2. If the property is not replaced within 90 days following assets:
1. If the property was transferred prior to July 1,
tod no extension has been granted, consider the total
1988 and the property was transferred more than 24
Payment received as an asset.
421.2 Proceeds Other Than or In Addition to a months prior to the date of application. Also, apply no
sanction for the transfer of an asset which would have
Lump Sum

R810-304-411
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these types of contracts are merely promising these
items when needed (a plot, a casket, a marker, etc.)
and are considered to be a part of the contract or plan.
They are not evaluated separately. They are considered for exemption under Section 411, (9).
9. Burial/Funeral Fund — All Cases
Allow a $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption for
each eligible household member. Compute this burial
or funeral fund exemption as follows:
a. First, subtract the value of any irrevocable burial trust from the $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption. If the irrevocable burial trust is valued at
$1,500 or more, it will reduce the burial or funeral
fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go
on to steps b. and c. The amount of the irrevocable
burial trust which exceeds $1,500 is not counted as an
asset.
b. Second, for A, B and D categories only, reduce
the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption by
the total face value of any exempt whole life insurance policies. If the face value of these policies exceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption, it will reduce the burial or funeral fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go on to step c.
The amount of face value which exceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption level is not
counted as an asset. This step does not apply to F and
C categories as life insurance is already counted.
c. If after subtracting the value of the irrevocable
burial trusts and face value of exempt whole life insurance policies there is still a balance in the burial
or funeral fund exemption, reduce the remaining exemption level by the cash value of any burial contract, funeral plan, and/or funds set aside for burial.
d. In A, B, and D cases only, subtract the cash
value of non-exempt life insurance policies.
e. If these reductions result in an exemption
greater than $1,500 then the difference is to be added
to the other countable assets.
(1) Any interest which is accrued on an exempt
burial contract, funeral plan, or on funds set aside for
burial are exempt from consideration as an asset or
as income.
Funds set aside for burial: funds which are separately identified and not commingled with other
funds. They must be clearly designated so that an
outside observer can see that these funds are specifically for the client's burial expense.
(2) If a person ever removes the principle or interest from an exempt burial contract, funeral plan,
funds set aside for burial, or a life insurance policy
and uses the money for a purpose other than for their
burial expenses, the amount withdrawn from the account must be counted as income. The amount remaining in the fund is still exempt.
If a client has a previously unreported resource
which he claims is to be used for burial:
(a) and the resource is clearly designated as being
for burial, evaluate it for exemption back to when it
was either designated or intended for burial. However, the date cannot be before November 1,1982 and
cannot be any earlier than 2 years prior to the date of
application.
(b) and if the case is A, B, or D case and the resource is not clearly designated as being for burial, it
can be designated for burial retroactively back to the
first day of the month the client intended to set it
aside for burial. However, the date cannot be before
November 1, 1982 and cannot be any earlier than 2
years prior to the date of application.
10. Land or Accounts Held in Trust — All Cases
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Exclude ownership of beneficial interest in any
land or account which is held in trust by the United
States, a state, or in a tribal account.
11. Per Capita Tribal Payments
ExJude all per capita payments or any asset purchased with per capita payments made to a tribal
member by the Secretary of the Interior or the tribe
12. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act — All
Cases
Exclude shares received as payment under the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (Public Law
92-203).
13. Income Producing Property — A 3 , and D
Cases
Exclude income producing property from asset*
when the individual's equity in the property does not
exceed $6,000 and the property produces a net annual
return of at least 6 percent of the equity. Count any
equity value in excess of $6,000 only if the 6 percent
net annual return* is met. If it is not then count the
entire equity amount.
Net annual return: The income produced after
subtracting mortgage payments or other payment*
necessary to generate income.
14. Retroactive Social Security Benefits — All
Cases
Exempt lump sum retroactive benefits received
from the Social Security Administration (SSA and
SSI) for 6 months after the month of receipt.
15. Student Benefits
All Cases
Do not count monies from certain sources to undergraduate students as assets These sources include
a. Educational loans, grants or scholarships that
have funds guaranteed by the U.S Commissioner of
Education, including.
— Pell Grants (Formerly BEOG)
— Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant
(SEOG)
— National Direct Student Loans (NDSL)
— Guaranteed Student Loains
— State Student Incentive Grants (SSIG)
b. Payments to participants of a service learning
program, such as College Work Study or University
Year for Action (UYA).
A, B, and D Cases
Count any monies which remain after the school
period covered from an educational grant, loan, or
scholarship as an asset.
16. Pension Funds — A, B and D Cases
Do not count money held in a retirement fund under a plan administered by an employer or union, an
individual retirement account (IRA), or Keogh account owned by a spouse or parent ineligible for A, B,
or D medical.
a. Count as an asset any available money withdrawn from the pension starting the month after it is
withdrawn.
17. Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) — All
Cases
Do not count any asset, or the interest from the
asset, which is held within the rules of the Uniform
Gift to Minor's Act (UGMA). Count any money from
the asset given to the child as unearned income
Uniform Gift to Minors Act: An irrevocable gift of
money or property to a child under the age of 21. The
gift can be made to only one child, with only one
custodian. The gift is verified on a specific form which
includes a statement that the custodian holds the asset for the child under the Utah UGMA rules
18. Cash Payments Given to Help Pay for Medical
or Social Services.
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When it appears that a trust has been established
to allow the beneficiary to qualify for Medicaid, submit the trust document and all other pertinent inforBition to the State APA Office for a decision on the
availability of the trust.
Restricted Access: Only the court or the trustee,
vfeo is not the beneficiary, or the beneficiary's spouse
or parent, can invade the principle of the trust.
409.67 Trusts Set Up to Pay For Medical Expenses
Belated to Organ Transplants
Send a copy of all trust set up to pay expenses related to organ transplants to the State APA Office for
a decision regarding the availability of the trust.
409.68 When Availability is Not Clear
When you cannot determine whether all or part of
i trust is available, submit it and all other pertinent
documents to the State APA Office for a decision.
R810404-411. Exempt Assets.
Allow the following exemptions for medical assistance cases other than Indigent Medical cases. See
Section 807 for exemptions specific to Indigent Medical cases. If an asset is not treated in that section, use
the F or C policy.
1. One Home and Lot — All Cases
Exclude one home, including a mobile home, and
lot owned or being purchased and occupied by the
client.
a. F and C Cases — The lot on which the home
it&nds shall not exceed the average size of residential
lot* in the community where it is. Count the equity
nlue of property exceeding an average size lot.
b. A, B and D Cases — Exempt the home and all
contiguous property.
Exempt a life estate in a home if the owner of the
life estate continues to live in the home.
2. One Home and Lot of a Person Who is A Resident of a Medical Institution — All Cases
When a person who owns a home, or life estate in a
borne, becomes a resident of a medical institution, the
borne or life estate becomes countable unless:
a The person's stay in the medical institution will
be short term. A stay is short term if a doctor says
that the client is likely to return home within 6
months of admission. Anyone in a medical institution
more than 6 months after admission is long term, or
b. The person states that he intends to return
borne. It does not matter whether the person actually
returns home within 6 months. There is no time limit
to this exemption. The statement of intent must be in
writing from the client or his representative, or
c. The person has a spouse, dependent child, or relative* who lives in the home.
3. Water Rights — All Cases
Exclude water rights attached to a house and lot.
Relative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter,
tfepson, stepdaughter, in-laws, mother, father, stepmother, stepfather, half-sister, half-brother, niece,
nephew, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle, sister, brother, stepbrother, or stepsister
1 Household Goods and Personal Effects
F and C Cases
Exclude the contents of the home that are essential
to daily living. However, individual items with an
nlue over $1,000 must be counted against the asset
limit.
A, B, and D Cases
Exclude household goods and personal effects only
to the extent they do not exceed $2,000.
*. In developing this $2,000 limit, if there are no
fingle items with a value (as can be currently sold) of
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$500 or more, then do not consider the $2,000 exempt
amount to be exceeded.
b. If there are single items with a value of $500 or
more, then consider all other household goods and
personal effects to have a value of $1,000. Add the
single item(s) of $500 or greater value to $1,000, and
then count the amount in excess of $2,000 towards
the household's asset level.
5. Vehicles
F and C Cases — Exclude the equity value up to
$1,500 of one car or other motor vehicle used to provide transportation for the assistance unit. Count any
equity value in excess of this amount towards the
household's asset limitation.
A, B, and D Cases — Exclude one vehicle, regardless of value if:
a. It is necessary for employment; or
b. It is used at least four times per calendar year
for obtaining medical treatment; or
c. It is modified for use by a handicapped person.
d. It is needed due to climate, terrain, distance or
other such factors to provide transportation for essential daily activities.
If no vehicle is excludable for one of the above reasons, one vehicle may be exempt if its fair market
value does not exceed $4,500. If its fair market value
exceeds $4,500, then count the amount in excess towards the asset limit.
Count the equity value of all other vehicles towards
asset limits.
6. Irrevocable Burial Trust — All Cases
a. Exempt the value of an irrevocable burial trust
fund such as a pre-arranged funeral plan.
b. Additionally, only the value of an irrevocable
burial trust is used to reduce the burial/funeral fund
exemption (see Sec. 411, (9)).
7. Life Insurance
A, B, and D Cases
a. Whole life insurance policies are exempt if the
total face value of all such policies does not exceed
$1,500 per individual. If their total face value exceeds
$1500 for any individual, count the cash value of all
that individual's policies against the asset limit. Up
to $1,500 of the cash value can be exempt if it is used
as a burial/funeral fund (See 411-9 below). Term insurance policies have no cash value, are not resources, and are not used in any way in determining
countable assets.
b. Whole life insurance which is exempt must be
deducted from the exemption level of burial/funeral
funds (see Sec. 411, (9)).
Note: The cash value shown on the insurance policy
table includes some interest. Often the interest paid
on the cash value is greater than that used to compute the table. Therefore, the table may not show the
true cash value. This is especially likely in cases of
policies that have been held for a long time. When
there is countable cash value that, combined with
other assets, puts the assets close to the limit, you
should obtain a current statement of the cash value.
F and C Cases
Count the cash value of life insurance policies.
8. Burial Spaces — All Cases
a. Exempt burial spaces and any items related to
repositories used for the remains of the deceased, for
any member of the client's immediate family. This
includes caskets, concrete vaults, crypts, urns, grave
markers, etc. Also, if a client owns a grave site, the
value of which includes opening and closing, the
value of these services is also excluded.
b. A burial contract or funeral plan may include
many of the items exempted in this section. However,
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%. Trustee: The person who holds the legal title to
b. The likely cost of making the asset available
property for the benefit or use of another.
exceeds its value.
3. Beneficiary: The person for whose benefit the
If 2a or 2b applies, explain this in the case log and
do not count the asset. Otherwise, require the client trust is created. Although this person does not bold
to take all reasonable steps to make the asset avail- legal title, he does have an ownership interest
able. The asset is exempt while these steps are being
The beneficiary can receive money from the trt»
taken.
directly or through the trustee.
409.62 Availability to the Trustee
For applicants, such steps must begin before the
1. The entire trust is available as an asset if the
application is approved. For ongoing cases, such steps
must begin before any more assistance is issued, pro- client is the trustee and has the legal ability to
vided 10 day notice can be given. If such steps are not
a. Revoke the trust, and
taken, or if the client does not follow through with
b. Use the money for his own benefit.
the process, close or deny the case.
2. The entire trust is available if:
409.4 Transfer of Title
a. The trust was created by the client or his spouse,
1. Vehicles — including motor vehicles, trailers, and
etc.
b. The client or his spouse has the right to diseolr*
Unless you have reason to question ownership of a the trust, and
vehicle, accept the bill of sale or other legal document
c. He can use the money for his own benefit
as proof of ownership. When questioning ownership,
3. In all other cases, the trust is not available to"
remember that until the Department of Motor Vehi- the trustee.
cles issues a new certificate of registration and certif409.63 Availability to the Beneficiary — All Cases
icate of ownership, the transfer of title is incomplete.
If the client is the beneficiary and access to the
If transfer is incomplete, legal ownership is re- trust is not restricted, the full value of the trust is an
tained by the original owner and the vehicle is avail- available asset. If access is restricted, see 409.64 and
able to him alone, and not to the new owner.
409.65 below.
If transfer is complete, legal ownership is with the
409.64 Trusts Set Up for Purposes Other Than to
new owner.
Qualify for Medicaid — Created by the Client or His
2. All Other Property with a Title Document.
Spouse — All Cases
When the client states property has been sold, but
1. With the exception of burial trusts, these rule*
the title document has not been transferred, contact apply to all trusty including irrevocable trust*.
the State APA Office to determine the availability of
2. Potential payments m the budget month from
the property. Send all documents related to the prop- the trust are an availab je asset if the client or his
erty and the transfer. Be sure to include any condi- spouse set up the trust. The value of the asset is the
tions attached to the transfer.
maximum amount that the trustee can disburse to
If the State APA Office determines that the asset is the client when exercising his full discretion under
not available because title has not been transferred, the terms of the trust. It does not matter whether
follow the rules in Sec. 409.3.
disbursement is actually made. The potential dis409.5 Divorce Decrees
bursement can include both income and principle of
Review divorce decrees on a case-by-case basis.
the trust.
1. Before a divorce is final:
409.65 Trusts Set Up for Purposes Other Than to
The filing of a divorce petition does not change the
ownership or availability of assets unless there is a Qualify for Medicaid — Created by Someone Other
court order specifically dealing with the assets. Un- Than the Client or His Spouse
For A, B, and D Cases
. less there is such a court order, base availability on
If the client's access to the trust principle is rethe ownership prior to the filing of the divorce petistricted*, the principle is not an available asset. This
tion.
If there is a question of an asset's availability after is true even when the trust:
1. Can be revoked by someone other than the beneviewing the court order, contact the State APA Officiary, and
fice.
2. Provides a regular payment from the principle
2. After a divorce is final:
a. When there is no title document, a divorce de- to the beneficiary.
Payments made to the client from the trust are
cree can transfer legal title of personal property. But
be sure to check for conditions attached to the trans- income.
For F and C Cases
fer liens, conditions concerning remarriage, etc.
The principle is an available asset if there is access
These conditions may restrict the sale of the asset. If
to the principle to meet the needs of a household
to, see Sec. 409.2-2.
b. In cases of property where there is a title docu- member. It does not matter if access is restricted TS
ment, be sure the title has been transferred. Again, the only way to access the trust is by approval of the
be sure to check for conditions attached to the trans- court, require the client to petition the court to refer. If title has not been transferred, see Sec. 409.4. lease the funds in the trust. Follow the procedures in
Sec. 409.3.
409.6 Trusts
When disbursement is limited to specific and limThe rules which follow are guidelines to help you
determine the availability of trust funds. Sometimes ited needs or the principle cannot be invaded, the
you will have to get more information or a legal opin- trust may not be available. (See 409.68.)
For example, when disbursement of funds of a trust
ion about trust funds. This can occur even when you
have complete documentation. In these cases, be sure set upfroman insurance settlement is legally limited
to send a copy of the trust agreement to the State to payment of medical bills arising from an accident,
APA Office for a decision about the availability of the the trust is not available. However, forward information about the trust to ORS. In this case, there is TPL
trust.
coverage ORS must pursue.
409.61 Definitions
409.66 Trusts Set Up for the Purpose of Qualifying
1. Trust: A right of property held by one party for
for Medicaid
another.
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An SSI recipient must meet Medicaid asset limits.
When these limits are exceeded, close the case or
feny the application.
403.3 Deeming of Parental Assets to D and B Children
When a D or B unemancipated child is a Medicaid
recipient and lives with his parents, count his parent*' assets. It does not matter whether either parent
M eligible. In this situation, follow the rules below:
1. Apply all asset exclusions of the D or B program
to the parent's assets.
2. From the value of the parent's countable assets,
deduct the one person $1,900 or two person $2,850
tiset limit depending on whether there are 1 or 2
parents in the home. Do not allow the $25.00 exemption for each additional household member.
3. When more than one child is D or B, divide the
parents' countable assets equally between each eligible child.
4 Allow each eligible B or D child the $1,900 limit
ID total countable assets.
Example:
The Blakes have five children living at home. Tom
(age 17) and Tim (age 16) are SSI recipients. Neither
Tom nor Tim have any assets of his own. Mr. and
Mrs Blake have a $5,000.00 savings account. Of this
$2,850.00 is exempt as a parental asset exclusion.
Ink leaves a countable asset of $2,150.00 ($5,000.00
- $2,850.00 = $2,150.00). Of this $1,075.00 is
deemed to each eligible D or B child ($2,150.00 dinded by 2 equals $1,075.00). In this example neither
child's assets exceed $1,900.00. Both are eligibile
based on their assets.

R810-304-409

If the asset belongs to someone else, the money
must be removed or access must be restricted. If this
is not done, count all the funds as an asset for the
entire time access was not restricted. If access is restricted, do not count the asset back through the entire period the client is able to refute his ownership.
Example: In October you discover Mr. Jones had a
savings account in his name and that of his father.
Mr. Jones has been a joint owner of this account since
January when first started receiving assistance. He
proves that all deposits and withdrawals have been
made by his father and are his father's money. Mr.
Jones has his name removed from the account in October. Exempt the asset back to January.
2. When the assets of an A, B, or D SSI recipient
are combined with those of an F or C family unit,
such as in a savings account, decide the portion of the
asset available to the F or C household as follows:
a. If the asset is jointly owned, divide the value
equally among the owners.
Account: A contract of deposit of funds between depositors and a financial institution. This includes
checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit,
share accounts, etc.
b. If you can identify exempt funds, such as a lump
sum SSI payment which is exempt for 6 months after
receipt, do not count them until after the exempt period has expired.
409.2 Joint Ownership of Assets
If property is owned by more than one person, determine the client's share. Plural ownership can exist
in different forms.
In Utah these are:
1. Joint-tenancy.
R810-3O4-4O5. Real Property.
Real property includes items which may be fixed or
2. Tenancy-in-common.
permanent, such as land, houses, buildings, and
3. Not specified. The property is simply recorded in
trailer homes.
the names of 2 or more persons. Ownership is tenancy-in-common unless stated to be otherwise.
R810-3O4-4O7. Personal Property.
In all 3 cases, each owner has the legal right to sell
Personal property is an item other than real prop- only his share of the property. Unless there is a condierty. Some examples are:
tion of ownership specifically prohibiting sale of any
1. Liquid assets such as savings and checking ac- part of the asset without permission of the other
counts, stocks, water stock, bonds, mutual fund owners, the client's share is an available asset. If
shares, promissory notes, mortgages, insurance poli- there is such a condition, see Sec. 409.3.
cies, trust funds, and agreements in escrow.
However, when other owners refuse to sell the
2. Motor vehicles, including automobiles, trucks, property, the fair market value of the client'6 share
motorbikes, snowmobiles, etc.
may be reduced. In such a case, allow the client to
3. Boats, campers and trailers.
refute the determination of hi6 equity by providing a
4. Implements, instruments, and tools.
statement from a knowledgeable source documenting
5. Livestock.
the fair market value of the client's share based on
6. Merchandise and inventory.
the particular circumstances of the case.
7. Time shares and time share agreements.
The laws on plural ownership may differ for propLiquid Assets: Assets in cash or payable in cash on
erty located in other states. If you have a case with
demand.
property in another state under plural ownership,
contact the State APA Office.
B810-304-4O9. Availability of Assets.
409.3 When Legal Factors Hinder Making an As409.1 Joint Accounts
1 When an account is jointly held by a client and set Available
1. If legal factors hinder making the asset availtomeone who is not eligible, count all the funds as an
•Beet for the client if he can legally withdraw funds able, it is exempt until it can be made available. (See
from the account. If more than one of the account 2 below). For example, a condition of ownership may
bolders is eligible, divide the funds equally among prohibit selling the asset without the consent of both
parties. In this case, the asset is exempt until the
them.
If the client claims that the asset does not belong to condition of ownership is changed or both parties conhim, allow him to refute it. He can refute it by provid- sent to the sale.
2. If an asset is not legally available but can be
ing 2 things:
a His statement about the ownership of the funds. made available by client action, the client must take
The statement should include the reason the joint steps to make it available. There are 2 exceptions.
account was set up and who made the deposits to and These are:
withdrawals from the account, and
a. It is doubtful that reasonable actions will sucb. Supporting statements from the other account ceed. This should be confirmed by a knowledgeable
holders.
source, such as a lawyer or financial institution.

R810-303-375

SOCIAL SERVICES (HUMAN SERVICES)

5. Subtract medical insurance premiums and payments for medical services, see section 309.32.
6. If the client is a resident of a nursing home, the
client must pay the rest of the income to the nursing
home. If the client is a resident of another kind of
medical institution, the client must spend down to
the district office.
R810-303*375. Changes In Circumstances — Residents of Medical Institutions.
See Sec. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institution See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a
medical institution.
375.1 Client Responsibility
The client is responsible to report within 10 days
any change in income or circumstances which may
affect eligibility.
375.2 Date of Income Change
Consider the date of receipt of income as the date of
change.
R810-303-377. Residents of Medical Institutions
and Veteran's Administration (VA) Benefits.
A VA benefit recipient may be eligible for increased benefits when they enter a medical institution. These increased benefits are called Aid and Attendance. Also, potential VA recipients may become
eligible for VA benefits when they enter a medical
institution. Potential recipients include a veteran, or
the spouse, parent, or child of a veteran.
When you identify a recipient or potential recipient
who has entered a medical institution, take one of
these actions:
1. Notify ORS.
2. If the client or his family wishes to apply directly to the VA, they may do so. Notify ORS.
3. If the OCO worker wishes to apply directly with
the VA, you may do so. Notify ORS.
To notify ORS, use VA Form 21-8416a (Request for
Information Concerning Unreimbursed Family Medical Expenses). This form is the minimum that you
must send to ORS. If you have more information or a
copy of the complete application, send it too. Send the
form as soon as possible after application. The VA
will pay only from the date this form is received by
them.
If the client is in a nursing home, tell the nursing
home operator to immediately report any increased
benefits. Control for the increased benefits on Form
62 or Form 69.
If you have any questions about application for increased veteran's benefits, you may call the ORS Veteran's Benefits Coordinator at 538-4534.
377.1 Treatment of Lump Sum VA Benefits
Break any lump sum payment into Aid and Attendance and regular pension
1. Tell ORS of the Aid and Attendance amount.
ORS will collect any Aid and Attendance for the time
period that the client recieved Medicaid.
2. Consider the remainder of a VA lump sum payment as income in the month received. If the client is
a resident of a nursing home and it is too late to be
correctly reflected on the APA file, use the Form
417A to notify the nursing home and HCF.
1M

SS-18

R810-304. Medicaid: Asset Standards.
R810-304-400. Asset Standards.
R810-304-403. Asset Limits.
R810-304-405. Real Property.
RS10-304-407
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R810-304-409. Availability of Assets.
R810-304-411. Exempt Assets.
R810-304-419. When to Deem Assets.
R810-304-421. Lump Sum Payments — All Cases
R810-304-425. Income Producing Property.
R810-304-431. Transfer of Excess Assets.
R810-304-441. Third Party Liability (TPL) - AH
Cases.
R810-304-443. Eligible Aliens and Counting The Assets of Sponsors — All Cases.
R810-304-461. Whose Assets to Count — Clients
Who Are Not Residents of Medical Institutions
R810-304-465. Whose Assets to Count — Clients
Who Are Residents of Medical Institutions.
R810-304-400. Asset Standards.
1. This section describes asset* standards for all
Medicaid clients.
2. An Asset is available when the client owns it, or
has the legal right to sell it or dispose of it for his own
benefit. (See Sec. 409.)
3. The assets of a ward controlled by a legal guardian are available to the ward. This is true even if the
ward is not living with the guardian. If the asset is a
trust, follow the rules on trusts. (See Sec. 409.6.)
4. Do not count money as an asset in the same
month it is counted as income.
BS10-304-403. Asset limits.
Base asset levels on the same number of persons
included in the Basic Maintenance Standard (BMSt
Number In BMS
1 person BMS
2 person BMS
Each additional person in
the BMS

Asset Level
$2,000
$3,000
add $25

Use section 329 to set the number of persons in the
BMS.
Close the case or deny the application when the
countable value of all assets is more than the asset
limits.
403.1 The Value of Assets
Judge assets by their equity value. An exception is
made for vehicles in A, B and D cases. (See Sec
411-5.)
1. Equity value is the current market value less
any debts owing on the iLSset.
2. Current market value is the item's selling pnce
on the open market as set by current standards of
appraisal.
Assets: Any real or personal property that has
money value. (See Sec. 405 and 407)
403.11 F and C Cases
For both applications and open cases, if asset levels
are met at any time in a month, they are met for the
entire month.
403.12 A,B, and D Cases
For both applicants and open' cases, use assets held
on the first moment of a calendar month to compute
eligibility for that month. The case is ineligible for
the entire month if countable assets exceed limita on
the first moment of the month.
1. However, when the asset level is exceeded and a
checking account is part of it, look at checks written
prior to the first moment of the month which had not
cleared as of the first moment.
2. Do not count such checks in the asset computation.
Subtract these checks from the checking balance
iAO O M T
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with the requirements of 42 CFR 435 940 through
435 960
(b) Attachment 4 32A describes, in accordance
with 42 CFR 435 948 (a)(6), the information that will
be requested in order to verify eligibility or the correct payment amount and the agencies and the
State(s) from which that information will be requested
R455-1-80. Section 5: Personnel Administration.
5 1 Standards of Personnel Administration
(a) The Medicaid agency has established and will
maintain methods of personnel administration in
conformity with standards prescribed by the U S
Civil Service Commission in accordance with Section
208 of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970
and the regulations on Administration of the Standards for a Merit System of Personnel Administration, 5 CFR Part 900, Subpart F All requirements of
42 CFR 432 10 are met
(b) Affirmative Action Plan
The Medicaid agency has in effect an affirmative
action plan for equal employment opportunity that
includes specific action steps and timetables and
meets all other requirements of 5 CFR Part 900, Subpart F
R455-1-82
5 3 Training Programs, Subprofessional and Volunteer Programs
The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42
CFR Part 432, Subpart B, with respect to a training
program for agency personnel and the training and
use of subprofessional staff and volunteers
R455-1-83 Section 6. Financial Administration.
6 1 Fiscal Policies and Accountability
The Medicaid agency and, where applicable, local
agencies administering the plan, maintains an accounting system and supporting fiscal records adequate to assure that claims for Federal funds are in
accord with applicable Federal requirements The requirements of 42 CFR 433 32 are met
R455-1-84
6 2 Cost Allocation
The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42
CFR 433 34, paragraphs (c) through (e) with respect
to the submittal and content of a cost allocation plan
R455-1-85
6 3 State Financial Participation
(a) State funds are used in both assistance and administration
X State funds are used to pay all of the non-Federal
share of total expenditures under the plan Effective
Date April 12, 1974
(b) State and Federal funds are apportioned among
the political subdivisions of the State on a basis consistent with equitable treatment of individuals in
similar circumstances throughout the State
R455-1-86. Section 7: General Provisions.
7 1 Plan Amendments
The plan will be amended whenever necessary to
reflect new or revised Federal statutes or regulations
or material change in any phase of State law, organisation, policy or State agency operations
R45M-87
7 2 Nondiscrimination
In accordance with title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U S C 2000d et seq), Section 504 of the
RehabihUtion Act of 1973 (29 U S C 70b), and the
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regulations at 45 CFR Parts 80 and 84, the Medicaid
agency assures that no individual shall be subjects
to discrimination under this plan on the grounds of
race, color, national origin, or handicap
The Medicaid agency has methods of admirugtra
tion to assure that each program or activity for which
it receives Federal financial assistance will be oper
ated in accordance with title VI regulations These
methods for title VI are described in Attachment
7 2A
R455-1-88
7 3 State Governor's Review
The Medicaid agency will provide opportunity for
the Office of the Governor to review amendment*
any new State plan and subsequent amendments and
long-range program planning projections or other periodic reports thereon Any comments made will be
transmitted to the Health Care Financing Administration with such documents
I hereby certify that I am authorized to submit this
plan on behalf of UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, dated August 20, 1980, signature by
James O Mason, M D , Dr P H
1967
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R455-1A. Utah State Medicaid Plan Attachments.
R455-1A-100 Attachments Utah
Plan
R455'1A-102 State Agency
R455-1A-200 Attachments Utah
Plan Coverage and Eligibility
R455-1A-300 Attachments
R455-1A-400 Attachments Utah
Plan Standards for Institutions
R455-1A-700 Attachments Utah
Plan Nondiscrimination

State Medicaid
State Medicaid
State Medicaid
State Medicaid

R455-1A-100. Attachments: Utah State Medicaid
Plan.
1A Attorney General's Certification
I certify that THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH is the single State agency responsible
for
X Administering the plan
The legal authonty under which the agency admin
isters the plan on a Statewide basis is Utah Code
Annotated Section 63-35-10, Section 55-15a-3 and
Senate Bill 332 (1979 General SessionXstatutory a
tation) dated May 21, 1980, signed by Utah State
Attorney General Robert B Hanson
1A1 State of Utah Office of the Governor
May 2, 1979 SUBJECT Single State Agency Title XIX Program
Effective May 8, 1979, the Utah Health Agency IB
hereby designated as the single State Agency for the
Title XIX program As the single State Agency they
will be responsible for the total Title XIX program
including certification of facilities, utilization review
and payment of claims Eligibility for Title XDC programs will continue to be a responsibility of the Department of Social Services Scott M Matheson, Gov
ernor
1A2 Reorganization of State Health Functions
1979 General Session — Enrolled Copy S B No 332
AN ACT RELATING TO THE ORGANIZATION
OF A STATE HEALTH AGENCY BY THE GOVER
NOR WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONS

Attachment 4 19E specifies, for each type of serfice the definition of a claim for purposes of meeting
these requirements
R455-1-62
419(f) The Medicaid agency limits participation to
providers who meet the requirements of 42 CFR
44715
No provider participating under this plan may
deny services to any individual eligible under the
plan on account of the individual's inability to pay a
cost sharing amount imposed by the plan in accordance with 42 CFR 447 53
R455-1-63
4 19(g) The Medicaid agency assures appropriate
audit of records when payment is based on costs of
services or on a fee plus cost of materials
R455-1-64
419(h) The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42 CFR 447 203 for documentation and
availability of payment rates
R455-1-65
4 19(i) The Medicaid agency's payments are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services under the plan are available to recipients at least to the
extent that those services are available to the general
population
R455-1-66
4 19(j) The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42 CFR 447 205 for public notice of any significant changes in Statewide method or standards
for setting payment rates
R45M-66a
4 19(k) Payments to Physicians for Clinical Laboratory Services
For services performed by an outside laboratory for
a physician who bills for the service, payment does
not exceed the amount that would be authorized under Medicare in accordance with 42 CFR 405 515 (b),
(c) and (d)
X Not applicable The Medicaid agency does not
allow payment under the plan to physicians for outaide laboratory services
R455-1-67
4 20 Direct Payments to Certain Recipients for
Physicians' or Dentists' Services
X Not applicable No direct payments are made to
recipients
R455-1-68
4 21 Prohibition Against Reassignment of Provider Claims
Payment for Medicaid services furnished by any
provider under this plan is made only in accordance
with the requirements of 42 CFR 447 10
R455-1-69
4 22 Third Party Liability
(a) The Medicaid agency meets all requirements of
42 CFR 433 138 and 433 139
Attachment 4 22A specifies the threshold amount
or other guideline used in determining whether to
aeek reimbursement from a liable third party, or describes the process by which the agency determines
that seeking reimbursement would not be cost effective It also specifies the dollar amount or time penod
the State uses to accumulate billings from a particular liable third party for this purpose

R455-1-70
(c) The Medicaid agency has written cooperative
agreements for the enforcement of rights to and collection of third party benefits assigned to the State as
a condition of eligibility for medical assistance with
at least one of the following (Check as appropriate)
X State title IV-D agency The requirements of 42
CFR 433 152 (b) are met
(d) The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of
42 CFR 433-153 and 433 154 for making mcentive
payments and for distributing third party collections
R455-1-71
4 23 Use of Contracts
The Medicaid agency has contracts of the type(s)
listed in 42 CFR Part 434 All contracts meet the
requirements of 42 CFR Part 434
R455-1-72
4 24 Standards for Payments for Skilled Nursing
and Intermediate Care Facility Services
With respect to skilled nursing and intermediate
care facilities, all applicable requirements of 42 CFR
Part 442, Subparts B and C are met
R455-1-73
4 25 Program for Licensing Administrators of
Nursing Homes
The State has a program that, except with respect
to Christian Science sanatoria, meets the requirements of 42 CFR Part 431, Subpart N, for the licensing of nursing home administrators
R45M-75
4 27 Disclosure of Survey Information and Provider or Contractor Evaluation
The Medicaid agency has established procedures
for disclosing pertinent findings obtained from surveys and provider and contractor evaluations that
meet all the requirements in 42 CFR 431115
R455-1.76
4 28 Appeals Process for Skilled Nursing Facilities
and Intermediate Care Facilities
The Medicaid agency has established appeals procedures for skilled nursing facilities and intermediate
care facilities as specified in 42 CFR 431153 and
431154
R455-1-77
4 29 Conflict of Interest Provisions
The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of
Section 1902 (a) (4) (C) of the Act concerning the prohibition against acts, with respect to any activity under the plan, that are prohibited by Section 207 or
208 of title 18, United States Code
R455-1-78
4 30 Exclusion of Providers and Suspension of
Practitioners and other Individuals
All requirements of 42 CFR Part 455, Subpart C
are met
R455-1-79
4 31 Disclosure of Information by Providers and
Fiscal Agents
The Medicaid agency has established procedures
for the disclosure of information by providers and fiscal agents as specified in 42 CFR 455 104 through
455 106
4 32 Income and Eligibility Verification System
(a) The Medicaid agency has established a system
for income and eligibility verification in accordance
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•titution, to spend for medical care costs all but a
minimal amount of his or her income required for
personal needs.
(v) Emergency services if the services meet the requirements in 42 CFR 447.53(b)(4).
(vi) Family planning services and supplies furnished to individuals of childbearing age.
(vii) Services furnished by a health maintenance
organization in which the individual is enrolled.
(viii) Services furnished to an individual receiving
hospice care, as defined in section 1905(o) of the Act.
R455-1-56
(3) Unless a waiver under 42 CFR 431.55(g) applies, nominal deductible, coinsurance, copayment, or
similar charges are imposed for services that are not
excluded from such charges under item (b)(2) above.
X Not applicable. No such charges are imposed.
R455-l~56a
(iii) Attachment 4.18A specifies the:
(A) Services(s) for which a charge(s) is applied;
(B) Nature of the charge imposed on each service;
(C) Amount(s) of and basis for determining the
charge(s);
(D) Method used to collect the charge(s);
(£) Basis for determining whether an individual is
unable to pay the charge and the means by which
such an individual is identified to providers;
(F) Procedures for implementing and enforcing the
exclusions from cost sharing contained in 42 CFR
447.53(b); and
(G) Cumulative maximum that applies to all deductible, coinsurance or copayment charges imposed
on a specified time period.
X Not applicable. There is no maximum.
R455-l-56b
(c) Individuals are covered as medically needy under the plan.
X Yes. With respect to them:
(1) An enrollment fee, premium or similar charge
is imposed.
X Not applicable. No such charge is imposed.
R455-1-56C
(2) No deductible, coinsurance, copayment, or similar charge is imposed under the plan.
(ii) Services to pregnant women related to the
pregnancy or any other medical condition that may
complicate the pregnancy.
R455-l-56d
(iii) All services furnished to pregnant women.
(iv) Services furnished to any individual who is an
inpatient in a hospital, long-term care facility, or
other medical institution, if the individual is required, as a condition of receiving services in the institution, to spend for medical care costs all but a
minimal amount of his income required for personal
needs.
(v) Emergency services if the services meet the requirements in 42 CFR 447.53(b)(4).
(vi) Family planning services and supplies furnished to individuals of childbearing age.
(vii) Services furnished to an individual receiving
hospice care, as defined in section 1905(o) of the Act.
R455-l-56e
(viii) Services provided by a health maintenance
organization (HMO) to enrolled individuals.
(3) Unless a waiver under 42 CFR 431.55(g) applies, nominal deductible, coinsurance, copayment, or
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similar charges are imposed on services that are not
excluded from such charges under item (b)(2) above
X Not applicable. No such charges are imposed
R455-l-56f
(iii) Attachment 4.18C specifies the:
(A) Service(s) for which charge(s) is applied;
(B) Nature of the charge imposed on each service,
(C) Amount(s) of and basis for determining the
charge(s);
(D) Method used to collect the charge(s);
(E) Basis for determining whether an individual u
unable to pay the charge(s) and the means by which
such an individual is identified to providers;
(F) Procedures for implementing and enforcing the
exclusions from cost sharing contained in 42 CFR
447.53(b); and
(G) Cumulative maximum that applies to all deductible, coinsurance or copayment charges imposed
on a family during a specified time period.
X Not applicable. There is no maximum.
R455-1-57
4.19 Payment for Services
(a) The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of
42 CFR Part 447, Subpart C, with respect to payment
for inpatient hospital services. Attachment 4.19A describes the methods and standards used to determine
rates for payment for inpatient hospital services
R455-1-58
4.19(b) In addition to the services specified in paragraphs 4.19(a) and (d), the Medicaid agency meets the
requirements of 42 CFR Part 447, Subpart C, with
respect to payment for all other types of services provided under the plan.
Attachment 4.19B describes the methods and standards used for the payment of each of these services
except for inpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility
and intermediate care facility services that are described in other attachments.
R455-1-59
4.19(c) Payment is made to reserve a bed during a
recipient's temporary absence from an inpatient facility.
X yes. The State's policy is described in Attachment 4.19C.
R45M-60
4.19(d) X 1. The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42 CFR Part 447 Subpart C, with respect to payments for skilled nursing and intermediate care facility services.
Attachment 4.19D describes the methods and standards used to determine rates for payment for skilled
nursing and intermediate care facility services
X 2. The Medicaid agency provides payment for
routine skilled nursing facility services furnished by
a swing-bed hospital at the average rate per patient
day for routine SNF services furnished during the
previous calendar year.
X 3. The Medicaid agency provides payment for
routine intermediate care facility services furnished
by a swing-bed hospital at the average rate per patient day for ICF services other that ICFs for the
mentally retarded furnished during the previous calendar year.
R455-1-61
4.19(e) The Medicaid agency meets all requirements of 42 CFR 447.45 for timely payment of claims.
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(a) The State agency utilized by t h e Secretary to
determine qualifications of institutions and suppliers
gf services to participate in Medicare is responsible
for establishing and maintaining health standards
for private or public institutions (exclusive of Christian Science sanatoria) t h a t provide services to Medicaid recipients This agency is UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
(b) The State authonty(ies) responsible for establishing and maintaining standards, other t h a n those
relating to health, for public or private institutions
that provide services to Medicaid recipients is (are)
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
(c) Attachment 4 11A describes t h e standards specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, t h a t are kept on
file and made available to the Health Care Financing
Administration on request
R455-1-43
411(d) The UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT O F
HEALTH (agency) which is t h e State agency responnble for licensing health institutions, determines if
institutions and agencies meet t h e requirements for
participation in the Medicaid program The requirements in 42 CFR 431 610(e), (f) and (g) a r e m e t
R455-1-44
4 12 Consultation to Medical Facilities
(a) Consultative services are provided by health
and other appropriate State agencies to hospitals,
nursing facilities home health agencies, clinics and
laboratories in accordance with 42 CFR 431105(b)
X Not applicable Similar services are not provided
to other types of medical facilities
R45M-45
4 13 Required Provider Agreement
All requirements of 42 CFR 431 107 are met with
respect to agreements between the Medicaid agency
and each provider furnishing services under the plan
R455-1-46
4 14 Utilization Control
(a) A Statewide program of surveillance and utilization control has been implemented t h a t safeguards
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid
services available under thi6 plan and against excess
payments and that assesses t h e quality of services
The requirements of 42 CFR P a r t 456 are met
X Directly
R45M-47
4 14(b) The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42 CFR P a r t 456, Subpart C, for control of
the utilization of inpatient hospital services
X Utilization review is performed in accordance
with 42 CFR P a r t 456, Subpart H, t h a t specifies t h e
conditions of a waiver of the requirements of Subpart
Cfor
X All hospitals (other t h a n mental hospitals)

R455-1-55

conditions of a waiver of the requirements of Subpart
E for
X All skilled nursing facilities
R45M-50
4 14 X (e) The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42 CFR P a r t 456, Subpart F, for control of
t h e utilization of intermediate care facility services
Utilization review in facilities is provided through
X Direct review by personnel of the medical assistance unit of the State agency
R455-1-51
4 15 Inspections of Care in Skilled Nursing and Intermediate Care Facilities and Institutions for Mental Diseases
All applicable requirements of 42 CFR P a r t 456,
Subpart I, are met with respect to periodic inspections of care and services
R455-1-52
4 16 Relations with State Health and Vocational
Rehabilitation Agencies and Title V Grantees
The Medicaid agency h a s cooperative arrangements with State health and vocational rehabilitation agencies and with Title V grantees, t h a t meet
the requirements of 42 CFR 431 615
Attachment 4 16A describes t h e cooperative arrangements with t h e health and vocational rehabilitation agencies
R455-1-53
4 17 Liens and Recoveries
Liens are imposed against an individual's property
X Yes
(a) Liens are imposed against an individual's prop
erty before his or her death because of Medicaid
claims paid or to be paid on behalf of t h a t individual
following a court judgment which determined that
benefits were incorrectly paid for t h a t individual
X Item (a) applies only to an individual's real prop
erty,
(b) Liens are placed against t h e real property of an
individual before his or her death because of Medicaid claims paid or to be paid for t h a t individual in
accordance with 42 CFR 433 36(g) (2)
X Item (b) is not applicable No such h e n is lm
posed
(c) Adjustments or recoveries for Medicaid claims
correctly paid are imposed only in accordance with
section 433 36(h)
(d) No money payments under another program
are reduced as a means of recovering Medicaid claims
incorrectly paid
(e) Attachment 4 17A

R455-1-48
4 14(c) The Medicaid agency meets t h e requirements of 42 CFR Part 456, Subpart D, for control of
utilization of inpatient services in mental hospitals
X No waivers have been granted

R455-1-54
(a) Specifies t h e process for determining t h a t an
institutionalized individual cannot reasonably be expected to be discharged from the medical institution
and return home The description of t h e process
meets the requirements of 42 CFR 433 36(d)
(b) Defines t h e terms specified in 42 CFR
433 36(e)
(c) Specifies the criteria by which a son or daughter can establish t h a t he or she h a s been providing
care, as specified under 42 CFR 433 36(f)

R45M-49
4 14(d) The Medicaid agency meets t h e requirements of 42 CFR P a r t 456, Subpart E, for t h e control
of utilization of skilled nursing facility services
X Utilization review is performed in accordance
with 42 CFR P a r t 456, Subpart H, t h a t specifies t h e

R455-1-55
(in) All services furnished to pregnant women
(IV) Services furnished to any individual who is a n
inpatient in a hospital, long-term care facility, or
other medical institution, if the individual is required, as a condition of receiving services in the in-

R455-1-28
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services" under this plan and are reimbursed whether
furnished by a physician or an optometrist.
X Not applicable. The conditions in the first sentence do not apply.
R45M-28
3.1(g) Participation by Indian Health Service Facilities
Indian Health Service facilities are accepted as providers, in accordance with 42 CFR 431.110(b), on the
same basis as other qualified providers.
R45M-29
3.2 Coordination of Medicaid with Medicare Part B
X The Medicaid agency makes the entire range of
benefits under Part B of title XVIH available as part
of the plan to certain eligible individuals under a
buy-in agreement, through payment of the premium
charges on behalf of such individuals, or by meeting
all or part of the cost of the deductible, cost sharing or
similar charges under Part B.
Attachment 3.2A describes the method by which
such benefits are made available. The agency makes
the same services available to recipients not covered
by Medicare.
X No.
R455-1-30
3.3 Medicaid for Individuals Age 65 or Over in institutions for Mental Diseases
Medicaid is provided for individuals 65 years of age
or older who are patients in institutions for mental
diseases.
X Yes. The requirements of 42 CFR Part 441, Subpart C, and 42 CFR 431.620(c) and (d) are met.
R455-1-31
3.4 Special Requirements Applicable to Sterilization Procedures
All requirements of 42 CFR Part 441, Subpart F
are met.
R455-1-32. Section 4: General Program Administration.
4.1 Methods of Administration
The Medicaid agency employs methods of administration found by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare to be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan.
R45M-33
4.2 Hearings for Applicants and Recipients
The Medicaid agency has a system of hearings that
meets all the requirements of 42 CFR Part 431, Subpart £.
R455-1-34
4.3 Safeguarding Information on Applicants and
Recipients
Under State statute which imposes legal sanctions,
safeguards are provided that restrict the use or disclosure of information concerning applicants and recipients to purposes directly connected with the administration of the plan.
All other requirements of 42 CFR Part 431, Subpart F are met.
R455-1-35
4.4 Medicaid Quality Control
(a) A system of eligibility quality control is implemented that meets the requirements of 42 CFR
431,800(d), (f), (h), (i) and (k).
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(b) The agency operates a claims processing as**
ment system that meets the requirements of Section
431.800 (e), (g), (h), (j), and (k).
X Not applicable. The agency has a Medicaid Man.
agement Information System (MMIS) approved uncW
42 CFR Part 433, Subpart C.
R455-1-36
4.5 Medicaid Agency Fraud Detection and Invest
gation Program
The Medicaid agency has established and will
maintain methods, criteria, and procedures that meet
all requirements of 42 CFR 455.13-455.21 for prevention and control of program fraud and abuse.
R455-1-37
4.6 Reports
The Medicaid agency will submit all reports in the
form and with the content required by the Secretary,
and will comply with any provisions that the Seer*
tary finds necessary to verify and assure the correctness of the reports. All requirements of 42 CFR
431.16 are met.
R45M-38
4.7 Maintenance of Records
The Medicaid agency maintains or supervises the
maintenance of records necessary for the proper and
efficient operation of the plan, including records regarding applications, determination of eligibility, the
provisions of medical assistance, and administrative
costs, and statistical, fiscal and other records nee**aary for reporting and accountability, and retains
these records in accordance with Federal requirements. All requirements of 42 CFR 431.17 are met
R455-1-39
4.8 Availability of Agency Program Manuals
Program manuals and other policy issuances that
affect the public, including the Medicaid agency's
rules and regulations governing eligibility, need and
amount of assistance, recipient rights and responsibilities, and services offered by the agency are maintained in the State office and in each local and district office for examination, upon request, by individuals for review, study, or reproduction. All requirements of 42 CFR 431.18 are met.
R455-1-40
4.9 Reporting Provider Payments to Internal Revenue Service
There are procedures implemented in accordance
with 42 CFR 433.37 for identification of providers of
services by social security number or by employer
identification number and for reporting the information required by the Internal Revenue Code (26
U.S.C. 6041) with respect to payment for services under the plan.
R455-1-41
4.10 Free Choice of Providers
Unless an exception under 42 CFR 431.55 applies,
the Medicaid agency assures that any individual eligible under the plan may obtain Medicaid services
from any institution, agency, pharmacy, person, or
organization that is qualified to perform the services,
including an organization that provides these services or arranges for their availability on a prepayment basis.
R455-1-42
4.11 Relations with Standard-Setting and Survey
Agencies
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^at nurse-mid wives are authorized to practice under
§ute law or regulation
Norse-mid wives are permitted to enter into independent provider agreements with the Medicaid
^ency without regard to whether the nurse-midwife
ponder the supervision of, or associated with, a phyaoan or other health care provider
(m) For any women who, while pregnant, were eligible for, applied for, and received medical assistance
under the approved State Plan, all pregnancy-related
ind postpartum services will continue to be provided,
is though the women were pregnant, for 60 days after
the pregnancy ends, beginning on the last date of
pregnancy
X (iv) For pregnant women, services for any other
pedical condition that may complicate the pregnancy
(v) Home health services are provided to
categorically needy recipients entitled to skilled
nursing facility services as indicated in item 3 1(b) of
this plan
Attachment 3 1A identifies the medical and remedial services provided to the categorically needy and
specifies all limitations on the amount, duration and
rope of those services

d) Services made available to the categorically
needy are equal in amount, duration, and scope for
each categorically needy person
(n) The amount, duration, and scope of services
made available to the categorically needy are equal
to or greater than those made available to the medically needy
X Yes
(in) Services made available to the medically
needy are equal in amount, duration, and scope for
each person in a medically needy coverage group
X Yes

B455-1-20
31(a)(2) This State Plan covers the medically
needy
X Yes The services described below and in Attachment 3 IB are provided
Services for the medically needy include
d) Prenatal care and delivery services for pregnant
women
(u) For women who, while pregnant, were eligible
for applied for, and received medical assistance under the approved State Plan, all pregnancy-related
and postpartum services will continue to be provided,
is though the women were pregnant, for 60 days after
the pregnancy ends, beginning on the last day of
pregnancy
X (m) For pregnant women, services for any other
medical condition that may complicate the preg
nancy
(iv) Ambulatory services, as defined in Attachment
3 IB for recipients under age 18 and recipients entitled to institutional services
(v) Home health services to recipients entitled to
nursing facility services as indicated in item 3 1(b) of
this plan
X (vi) Services in an institution for mental diseases
X Services in an intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded
Each medically needy group is provided either the
•ervices listed in section 1905(a)(1) through (5) and
(17) of the Act, or seven of the services listed in section 1905(a)(1) through (18) The services are provided as defined in 42 CFR Part 440, Subpart A and
ID section 1905(o) of the Act
Attachment 3 IB identifies the services provided to
each covered group of the medically needy, specifies
til limitations on the amount, duration, and scope of
those items, and specifies the ambulatory services
provided under this plan and any limitations on
them

R455-1-23
3 1(b) Home health services are provided in accordance with the requirements of 42 CFR 44 L 15
(1) Home health services are provided to all
categorically needy individuals 21 years of age or
over
(2) Home health services are provided to all
categorically need individuals under 21 years of age
X Yes
(3) Home health services are provided to the medically needy
X Yes, to all
X Yes, to individuals age 21 or over, SNF services
are provided
X Yes, to individuals under age 21, SNF services
are provided

R45M-21
3 1(a)(3) Except for those items or services for
which section 1902(a)(10) of the Act and 42 CFR
440 250 permit exceptions

R455-1-22
3 1(a)(5) The Medicaid agency meets the requirements of 42 CFR 441 56 — 441 62 with respect to
early and periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment
(EPSDT) services
X The Medicaid agency has in effect agreements
with continuing care providers Described below are
the methods employed to assure the providers' compliance with their agreements
Methods employed to assure provider's compliance
are identified in the respective contractus) with each
continuing care provider (e g, sample recipient
audits, and SURS Reports)

R455-1-24
3 1(c) Assurance of Transportation
Provision is made for assuring necessary transportation of recipients to and from providers Methods
used to assure such transportation are described in
Attachment 3 ID Methods of Providing Transportation
R45M-25
3 1(d) Methods and Standards to Assure Quality of
Services
The standards established and the methods used to
assure high quality care are described in Attachment
31C
R455-1-26
3 1(e) Family Planning Services
The requirements of 42 CFR 441 20 are met regarding freedom from coercion or pressure of mind
and conscience, andfreedomof choice of method to be
used for family planning
R455-1-27
3 1(f) Optometnc Services
Optometnc services (other than those provided under Sections 435 531 and 436 531) are not now but
were previously provided under the plan Services of
the type an optometrist is legally authorized to perform are specifically included in the term "physicians'

R455-1-6
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X Determinations of eligibility for Medicaid under
this plan are made by the agencyties) specified in
Attachment 2.2A. There is a written agreement between the agency named in paragraph 1.1(a) and
other agency(ies) making such determinations for
specific groups covered under this plan. The agreement defines the relationships and respective responsibilities of the agencies.
R455-1-6
1.1(e) All other provisions of this plan are administered by the Medicaid agency except for those functions for which final authority has been granted to a
Professional Standards Review Organization under
title XI of the Act.
(f) All other requirements of 42 CFR 431.10 are
met.
R45M-7
1.2 Organization for Administration
(a) Attachment 1.2A contains a description of the
organization and functions of the Medicaid agency
and organization chart of the agency.
(b) Within the State agency, the DIVISION OF
HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND STANDARDS
has been designated as the medical assistance unit.
Attachment 1.2B contains a description of the organization and functions of the medical assistance unit
and an organization chart of the unit.
(c) Attachment 1.2C contains a description of the
kinds and numbers of professional medical personnel
and supporting staff used in the administration of the
plan and their responsibilities.
(d) Eligibility determinations are made by State or
local staff of an agency other than the agency named
in paragraph 1.1(a). Attachment 1.2D contains a description of the staff designated to make such determination and the functions they will perform.
R455-1-8
1.3 Statewide Operation
The plan is in operation on a Statewide basis in
accordance with all requirements of 42 CFR 431.50.
X The plan is state administered.
R45M-9
1.4 State Medical Care Advisory Committee
There is an advisory committee to the Medicaid
agency director on health and medical care services
established in accordance with and meeting all the
requirements of 42 CFR 431.12.
R455-M0. Section 2: Coverage and Eligibility.
2.1 Application, Determination of Eligibility and
Furnishing Medicaid
(a) The Medicaid agency meets all requirements of
42 CFR Part 435, Subpart J for processing applications, determining eligibility and furnishing Medicaid.
R455-M1
2.1(b) Individuals are entitled to Medicaid services
under the plan during the three month? preceding
the month of application, if they were, or on application would have been, eligible. The effective date of
prospective and retroactive eligibility is specified in
Attachment 2.6A.
2.1(c) The Medicaid agency electa to enter into a
risk contract with an HMO that is
X Not Federally qualified, but meets the requirements of 42 CFR 434.20(c) and is defined in Attachment 2.1A.
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R455-M2
2.2 Coverage and Conditions of Eligibility
Medicaid is available to groups specified in Attach
ment 2.2A.
X Both categorically needy and medically needy
The conditions of eligibility that must be met are
specified in Attachment 2.6A.
All applicable requirements of 42 CFR Part 435 are
met.
R455-M3
2.3 Residence
Medicaid is furnished to eligible individuals who
are residents of the State under 42 CFR 435.403.
R455-M4
2.4 Blindness
(a) The definition of blindness in terms of ophthalmic measurement used in this plan is specified in
Attachment 2.6A.
(b) All other requirements of 42 CFR 435.530 and
42 CFR 435.531 are met.
R455-M5
2.5 Disability
(a) The definition of disability that is used in this
plan is specified in Attachment 2.6A.
(b) All other requirements of 42 CFR 435.540 and
435.541 are met.
R455-M6
2.6 Financial Eligibility
(a) Categorically needy
(1) With respect to AFDC-related families and individuals under age 21 (not otherwise eligible under
this plan), the financial eligibility conditions of the
State's approved AFDC plan apply.
(2) With respect to aged, blind and disabled individuals, the financial eligibility conditions described
in Attachment 2.6A apply.
(3) All requirements of 42 CFR Part 435; Subpart*
G and H are met with respect to the families and
individuals to whom the requirements apply.
R455-M7
2.6(b) Medically needy
All requirements of 42 CFR Part 435, Subparts G
and I are met with respect to the families and individuals to whom the requirements apply. The level of
income and resources, expressed in total dollar
amounts, that are used as a basis for establishing
eligibility under the plan are as described in Attachment 2.6A.
R455-M8
2.7 Medicaid Furnished out of State
Medicaid is furnished under the conditions specified in 42 CFR 431.52 to an eligible individual who is
a resident of the State while the individual is in another state, to the same extent that Medicaid is furnished to residents in the State.
R455-M9
3.1 Amount, Duration and Scope of Services
(a) Medicaid is provided in accordance with the requirements of 42 CFR Part 440, Subpart B.
(l)(i) Each item of service listed in section 1905
(a)(1) through (5) of the Act, as defined in 42 CFR
Part 440, Subpart A is provided for the categorically
needy.
(ii) Nurse-midwife services listed in section
1905(a)(17) of the Act, as defined in 42 CFR 440.165
are provided for the categorically needy to the extent
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26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by department — Disciplinary measures and sanctions —
Funds collected.
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the
Social Security Act.
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations.
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permitted by law and quality control services.
(4) The department shall provide, by rule, disciplinary measures and sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and procedures
of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively may not
extend beyond:
(a) termination from the program;
(b) recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid; and
(c) those specified in Section 1919 of Title XIX of the federal Social
Security Act.
(5) Funds collected as a result of a sanction imposed under Section 1919 of
Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act shall be deposited in the General
Fund as nonlapsing dedicated credits to be used by the division in accordance
with the requirements of that section.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5; 1989,
ch. 165, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, added the (a)
and (b) designations in Subsection (4); substituted "shall provide, by rule" for "may provide
by rule for" and "may not extend" for "shall not
extend" in the introductory language of Subsection (4); deleted "or" from the end of Subsection (4)(a); added "and" to the end of Subsec-

tion (4)(b); added Subsection (4)(c); made punctuation changes throughout Subsection (4);
and added Subsection (5).
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, substituted "Human" for "Social" in Subsection (3).
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal
Social Security Act is compiled as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396 et seq. Section 1919 of Title XIX is 42
U.S.C. § 1396r.

56

26-18-11

HEALTH CODE

The 1987 amendment, effective July 1,1987,
in Subsection (1), substituted "Medicare under
Title XVm of that act" for "Medicare under
Title XVII of said act," deleted former Subsection (6), which provided for relief of the obligation of counties to provide medical care to the
indigent, and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988,
substituted "division" for "department*' in Sub-

sections (1) and (4) and in Subsection (1) inserted "which shall be known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program"
Social Security A c t — Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act, cited in Subsection
(1), appears as 42 U.S C §§ 1396 to 1396s Title XVIQ of the act appears as 42 U.SC
§§ 1395 to 1395ccc

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Utah's
Medicaid Program A Senior's Eligibility

Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J Contemp
L 1 (1988)

26-18-11. Rural hospitals.
(1) For purposes of this section "rural hospital" means a hospital located
outside of a standard metropolitan statistical area, as designated by the
United States Bureau of the Census.
(2) For purposes of the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance
Program, the Division of Health Care Financing shall not discriminate among
rural hospitals on the basis of size.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-11, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 12, i 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 12, § 2
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988

CHAPTER 19
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT
Section
26-19-1
26-19-2
26-19-3
26-19-4
26-19-5

26-19-6
26-19-7.

26-19-8

Section
Short title
Definitions
Program established by department —- Promulgation of rules
Repealed
Recovery of medical assistance
from third party liable for payment — Notice — Action —
Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to action protected — Limit on payment for
liability
Action by department — Notice to
recipient
Action or claim by recipient —
Consent of department required
— Department's nght to intervene — Department's interests
protected — Attorney's fees and
costs
Statute of limitations — Survival
of right of action — Insurance

policy not to limit time allowed
for recovery
26-19-9 to 26-19-12 Repealed
Recovery of medical assistance
26-19-13
payments from recipient —
Lien against estate — Recovery
of incorrectly paid amounts
Insurance policies not to deny or
26-19-14
reduce benefits of persons eligible for state medical assistance
— Exemptions
Attorney general or county attor26-19-15
ney to represent department
Department's right to attorney's
26-19-16
fees and costs
Application of provisions contrary
26-19-17.
to federal law prohibited
Release of medical billing infor26-19-18
mation by provider restricted —
Liability for violation
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26-18-9. Prohibited acts of state or local employees of
Medicaid program — Violation a misdemeanor.
Each state or local employee responsible for the expenditure of funds under
the state Medicaid program, each individual who formerly was such an officer
or employee, and each partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited for
a period of one year after termination of such responsibility from committing
any act, the commission of which by an officer or employee of the United
States Government, an individual who was such an officer or employee, or a
partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited by Section 207 or Section
208 of Title 18, United States Code. Violation of this section is a class A
misdemeanor.
History: C. 1053, 26-18-9, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17.
Compiler's Notes. — 18 U.S.C. §§ 207 and
208 deal respectively with participation by former federal officers or employees in matters
involving the government and with involve-

ment by federal officers or employees in their
official capacity in matters in which they have
a personal financial interest.
Cross-References. — Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies
and standards.
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance program, which shall be
known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income persons; who
are not eligible under the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that act.
(2) Persons in the custody of prisons, jails, halfway houses, and other nonmedical government institutions are not eligible for services provided under
this section.
(3) The department shall develop standards and administer policies relating to eligibility requirements for participation in the program, and for payment of medical claims for eligible persons.
(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before assistance is rendered the division shall investigate the availability of the resources of the
spouse, father, mother, and adult children of the person making application.
(5) The department shall determine what medically necessary care or services are covered under the program, including duration of care, and method
of payment, which may be partial or in full.
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for medical, hospital, or other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible
persons where the purpose of the assistance is for the performance of an
abortion, unless the life of the mother would be endangered if an abortion
were not performed.
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the provisions of this
section.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L.
1982, ch. 26, i 1; 1985, ch. 165, t 38; 1987,
ch. 181, i 3; 1988, ch. 21, § 9.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1982,
ch 26, § 1 repealed former § 26-18-10 (C.
1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126,

{ 17), relating to duties of the department, and
enacted present § 26-18-10.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment substituted "equivalent of .00005" for
"equivalent of V4 mill" in two places in Subsection (6).
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26-18-6. Federal aid — Authority of executive director.
The executive director, with the approval of the governor, may bind the
state to any executive or legislative provisions promulgated or enacted by the
federal government which invite the state to participate in the distribution,
disbursement or administration of any fund or service advanced, offered or
contributed in whole or in part by the federal government for purposes consistent with the powers and duties of the department. Such funds shall be used
as provided in this chapter and be administered by the department for purposes related to medical assistance programs.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-6, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17.

26-18-7. Medical vendor rates.
Medical vendor payments made to providers of services for and in behalf of
recipient households shall be based upon predetermined rates from standards
developed by the division in cooperation with providers of services for each
type of service purchased by the division. As far as possible, the rates paid for
services shall be established in advance of the fiscal year for which funds are
to be requested.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-7, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sentence twice substituted "division" for "department."

26-18-8. Enforcement of public assistance statutes — Contract with Office of Recovery Services.
(1) The department shall enforce or contract for the enforcement of the
provisions of Sections 62A-9-121, 62A-9-129, 62A-9-131 through 62A-9-133,
and 62A-9-135 insofar as these sections pertain to benefits conferred or administered by the division under this chapter.
(2) The department may contract for services covered in Part 1, Chapter 11,
Title 62A insofar as that chapter pertains to benefits conferred or administered by the division under this chapter.
Higtory: C 1953, 26-18-8, enacted by L.
The 1988 amendment by Chapter 21, effec1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 1, 5 2; 1988, ch. tive July 1, 1988, substituted "division" for
21, § 8.
"department" throughout the section.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendThis section has been reconciled by the Ofment by Chapter 1, effective January 19,1988, fice o f Legislative Research and General Counsubstituted the present statutory references for ***"Sections 55-15a-24, and 55-15a-29 through
55-15a-33" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter 15c
of Title 55" in Subsection (2).
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(3) Any employee of the department who authorizes payment for an abortion contrary to the provisions of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor and subject to forfeiture of office.
(4) Any person or organization that, under the guise of other medical treatment, provides an abortion under auspices of the Medicaid program is guilty
of a third degree felony and subject to forfeiture of license to practice medicine
or authority to provide medical services and treatment.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-4, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, S 17; 1987, ch. 181, { 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted former Subsection (1), relating to
the responsibility of counties, redesignated the
subsequent subsections accordingly and made

minor changes in phraseology throughout the
section.
Cross-References. — Penalties for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for felonies, §§76-3-201,
76-3-203, 76-3-301.

26-18-5. Contracts for provision of medical services —
Federal provisions modifying department rules
— Compliance with Social Security Act.
(1) The department may contract with other public or private agencies to
purchase or provide medical services in connection with the programs of the
division. Where these programs are used by other state agencies, contracts
shall provide that other state agencies transfer the state matching funds to
the department in amounts sufficient to satisfy needs of the specified program.
(2) All contracts for the provision or purchase of medical services shall be
established on the basis of the state's fiscal year and shall remain uniform
during the fiscal year insofar as possible. Contract terms shall include provisions for maintenance, administration, and service costs.
(3) If a federal legislative or executive provision requires modifications or
revisions in an eligibility factor established under this chapter as a condition
for participation in medical assistance, the department may modify or change
its rules as necessary to qualify for participation; providing, the provisions of
this section shall not apply to department rules governing abortion.
(4) The department shall comply with all pertinent requirements of the
Social Security Act and all orders, rules, and regulations adopted thereunder
when required as a condition of participation in benefits under the Social
Security Act.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, { 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, efifective July 1, 1988, in the first sentence of Subsection (1) substituted "division"
for "department" and in Subsection (3) substi-

tuted "its rules as necessary" for "department
rules necessary."
Social Security Act — The federal Social
Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 301 et
aeqt
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(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of
Social Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permitted by law and quality control services.
(4) The department may provide by rule for disciplinary measures and
sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and procedures of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively shall
not extend beyond termination from the program or recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, in Subsection (2)
substituted 'this chapter, the requirements of
Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations"
for "the requirements of Title XIX and with

regulations adopted pursuant thereto by the
federal agency" and made various minor phrageology and stylistic changes,
Social Security Act — Title XIX of the fede r a i Social Security Act is compiled as 42
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 126.
Key Numbers. — Social Security *=» 241.

26-18-3.5. Copayments by health
spouses, and parents.

service

recipients,

The department shall selectively provide for enrollment fees, premiums,
deductions, cost sharing or other similar charges to be paid by recipients, their
spouses, and parents, within the limitations of federal law and regulation.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 135, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 169.

26-18-4. Department standards for eligibility under Medicaid — Funds for abortions.
(1) The department may develop standards and administer policies relating
to eligibility under the Medicaid program. An applicant receiving Medicaid
assistance may be limited to particular types of care or services or to payment
of part or all costs of care determined to be medically necessary.
(2) The department shall not provide any funds for medical, hospital, or
other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible persons
where the purpose of the assistance is to perform an abortion, unless the life of
the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not performed.
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History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 3.

26-18-3

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 21, § 10
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Periodic assessment.
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economical manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services, excessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that
fail to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with
regard to both publicly and privately provided services.
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods,
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to:
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utilization is reasonable and necessary;
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions;
(c) mandatory outpatient, rather than inpatient, surgery in appropriate cases;
(d) second surgical opinions;
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services;
(f) coordination of benefits; and
(g) review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures
and provisions of federal law and regulation.
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effectiveness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreasonable utilization.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10
1988, ch. 21, § 4.
makes the act effective July 1, 1988.
Social Security Act — Title XDC of the federal Social Security Act is compiled as 42
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by department.
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the
Social Security Act.
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations.
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by § 17 of the act. For present provisions relating to confidential information, see Chapter 25
of this title.

26-18-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the
medical programs of the state.
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1.
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10.
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assistance for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant
to Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act.
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or payments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance
under state medical programs.
(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance
Program established under Section 26-18-10.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, added present
Subsections (2) and (3), designated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6),
and, in Subsection (6), substituted "has received medical or hospital assistance under the

Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance Program established under Section
26-18-10" for '"the department has determined
to be eligible for medical or hospital assistance
under the medical programs of the state "
Social Security Act — Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act is compiled as 42
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

26-18-2.1. Division — Creation.
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care Financing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and applicable federal law.
History: C. 1953, 26-18*2.1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 2.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 21, § 10
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988

26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities.
The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of
the department. The director of the division may employ other employees as
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall:
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this
chapter;
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in
compliance with federal law and regulations.
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ARTICLE 3
TESTS OF NEWBORN INFANTS
26-17-21. PKU tests of newborn infants — Board of Health
to establish rules and regulations.
The Board of Health shall establish rules and regulations requiring each
newborn infant to be tested for the presence of phenylketonuria (PKU) and
other metabolic diseases which may result in mental retardation or brain
damage and for which a preventive measure or treatment is available and for
which a laboratory diagnostic test method has been found reliable.
History: L. 1965, ch. 49, ft 1; 1967, ch. 174,
136

Cross-References. —- Fees for and restriction on testing, § 26-10-6

26-17-22. Repealed.
Repeals — Section 26-17-22 (L 1965, ch
49, § 2), relating to the penalty for violations

of regulations relating to PKU tests, was repealed by Laws 1967, ch 174, § 162

CHAPTER 18
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT
Sunset Act — See Section 63-55-7 for the termination date of the Medical Assistance Act
Section
26-18-1
26-18-2
26-18-2 1
26-18-2 2
26-18-2 3
26-18-3
26-18-3 5
26-18-4
26-18-5

Section
Short title
Definitions
Division — Creation
Director — Appointment — Respo risibilities
Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Periodic assessment
Administration of Medicaid program by department
Copayments by health service recipients, spouses, and parents
Department standards for eligibility under Medicaid — Funds
for abortions
Contracts for provision of medical
services — Federal provisions

26-18-6
26-18-7
26-18-8
26-18-9
26-18-10
26-18-11

modifying department rules —
Compliance with Social Security Act
Federal aid — Authority of executive director
Medical vendor rates
Enforcement of public assistance
statutes — Contract with Office
of Recovery Services
Prohibited acts of state or local
employees of Medicaid program
— Violation a misdemeanor
Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies and standards
Rural hospitals

26-18-1. Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance
Act."
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, ft 17.
Repeals and Reenactmenta. — Laws 1981,
ch 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1 to

26-18-4 (L 1963, ch 38, §§ 1 to 4, 1969, ch
197, §§ 64, 65, 1971, ch 53, § 1), relating to
use of confidential information in research
Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted
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1435.852 Treatment of income and resources: State plan requirements.
(a) The State's plan must specify the
methodology used to treat the income
and resources for each covered medically needy group.
(b) If the agency uses a methodology
that is not presumed to be reasonable
under {435.851, the State plan must
describe that methodology.
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30,1981]

APPLICATIONS

§ 435.905 Availability of program information.
(a) The agency must furnish the following information in written form,
and orally as appropriate, to all applicants and to all other individuals who
request it:
(1) The eligibility requirements.
(2) Available Medicaid services.
(3) The rights and responsibilities of
applicants and recipients.
(b) The agency must publish in
Subpart J—Eligibility in the States
quantity and make available bulletins
and District of Columbia
or pamphlets that explain the rules
SOUKCT. 44 FR 17937, Mar. 23, 1979, unless governing eligibility and appeals in
otherwise noted.
simple and understandable terms.
[44 FR 17937, Mar. 23, 1979, as amended at
§435.900 Scope.
45 FR 24887, Apr. 11. 1980]
This subpart sets forth requirements
for processing applications, determin- § 435.906 Opportunity to apply.
ing eligibility, and furnishing MedicThe agency must afford an individaid.
ual wishing to do so the opportunity
to apply for Medicaid without delay.
GENERAL METHODS OF ADMINISTRATION

§435.902 Consistency with objectives and
statutes.
The Medicaid agency's standards
and methods for determining eligibility must be consistent with the objectives of the program and with the
rights of individuals under the United
States Constitution, the Social Security Act, title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and all other relevant
provisions of Federal and State laws.
§ 435.903 Simplicity of administration.
The agency's policies and procedures
must ensure that eligibility is determined in a mariner consistent with
simplicity of administration and the
best interests of the applicant or recipient.
§435.904 Adherence of local agencies to
State plan requirements.
The agency must—
(a) Have methods to keep itself currently informed of the adherence of
local agencies to the State plan provisions and the agency's procedures for
determining eligibility; and
(b) Take corrective action to ensure
their adherence.

§ 435.907 Written application.
The agency must require a written
application from the applicant, an authorized representative or, if the applicant is incompetent or incapacitated,
someone acting responsibly for the applicant. The application must be on a
form prescribed by the agency and
signed under a penalty of perjury.
§ 435.908 Assistance with application.
The agency must allow an individual
or individuals of the applicant's choice
to accompany, assist, and represent
the applicant in the application process or a redetermination of eligibility.
§ 435.909 Automatic entitlement to Medicaid following a determination of eligibility under other programs.
The agency must not require a separate application for Medicaid from an
individual, if—
(a) The individual receives AFDC; or
(b) The agency has an agreement
with the Social Security Administration (SSA) under section 1634 of the
Act for determining Medicaid eligibility; and—
(1) The individual receives SSI;
(2) The individual receives a mandatory State supplement under either a
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42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-91 Edition)

(d) If the agency uses a medically
needy resource standard not specified
in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section—
(1) That standard is not presumed to
be reasonable; and
(2) HCPA must approve the standard.
C46 FR 47988, Sept SO, 1981; 46 FR 54743,
Nov. 11,1981]
0435.843 Medically needy resource standards: State plan requirements.
(a) The State plan must specify the
resource standard for each covered
medically needy group.
(b) If the agency uses a resource
standard that is not presumed to be
reasonable under (435.841, the State
plan must describe that standard.
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30, 1981]
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY ON THE BASIS
or RESOURCES

6435.845 Medically needy resource eligibility.
To determine eligibility on the basis
of resources for medically needy individuals, the agency must—
(a) Consider only the individual's resources and those that are considered
available to him under the financial
responsibility requirements for relatives in §435.821, {435.822, or
i 435.823;
(b) Consider only resources available
during the period for which income is
computed under § 435.831(a);
(c) For individuals under age 21 and
caretaker relatives, deduct the value of
resources that would be deducted in
determining eligibility under the
State's AFDC plan;
(d) For aged, blind, or disabled individuals in States covering all SSI recipients, deduct the value of resources
that would be deducted in determining
eligibility under SSI;
(e)(1) For aged, blind, or disabled individuals in States using requirements
more restrictive than SSI, deduct the
value of resources in an amount no
more restrictive than those deducted
under the Medicaid plan on January 1,
1972 and no more liberal than those
deducted in determining eligibility
under SSI.

(2) However, the amounts specified
in paragraph (e)(1) of this section
must be the same as those that would
be deducted in determining, under
{ 435.121, the eligibility of the categorically needy; and
(f) Apply the resource standards established under { 435.843.
[43 FR 45204, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at
45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980; 46 FR 47989,
Sept. 30,1981]
TREATMENT OF INCOME AND RESOURCES

6 435.850 Treatment of income and resources: General requirements.

To determine eligibility of medically
needy individuals, a Medicaid agency
must use a methodology for the treatment of income and resources that i s (a) Uniform for all individuals in a
covered group; and
(b) Reasonable (see § 435.851).
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30,1981]
§435.851 Treatment of income and resources: Reasonableness.

(a) The agency must use a methodology for the treatment of income and
resources, to determine eligibility of
the medically needy, that is reasonable.
(b) The methodology used to determine eligibility of individuals in the
cash assistance program related to the
covered medically needy group is presumed to be reasonable.
(c) If the agency provides Medicaid
for the aged, blind, or disabled individuals who meet more restrictive requirements than used under SSI, the
methodology for the treatment of
income and resources of those aged,
blind, or disabled individuals under
the State's plan on January 1, 1972, is
presumed to be reasonable.
(d) If the agency uses a methodology
not described in paragraphs (b) and (c)
of this section—
(1) The methodology is not presumed to be reasonable; and
(2) HCFA must approve that methodology.
[46 FR 47989, Sept. 30,1981]
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(d) Optional deduction: Allowance MEDICALLY NEEDY RESOURCE STANDARDS
for home maintenance. For single individuals and couples, an amount (in ad- §435.840 Medically needy resource standards: General requirements.
dition to the personal needs allowTo determine eligibility of medically
ance) for maintenance of the individneedy individuals, a Medicaid agency
ual's or couple's home if—
(1) The amount is deducted for not must use a resource standard under
this subpart that is—
more than a 6-month period; and
(a) Based on family size;
(2) A physician has certified that
(b) Uniform for all individuals in a
either of the individuals is likely to
return to the home within that period. group; and
(c) Reasonable. (See { 435.841)
(e) Determination of income—il)
Option, In determining the amount of [46 FR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981, 46 FR 54734,
an individual's income to be used to Nov. 11,1981]
reduce the agency's payment to the institution, the agency may use total §435.841 Medically needy resource standards: Reasonableness.
income received or it may project total
(a) The agency must use a medically
monthly income for a prospective
needy resource standard that is reaperiod not to exceed 6 months.
(2) Basis for projection. The agency sonable, according to the provisions of
must base the projection on income re- this section.
(b) The following medlically needy
ceived in the preceding period, not to
exceed 6 months, and on income ex- resource standards are presumed to be
reasonable:
pected to be received.
(1) The agency provides one medical(3) Adjustments. At the end of the
ly
needy resource standard for all covprospective period specified in paramedically needy groups. Except
graph (e)(1) of this section, or when ered
as provided in paragraph (c) of this
any significant change occurs, the section,
standard must at least
agency must reconcile estimates with equal thethehighest
resource standard
income received.
used to determine eligibility in the
(f) Determination of medical ex- cash assistance programs related to
penses—(I) Option. In determining the the covered medically needy groups.
amount of medical expenses to be de(2) The agency provides a different
ducted from an individual's income, medically needy resource standard for
the agency may deduct incurred medi- each covered medically needy group.
cal expenses, or it may project medical Except as provided in paragraph (c) of
expenses for a prospective period not this section, the standard for each covto exceed 6 months.
ered group must at least equal the
(2) Basis for projection. The agency highest resource standard used to demust base the estimate on medical ex- termine eligibility in the cash assistpenses incurred in the preceding ance program related to that covered
period, not to exceed 6 months, and medically needy group.
(c) In the case of an agency that promedical expenses expected to be invides Medicaid for the aged, blind, or
curred.
(3) Adjustments. At the end of the disabled individuals only if they meet
prospective period specified in para- more restrictive requirements than
graph (f)(1) of this section, or when used under SSI, the following proviany significant change occurs, the sions apply:
(1) The agency may use a resource
agency must reconcile estimates with
standard for those individuals that is
incurred medical expenses.
lower than the standard specified in
[45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980, as amended at paragraph (b) of this section.
46 FR 47988, Sept. 80, 1981; 48 FR 5735,
(2) The lower standard must at least
Feb. 8, 1983, 53 FR 3596, Feb. 8, 1988; 53 FR equal the medically needy resource
5344, Feb. 23,1988, 56 FR 8850, 8854, Mar, 1, standard for those aged, blind, or dis1991]
abled individuals under the State's
plan on January 1,1972.
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(d) Eligibility based on incurred
medical expenses. Once deduction of
incurred medical expenses reduces
income to the income standard, the Individual is eligible for Medicaid.

personal needs from those of the aged,
blind, and disabled.
(2) Maintenance needs of spouse. For
an individual with only a spouse at
home, an additional amount for the
maintenance
needs of the spouse. This
[43 FR 45204, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at
45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980; 46 FR 42067, amount must be based on a reasonable
Aug. 19. 1981; 46 FR 47988. Sept. 30, 1981] assessment of need but must not
exceed the highest of—
(i) The amount of the income stand§435.832 Post-eligibility
treatment of
income and resources of institutional- ard used to determine eligibility for
ized individuals: Application of patient SSI for an individual living in his own
home;
income to the cost of care.
(ii) The amount of the highest
(a) Basic rules. (1) The agency must
reduce its payment to an institution, income standard, in the appropriate
of age, blindness, or disabilfor services provided to an Individual category
ity,
used
to
determine eligibility for an
specified In paragraph (b) of this sec- optional State
supplement for an indition, by the amount that remains after vidual in his own
if the agency
deducting the amounts specified in provides Medicaidhome,
to optional State
paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, supplement recipients under {435.230;
from the individual's total income.
or
(2) The individual's Income must be
(iii) The amount of the highest
determined in accordance with para- medically needy income standards for
graph (e) of this section.
one
person
established
under
(3) Medical expenses must be deter- S 435.814.
mined in accordance with paragraph
(3) Maintenance needs of family. For
(f) of this section.
an individual with a family at home,
(b) Applicability. This section ap- an additional amount for the mainteplies to medically needy individuals In nance needs of the family. This
medical institutions and intermediate amount must—
care facilities.
(1) Be based on a reasonable assess(c) Required deductions. The agency ment of their financial need;
must deduct the following amounts, in
(ii) Be adjusted for the number of
the following order, from the individ- family members living in the home;
ual's total income, as determined and
under paragraph (e) of this section.
(lii) Not exceed the highest of the
Income that was disregarded in deter- following need standards for a family
mining eligibility must be considered of the same size:
in this process.
(A) The standard used to determine
(1) Personal needs allowance. A per- eligibility under the State's approved
sonal needs allowance that is reasona- AFDC plan.
ble in amount for clothing and other
(B) The standards used to determine
personal needs of the individual while eligibility under the State's Medicaid
in the institution. This protected per- plan, as provided for in § 435.814.
sonal needs allowance must be at
(4) Expenses not subject to third
leastparty payment. Amounts for incurred
CD $30 a month for an aged, blind, or expenses for medical or remedial care
disabled individual, including a child that are not subject to payment by a
applying for Medicaid on the basis of third party, including—
blindness or dlability.
(i) Medicare and other health insur(ii) $60 a month for an institutional- ance permiums, deductibles, or coinized couple if both spouses are aged, surance charges; and
blind, or disabled and their income is
(ii) Necessary medical or remedial
considered available to each other in care recognized under State law but
determining eligibility; and
not covered under the State's Medic(Hi) For other individuals, a reasona- aid plan, subject to reasonable limits
ble amount set by the agency, based the agency may establish on amounts
on a reasonable difference in their of these expenses.
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[46 FR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 46 FR 54743,
Nov. 4, 19813
6435.823 Financial responsibility of relatives of aged, blind, or disabled individuals in States using more restrictive requirements than SSI.

(a) The agency must meet the requirements of this section in determining eligibility under § 435.330 of medically needy aged, blind, and disabled
individuals.
(b) For aged, blind, or disabled individuals with spouses, the agency—
(1) Must consider income and resources as available if they are actually contributed by one spouse tfo the
other; and
(2) May consider income and resources of spouses as available to each
other even if they are not actually
contributed.
(c) For blind or disabled individuals
under age 21, the agencyCD Must consider the parent's or
spouse's income and resources as available if they are actually contributed to
the individual; and
(2) May consider the parent's or
spouse's income and resources as available even if they are not actually contributed.
[46 FR 47988, Sept. 30,1981]
MEDICALLY NEEDY INCOME ELIGIBILITY

§ 435.831 Income eligibility.

The agency must determine income
eligibility of medically needy individuals in accordance with this section.
The agency must use a prospective
period of not more than 6 months to
compute income.
(a) Determining countable income.
The agency must deduct the following
amounts from income to determine
the individual's countable income.
(1) For individuals under age 21 and
caretaker relatives, the agency must
deduct amounts that would be deducted in determining eligibility under the
State's AFDC plan.
(2) For aged, blind, or disabled individuals in States covering all SSI recipients, the agency must deduct
amounts that would be deducted in determining eligibility under SSI. However, the agency must also deduct the
highest amounts from income that
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would be deducted in determining eligibility for optional State supplements
if these supplements are paid to all individuals who are receiving SSI or
would be eligible for SSI except for
their income.
(3) For aged, blind, or disabled individuals in States using income requirements more restrictive than SSI, the
agency must deduct amounts that are
no more restrictive than those used
under the Medicaid plan on January 1,
1972 and no more liberal than those
deducted in determining eligibility
under SSI or an optional State supplement. However, the amounts must be
at least the same as those that would
be deducted in determining eligibility,
under § 435.121, of the categorically
needy.
(b) Eligibility based on countable
income. If countable income determined under paragraph (a) of this section is equal to or less than the applicable income standard under § 435.814,
the individual or family is eligible for
Medicaid.
(c) Deduction of incurred medical
expenses. (1) If countable income exceeds the income standard, the agency
must deduct from income, in the following order, incurred medical expenses that are not subject to payment by a third party:
(i) Medicare and other health insurance premiums, deductibles, or coinsurance charges, incurred by the individual or family or financially responsible relatives, including enrollment
fees, copayments, or deductibles imposed under § 447.51 or § 447.53 of this
subchapter.
(ii) Expenses incurred by the individual or family or financially responsible
relatives for necessary medical and remedial services that are recognized
under State law but not included in
the plan.
(iii) Expenses incurred by the individual or family or by financially responsible relatives for necessary medical and remedial services that aire included in the plan.
(2) The agency may set reasonable
limits on the amounts of incurred
medical expenses to be deducted from
income under paragraphs (c)(1) (i) and
(ii) of this section.
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§ 416.1212 Exclusion of the home.
(a) Defined. A home is any property
in which an individual (and spouse, if
any) has an ownership interest and
which serves as the individual's principal place of residence. This property
includes the shelter in which an individual resides, the land on which the
shelter is located and related outbuildings.
(b) Home not counted We do not
count a home regardless of its value.
However, see §§416.1220 through
416.1224 when there is an income-producing property located on the home
property that does not qualify under
the home exclusion.
(c) / / an individual changes principal place of residence. If an individual
(and spouse, if any) moves out of his
or her home without the intent to
return, the home becomes a countable
resource because it is no longer the individual's principal place of residence.
If an individual leaves his or her home
to live in an institution, we still consider the home to be the individual's
principal place of residence, irrespective of the individual's intent to
return, as long as a spouse or dependent relative of the eligible individual
continues to live there. The individual's equity in the former home becomes a countable resource effective
with the first day of the month following the month it is no longer his or
her principal place of residence.
(d) Proceeds from the sale of an excluded home. The proceeds from the
sale of a home which is excluded from
the individual's resources will also be
excluded from resources to the extent
they are intended to be used and are,
in fact, used to purchase another
home, which is similarly excluded,
within 3 months of the date of receipt
of the proceeds.
[50 FR 42686, Oct. 22. 1985, as amended at
51 FR 7437, Mar. 4. 19863
8 416.1216 Exclusion of household goods
and personal effects.
(a) Household goods and personal effects; defined. Household goods are defined as including household furniture, furnishings and equipment
which are commonly found in or about
a house and are used in connection

with the operation, maintenance tad
occupancy of the home. Household
goods would also include the furniture, furnishings and equipment
which are used in the functions and
activities of home and family life ai
well as those items which are for comfort and accommodation. Personal effects are defined as including clothing,
jewelry, items of personal care, individual education and
(b) Limitation on household gooix
and personal effects. In determining
the resources of an individual (and
spouse, if any), household goods and
personal effects are excluded if their
total equity value is $2,000 or less. If
the total equity value of household
goods and personal effects is in excess
of $2,000, the excess is counted against
the resource limitation.
(c) Additional exclusions of household goods and personal effects. In determining the resources of an individual (and spouse, if any) and in determining the value of the household
goods and personal effects of such individual (and spouse), there shall be
excluded a wedding ring and an engagement ring and household goods
and personal effects such as prosthetic
devices, dialysis machines, hospital
beds, wheel chairs and similar equipment required because of a person's
physical condition. The exclusion of
items required because of a person's
physical condition is not applicable to
items which are used extensively and
primarily by members of the household in addition to the person whose
physical condition requires the item.
[40 FR 48915, Oct. 20,1975, as amended at
44 FR 43266, July 24,19793
§ 416.1218 Exclusion of the automobile.
(a) Automobile; defined. As used in
this section, the term automobile includes, in addition to passenger cars,
other vehicles used to provide necessary transportation.
(b) Limitation on automobiles. In
determining the resources of an individual (and spouse, if any), automobiles are excluded or counted as follows:
(1) Total exclusion. One automobile
is totally excluded regardless of its
value if, for the individual or a
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of the month. A resource determination is based on what assets an individual has, what their values are, and
whether or not they are excluded as of
the first moment of the month.
(b) Increase in value of resources. If,
during a month, a resource increases
to value or an individual acquires an
additional resource or replaces an excluded resource with one that is not
excluded, the increase in the value of
the resources is counted as of the first
moment of the next month
(c) Decrease in value of resources. If,
during a month, a resource decreases
in value or an individual spends a resource or replaces a resource that is
not excluded with one that is excluded, the decrease in the value of
the resources is counted as of the first
moment of the next month.
(d) Treatment of items under income
and resource counting rules. Items received in cash or in kind during a
month are evaluated first under the
income counting rules and, if retained
until the first moment of the following month, are subject to the rules for
counting resources at that time.
(e) Receipts from the sale, exchange,
or replacement of a resource. If an individual sells, exchanges or replaces a
resource, the receipts are not income.
They are still considered to be a resource. This rule includes resources
that have never been counted as such
because they were sold, exchanged or
replaced in the month in which they
were received. See § 416.1246 for the
rule on resources disposed of for less
than fair market value (including
those disposed of during the month of
receipt).

6 416.1210 Exclusions from resources; general.

In determining the resources of an
individual (and spouse, If any) the following items shall be excluded:
(a) The home (including the land appertaining thereto) to the extent its
value does not exceed the amount set
forth in § 416.1212;
(b) Household goods and personal effects to the extent that their total
value does not exceed the amount provided in § 416.1216;
(c) An automobile to the extent that
its value does not exceed the amount
provided in f 416.1218;
(d) Property of a trade or business
which is essential to the means of selfsupport as provided in § 416.1222;
(e) Nonbusiness property which is
essential to the means of self-support
as provided in § 416.1224;
(f) Resources of a blind or disabled
individual which are necessary to fulfill an approved plan for achieving
self-support as provided in § 416.1226;
(g) Stock in regional or village corporations held by natives of Alaska
during the twenty-year period in
which the stock is inalienable pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (see § 416.1228);
(h) Life insurance owned by an individual (and spouse, if any) to the
extent provided in § 416.1230; and
(i) Restricted allotted land owned by
an enrolled member of an Indian tribe
as provided in § 416.1234;
(j) Payments or benefits provided
under a Federal statute other than
title XVI of the Social Security Act
where exclusion is required by such
statute;
(k) Disaster relief assistance as provided in § 416.1237;
(1) Burial spaces and certain funds
up to $1,500 for burial expenses as provided in § 416.1231.
(m) Title XVI or title II retroactive
payments as provided in § 416.1233.
(n) Housing assistance as provided in
i 416.1238.

Example: Miss L., a disabled individual, receives a $350 unemployment insurance benefit on January 10, 1986. The benefit is unearned income to Miss L. when she receives
'* On January 14, Miss L. uses the $350 payment to purchase shares of stock. Miss L.
tos exchanged one item (cash) for another
am (stock). The $350 payment is never
sunted as a resource to Miss L. because she
^changed it in the same month she rested it. The stock is not income; it is a dif«rent form of a resource exchanged for the
ash. Since a resource is not countable until
•be first moment of the month foUowing its [40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, as amended at
"weipt, the stock is not a countable re- 41 FR 13338. Mar. 30, 1976; 44 FR 15664.
Mar. 15, 1979; 48 FR 57127, Dec. 28, 1983; 51
source to Miss L. until February 1.
FR 34464, Sept. 29, 1986; 55 FR 28378, July
11.1990]
$2 FR 4283, Feb. 11.19873
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applicable exclusions from resources
are explained in {§416.1210 (paragraphs (a) through (i) and (k»
through 416.1237. For resources excluded by Federal statutes other than
the Social Security Act, as applicable
to the resources of sponsors deemed to
aliens, see the appendix to subpart K,
Income. We next allocate for the sponsor or for the sponsor and spouse (if
living together). (The amount of the
allocation is the applicable resource
limit described in § 416.1205 for an eligible individual and an individual and
spouse.)
(b) An alien sponsored by more than
one sponsor. The resources of an alien
who has been sponsored by more than
one person are deemed to include the
resources of each sponsor.
(c) More than one alien sponsored by
one individual If more than one alien
is sponsored by one individual the
deemed resources are deemed to each
alien as if he or she were the only one
sponsored by the individual.
(d) Alien has a sponsor and a parent
or a spouse with deemable resources.
Resources may be deemed to an alien
from both a sponsor and a spouse or
parent (if the alien is a child) provided
that the sponsor and the spouse or
parent are not the same person and
the conditions for each rule are met.
(e) Alien's sponsor is also the alien's
ineligible spouse or parent If the
sponsor is also the alien's ineligible
spouse or parent who lives in the same
household, the spouse-to-spouse or
parent-to-child deeming rules apply instead of the sponsor-to-alien deeming
rules. If the spouse or parent deeming
rules cease to apply, the sponsor deeming rules will begin to apply. The
spouse or parent rules may cease to
apply if an alien child reaches age 18
or if either the sponsor who is the ineligible spouse or parent, or the alien
moves to a separate household.
(f) Alien's sponsor also is the ineligible spouse or parent of another SSI
beneficiary. If the sponsor is also the
ineligible spouse or ineligible parent of
an SSI beneficiary other than the
alien, the sponsor's resources are
deemed to the alien under the rules in
paragraph (a), and to the eligible
spouse or child under the rules in
§§ 416.1202, 1205, 1234, 1236, and 1237.

[52 FR 8888. Mar. 20,1987]
§ 416.1204a Deeming of resources where
Medicaid! eligibility is affected.
Section 416.1161a of this part describes certain circumstances affecting
Medicaid eligibility in which the Department will not deem family income
to an individual. The Department will
follow the same standards, procedures,
and limitations set forth in that section with respect to deeming of resources.
[49 FR 5747, Feb. 15,1984)
§ 416.1205 Limitation on resources.
(a) Individual with no eligible
spouse. An aged, blind, or disabled individual with no spouse is eligible for
benefits under title XVI of the Act if
his or her nonexcludable resources do
not exceed $1,500 prior to January 1,
1985, and all other eligibility requirements are met. An individual who is
living with an ineligible spouse is eligible for benefits under title XVI of the
Act if his or her nonexcludable resources, including the resources of the
spouse, do not exceed $2,250 prior to
January 1, 1985, and all other eligibility requirements are met.
(b) Individual with an eligible
spouse. An aged, blind, or disabled individual who has an eligible spouse is
eligible for benefits under title XVI of
the Act if their nonexcludable resources do not exceed $2,250 prior to
January 1, 1985, and all other eligibility requirements are met.
(c) Effective January 1, 1985 and
later. The resources limits and effective dates for January 1, 1985 and
later are as follows:
Effactrve date
Jtn
Jan
Jan
Jan
Jan

Individual

1, 1965
1, 1986
1,1987
1, 1988
1, 1989

$1,600
1,700
1,800
1,900
2.000

Individual
and spouse
$2*00
$2550
$2700
$2 850
$3000

[50 FR 38982, Sept. 26, 1985]
§416.1207 Resources determinations.
(a) General Resources determinations are made as of the first moment
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such individual's resources shall be § 416.1203 Deeming of resources of an esdeemed to include any resources, not
sential person.
otherwise excluded under this subpart,
In the case of a qualified individual
of such spouse whether or not such re- (as defined in §416.221) whose paysources are available to such individ- ment standard has been increased beual. In addition to the exclusions cause of the presence of an essential
listed in {416.1210, pension funds person (as defined in § 416.222), the rewhich the ineligible spouse may have sources of such qualified individual
are also excluded. Pension funds are shall be deemed to include all the redefined as funds held in individual re- sources of such essential person. If
tirement accounts (IRA), as described such qualified individual would not
by the Internal Revenue Code, or in meet the resource criteria for eligibilwork-related pension plans (including ity (as defined in §§416.1205 and
such plans for self-employed individ- 416.1260) because of the deemed reuals, sometimes referred to as Keogh sources, then the payment standard
plans).
increase because of the essential
(b) Child. In the case of a child (as person will be nullified and the providefined in { 416.1856) who is under age sion of this section will not apply; es18, such child's resources shall be sential person status is lost permadeemed to include any resources, not nently. However, if such essential
otherwise excluded under this subpart, person is an ineligible spouse of a
of an ineligible parent of such child qualified individual or a parent (or
(or the ineligible spouse of a parent) spouse of a parent) of a qualified indiwho is living in the same household vidual who is a child under age 21,
(as defined in { 416.1851) as such child, then the resources of such person will
whether or not available to such child, be deemed to such qualified individual
to the extent that the resources of in accordance with the provision in
such parent (or such spouse of a § 416.1202.
parent) exceed the resource limits de- [39 FR 33797, Sept. 20. 1974, as amended at
scribed in § 416.1205. (If the child is 51
FR 10616, Mar. 28, 1986]
living with only one parent, the resource limit for an individual applies. §416.1204 Deeming of resources of the
If the child is living with both parents
sponsor of an alien.
(or one parent and his or her spouse),
The
of an alien who first
the resource limit for an individual appliesresources
for SSI benefits after Septemind spouse applies.) In addition to the ber 30, 1980,
deemed to include the
exclusions listed in J 416.1210, pension resources of are
the alien's sponsor for 3
funds which the ineligible parent or years after the
alien's date -of admisspouse of a parent may have are also sion into the United
States. The date
excluded. Pension funds are defined in of admission is the date established by
paragraph (a) of this section. As used the Immigration and Naturalization
in this section, the term parent means Service as the date of admission for
the natural or adoptive parent of a permanent residence. The resources of
child and spouse of a parent means the the sponsor's spouse are included if
spouse (as defined in §416.1806) of the sponsor and spouse live in the
such natural or adoptive parent.
same household. Deeming of these re(c) Applicability. When used in this sources applies regardless of whether
subpart L, the term individual refers the alien and sponsor live in the same
to an eligible aged, blind, or disabled household and regardless of whether
person, and also includes a person the resources are actually available to
whose resources are deemed to be the the alien. For rules that apply in speresources of such individual (as provid- cific situations, see § 416.1166a(d).
ed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
(a) Exclusions from the sponsor's resection).
sources. Before we deem a sponsor's
(40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, as amended at resources to an alien we exclude the
SO FR 38982, Sept. 26, 1985; 52 FR 8888, same kinds of resources that are extt&r. 20, 1987; 52 FR 29841, Aug. 12, 1987; 52cluded from the resources of an individual eligible for SSI benefits. The
FR 32240, Aug. 26,1987]
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similar programs, unless determined by the
Director of the Action Agency to constitute
the minimum wage, under sections 404(g)
and 418 of the Domestic Volunteer Service
Act of 1973 (87 Stat. 409, 413), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 96-143; (93 Stat. 1077); 42
UJS C. 5044(g) and 5058).
NOTE—This exclusion does not apply to
the income of sponsors of aliens.
(b) Any assistance to an individual (other
than wages or salaries) under the Older
Americans Act of 1965, as amended by section 102(h)(1) of Pub. L. 95-478 (92 Stat.
1515, 42 U.S.C. 3020a).
[45 FR 65547, Oct. 3, 1980, as amended at 52
FR 8888, Mar. 20, 19873

(e) and (g) of § 416.1121 because they
are to be spent on costs resulting from
the last illness and burial of the deceased, are not resources for the calendar month following the month of receipt. However, such death benefits retained until the first moment of the
second calendar month following their
receipt are resources at that time.
(b) Liquid resources. Liquid resources are cash or other property
which can be converted to cash within
20 days, excluding certain nonwork
days as explained in § 416.120(d). Examples of resources that are ordinarily
liquid are stocks, bonds, mutual fund
Subpart L—Resources and Exclusions
shares, promissory notes, mortgages,
life insurance policies, bank accounts
AUTHORITY: Sees. 1102, 1602, 1611, 1612,
1613, 1614(f), 1621, and 1631 of the Social (savings and checking), certificates of
Security Act; 42 U.S.C. 1302, 1381a, 1382, deposit and similar items. Liquid re1382a, 1382b, 1382c(f), 1382J, and 1383; sec. sources, other than cash, are evaluat211 of Pub. L. 93-66; 87 Stat. 154.
ed according to the individual's equity
in the resources.
SOURCE: 40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, unless
otherwise noted.
(c) Nonliquid resources. (1) Nonliquid resources are property which is
§ 416.1201 Resources; general.
not cash and which cannot be convert(a) Resources; defined. For purposes ed to cash within 20 days excluding
of this subpart L, resources means certain nonwork days as explained in
cash or other liquid assets or any real § 416.120(d). Examples of resources
or personal property that an individ- that are ordinarily nonliquid are loan
ual (or spouse, if any) owns and could agreements, household goods, automoconvert to cash to be used for his or biles, trucks, tractors, boats, machinher support and maintenance.
ery, livestock,, buildings and land. Non(1) If the individual has the right, liquid resources are evaluated accordauthority or power to liquidate the ing to their equity value except as othproperty or his or her share of the erwise provided. (See §416.1218 for
property, it is considered a resource. If treatment of automobiles.)
a property right cannot be liquidated,
(2) For purposes of this subpart L,
the property will not be considered a the equity value of an item is defined
resource of the individual (or spouse). as:
(2) Support and maintenance assist(i) The price that item can reasonance not counted as income under ably
expected to sell for on the
§ 416.1157(c) will not be considered a open be
market in the particular georesource.
(3) Except for cash reimbursement graphic area Involved; minus
(ii) Any encumbrances.
of medical or social services expenses
already paid for by the individual, [40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, as amended at
cash received for medical or social 44 FR 43266, July 24, 1979; 48 FR 33259,
services that is not income under July 21, 1983; 52 FR 4283, Feb. 11, 1987; 52
(416.1103 (a) or (b) is not a resource FR 16845, May 6, 1987; 53 FR 23231, June
for the calendar month following the 21,1988; 56 FR 36001, July 30. 1991]
month of its receipt. However, cash retained until the first moment of the § 416.1202 Deeming of resources.
second calendar month following its
(a) Married individual In the case
receipt is a resource at that time.
of an individual who is living with a
(4) Death benefits, including gifts person not eligible under this part and
and inheritances, received by an indi- who is considered to be the husband
vidual, to the extent that they are not or wife of such individual under the
income in accordance with paragraphs criteria in §§416.1806 and 416.1811
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(34) provide that in the case of any individual who has been
determined to be eligible for medical assistance under the plan,
such assistance will be made available to him for care and
services included under the plan and furnished in or after the
third month before the month in which he made application (or
application was made on his behalf in the case of a deceased
individual) for such assistance if such individual was (or upon
application would have been) eligible for such assistance at the
time such care and services were furnished;
(35) provide that any disclosing entity (as defined in section
1320a-3(a)(2) of this title) receiving payments under such plan
complies with the requirements of section 1320a-3 of this title;
(36) provide that within 90 days following the completion of
each survey of any health care facility, laboratory, agency,
clinic, or organization, by the appropriate State agency described in paragraph (9), such agency shall (in accordance with
regulations of the Secretary) make public in readily available
form and place the pertinent findings of each such surve)
relating to the compliance of each such health care facility,
laboratory, clinic, agency, or organization with (A) the statutory
conditions of participation imposed under this subchapter, and
(B) the major additional conditions which the Secretary finds
necessary in the interest of health and safety of individuals who
are furnished care or services by any such facility, laboratory,
clinic, agency, or organization;
(37) provide for claims payment procedures which (A) ensure that 90 per centum of claims for payment (for which no
further written information or substantiation is required in
order to make payment) made for services covered under the
plan and furnished by health care practitioners through individual or group practices or through shared health facilities are
paid within 30 days of the date of receipt of such claims and
that 99 per centum of such claims are paid within 90 days of
the date of receipt of such claims, and (B) provide for procedures of prepayment and postpayment claims review, including
review of appropriate data with respect to the recipient and
provider of a service and the nature of the service for which
payment is claimed, to ensure the proper and efficient payment
of claims and management of the program;
(38) require that an entity (other than an individual practitioner or a group of practitioners) that furnishes, or arranges
for the furnishing of, items or services under the plan, shall
supply (within such period as may be specified in regulations
by the Secretary or by the single State agency which administers or supervises the administration of the plan) upon request
410
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payments under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV, or to have
paid with respect to him supplemental security income benefits
under subchapter XVI of this chapter) as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his
eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for
reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources, and (D)
do not take into account the financial responsibility of any
individual for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the
plan unless such applicant or recipient is such individual's
spouse or such individual's child who is under age 21 or (with
respect to States eligible to participate in the State program
established under subchapter XVI of this chapter), is blind or
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as
defined in section 1382c of this title (with respect to States
which are not eligible to participate in such program); and
provide for flexibility in the application of such standards with
respect to income by taking into account, except to the extent
prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of
insurance premiums, payments made to the State under section
1396b(f)(2)(B) of this title, or otherwise and regardless of
whether such costs are reimbursed under another public program of the State or political subdivision thereof) incurred for
medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized
under State law;
(18) comply with the provisions of section 1396p of this title
with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical
assistance correctly paid, and transfers of assets;
(19) provide such safeguards as may be necessary to assure
that eligibility for care and services under the plan will be
determined, and such care and services will be provided, in a
manner consistent with simplicity of administration and the
best interests of the recipients;
(20) if the State plan includes medical assistance in behalf of
individuals 65 years of age or older who are patients in institutions for mental diseases—
(A) provide for having in effect such agreements or other
arrangements with State authorities concerned with mental
diseases, and, where appropriate, with such institutions, as
may be necessary for carrying out the State plan, including
arrangements for joint planning and for development of
alternate methods of care, arrangements providing assurance of immediate readmittance to institutions where needed for individuals under alternate plans of care, and ar401
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(E) for payment for services described in clause (B) or
(C) of section 1396d(a)(2) of this title under the plan of 100
percent of costs which are reasonable and related to the
cost of furnishing such services or based on such other tests
of reasonableness, as the Secretary prescribes in regula
tions under section 1395/(a)(3) of this title, or, in the case
of services to which those regulations do not apply, on the
same methodology used under section 13957(a)(3) of this
title; and
(F) for payment for home and community care (as defined in section 1396t(a) of this title and provided under
such section) through rates which are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs of providing care, efficiently and
economically, in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards,
(14) provide that enrollment fees, premiums, or similar
charges, and deductions, cost sharing, or similar charges, may
be imposed only as provided in section 1396o of this title,
(15) Repealed. Pub.L. 100-360, Title III, § 301(e)(2)(C), as
added by Pub.L. 100-485, Title VI, § 608(d)(14)(I)(iii), Oct. 13,
1988, 102 Stat. 2416.
(16) provide for inclusion, to the extent required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary, of provisions (conforming to
such regulations) with respect to the furnishing of medical
assistance under the plan to individuals who are residents of
the State but are absent therefrom;
(17) except as provided in subsections (/)(3), (m)(3), and
(m)(4) of this section, include reasonable standards (which
shall be comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with
standards prescribed by the Secretary, differ with respect to
income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of
assistance under the plan who are not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I,
X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV of this chapter, and
with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits
are not being paid under subchapter XVI of this chapter, based
on the variations between shelter costs in urban areas and in
rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of
medical assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with
the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking into
account only such income and resources as are, as determined
in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any
applicant or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or assistance in the form of money
400
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(V) who are qualified family members as defined in section 1396d(m)(l) of this title;1
(VI) who are described in subparagraph (C) of
subsection (/)(1) of this section and whose family
income does not exceed the income level the State
is required to establish under subsection (/ )(2)(B)
of this section for such a family, or
(VII) who are described in subparagraph (D) of
subsection (/)(1) of this section and whose family
income does not exceed the income level the State
is required to establish under subsection (/ )(2)(C)
of this section for such a family;
(11) at the option of the State, to any group or groups
of individuals described in section 1396d(a) of this title
(or, in the case of individuals described in section
1396d(a)(i) of this title, to any reasonable categories of
such individuals) who are not individuals described in
clause (i) of this subparagraph but—
(I) who meet the income and resources requirements of the appropriate State plan described in
clause (i) or the supplemental security income program (as the case may be),
(II) who would meet the income and resources
requirements of the appropriate State plan described in clause (i) if their work-related child care
costs were paid from their earnings rather than by
a State agency as a service expenditure,
(III) who would be eligible to receive aid under
the appropriate State plan described in clause (i) if
coverage under such plan was as broad as allowed
under Federal law,
(IV) with respect to whom there is being paid, or
who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were
not in a medical institution, to have paid with
respect to them, aid or assistance under the appropriate State plan described in clause (i), supplemental security income benefits under subchapter
XVI of this chapter, or a State supplementary payment;1
(V) who are in a medical institution for a period
of not less than 30 consecutive days (with eligibility by reason of this subclause beginning on the
first day of such period), who meet the resource
requirements of the appropriate State plan de391
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(A) that the State health agency, or other appropriate
State medical agency (whichever is utilized by the Secre
tary for the purpose specified in the first sentence of
section 1395aa(a) of this title), shall be responsible for
establishing and maintaining health standards for private
or public institutions in which recipients of medical assistance under the plan may receive care or services,
(B) for the establishment or designation of a State authority or authorities which shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining standards, other than those relating to health, for such institutions, and
(C) that any laboratory services paid for under such plan
must be provided by a laboratory which meets the applica
ble requirements of section 1395x(e)(9) of this title or
paragraphs (13) and (14) ! of section 1395x(s) of this title,
or, in the case of a laboratory which is in a rural health
clinic, of section 1395x(aa)(2)(G) of this title;
(10) provide—
(A) for making medical assistance available, including at
least the care and services listed in paragraphs (1) through
(5), (17) and (21) of section 1396d(a) of this title, to(1) all individuals—
(I) who are receiving aid or assistance under any
plan of the State approved under subchapter I, X,
XIV, or XVI of this chapter, or part A or part E of
subchapter IV of this chapter (including individuals eligible under this subchapter by reason of
section 602(a)(37), 606(h), or 673(b) of this title, or
considered by the State to be receiving such aid as
authorized under section 682(e)(6) of this title),
(II) with respect to whom supplemental security
income benefits are being paid under subchapter
XVI of this chapter or who are qualified severely
impaired individuals (as defined in section
1396d(q) of this title),
(III) who are qualified pregnant women or children as defined in section 1396d(n) of this title,
(IV) who are described in subparagraph (A) or
(B) of subsection (/)(1) of this section and whose
family income does not exceed the minimum income level the State is required to establish under
subsection (/ )(2)(A) of this section for such a family;1
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of recipients and other persons of low income, as community
service aides, in the administration of the plan and for the use
of nonpaid or partially paid volunteers in a social service
volunteer program in providing services to applicants and recipients and in assisting any advisory committees established
by the State agency, and (C) that each State or local officer or
employee who is responsible for the expenditure of substantial
amounts of funds under the State plan, each individual who
formerly was such an officer or employee, and each partner of
such an officer or employee shall be prohibited from committing any act, in relation to any activity under the plan, the
commission of which, in connection with any activity concerning the United States Government, by an officer or employee of
the United States Government, an individual who was such an
officer or employee, or a partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited by section 207 or 208 of Title 18;
(5) either provide for the establishment or designation of a
single State agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan; or provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to administer or to supervise the
administration of the plan, except that the determination of
eligibility for medical assistance under the plan shall be made
by the State or local agency administering the State plan approved under subchapter I or XVI of this chapter (insofar as it
relates to the aged) if the State is eligible to participate in the
State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this
chapter, or by the agency or agencies administering the supplemental security income program established under subchapter
XVI or the State plan approved under part A of subchapter IV
of this chapter if the State is not eligible to participate in the
State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this
chapter;
(6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in
such form and containing such information, as the Secretary
may from time to time require, and comply with such provisions as the Secretary may from time to time find necessary to
assure the correctness and verification of such reports;
(7) provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of
information concerning applicants and recipients to purposes
directly connected with the administration of the plan;
(8) provide that all individuals wishing to make application
for medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to
do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals;
(9) provide—
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Note 3
5. Eligibility
Although persons eligible for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children are
automatically eligible for medicaid, persons who do not qualify for welfare assistance may nevertheless still qualify
for medicaid. Perez v. Lavine, D.C.N.Y.
1976, 412 F.Supp. 1340, supplemented
422 F.Supp. 1259.
If alien was permanently residing in
United States under color of law within
meaning of federal regulation, she was
eligible to receive Medicaid benefits,
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even though she was not eligible pursuant to state regulation. Cruz v. Commit
sioner of Public Welfare, 1985, 478
N.E.2d 1262, 395 Mass. 107.
*n or( J cr f f o r P«"K>n t 0 Quality for
medicaid, that person must be eligible
and to be eligible a person must qualif)
under a state plan which agrees with all
the statutes and regulations promulgated
under this chapter. Flathead Health
Center v. Flathead County, 1979, 598
P.2d 1111, 183 Mont. 211.

§ 1396a* State plans for medical assistance
(a) Contents
A State plan for medical assistance must—
(1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandator}'
upon them;
(2) provide for financial participation by the State equal to
not less than 40 per centum of the non-Federal share of the
expenditures under the plan with respect to which payments
under section 1396b of this title are authorized by this subchapter; and, effective July 1, 1969, provide for financial participation by the State equal to all of such non-Federal share or
provide for distribution of funds from Federal or State sources,
for carrying out the State plan, on an equalization or other
basis which will assure that the lack of adequate funds from
local sources will not result in lowering the amount, duration,
scope, or quality of care and services available under the plan;
(3) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing
before the State agency to any individual whose claim for
medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon
with reasonable promptness;
(4) provide (A) such methods of administration (including
methods relating to the establishment and maintenance of
personnel standards on a merit basis, except that the Secretary
shall exercise no authority with respect to the selection, tenure
of office, and compensation of any individual employed in
accordance with such methods, and including provision for
utilization of professional medical personnel in the administration and, where administered locally, supervision of administration of the plan) as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan, (B) for
the training and effective use of paid subprofessional staff, with
particular emphasis on the full-time or part-time employment
388
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tion and other services to help such families and individuals attain
or retain capability for independence or self-care, there is hereby
authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient
to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made
available under this section shall be used for making payments to
States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary,
State plans for medical assistance.
(Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, 1965, Pub.L
89-97, Title I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343, and amended Dec. 31, 1973, Pub.L
93-233, § 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, Pub.L. 98-369, Div. B, Title
VI, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Effective Dates
1965 Act Senate Report No. 404 and
1984 Act Amendment by Pub.L
Conference Report No. 682, see 1965 98-369 effective July 18, 1984, but not to
U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 1943. be construed as changing or affecting
any right, liability, status or interpreta1973 Act House Report No. 93-627, tion which existed (under the provisions
see 1973 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, of law involved) before that date, sec
p. 3177.
section 2664(b) of Pub.L. 98-369, set out
_ T fto „,- as a note under section 401 of this title.
1M. . A „
1984 Act Housett Report KNo.
98-432
. ,
.
,
, _ ,t
€„_
Part II and House Conference Report 9 3 *™
* * ' . Amendment
by Pub.L
2 3 3 tff ct
1
No. 98-861, nsee697
1984 ILS.Code
and m e~m s u n d' e™
-* *, J S P " ? L° mP}Te
AdmSTws
^.o.wuuc Cong,
wuiig. miu
r s e c t l o n 1 3 9 6 D 0f ^
Aam.iNews, p. o*/.
fQr c^tn^SLT q uar t e rs commencing after
Amendment!

Dec

.
.
. .. , T fto ,. f t
loc.
1984 Amendment Pub.L. 98-369
struck out "of Health and Human Services" following "Secretary". See Change
of Name note set out under this section.

set out as a note under section 1396a of
^ . t^t

'

31

'

1973

'

$et

1 3 ( d ) o f P u b L 93 233

'

"

'

Change of Name
"Secretary of Health and Human Ser;
vices was substituted for "Secretary of
1973 Amendment Pub.L. 93-233 sub- Health, Education, and Welfare" in text
stituted in item (1) "disabled individuals" pursuant to section 509(b) of Pub.L
for "permanently and totally disabled in- 96-88 which is classified to section
dividuals".
3508(b) of Title 20, Education.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Administrative Law
Federal financial participation, see 45 C.F.R. § 304.10 et seq.
Medicare and Medicaid, see West's Federal Practice Manual § 5811 et seq.
State fiscal administration, see 42 C.F.R. § 433.1 et seq.
American Digest System
Appropriations and disbursement of federal funds, see United States *»82 et seq
Medical assistance programs, see Social Security and Public Welfare *»241 et
seq.
Encyclopedias
Appropriations and disbursement of federal funds, see C J.S. United States § 122
et seq.
Medical assistance programs, see CJ.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 126
et seq.
Law Reviews
Barriers to hospital diversification: The regulatory environment. Reed Hamilton, 24 Duquesne LRev. 425 (1985).
Behind closed doors: The confidentiality of psychotherapeutic records in
medicaid fraud investigations. 6 Pace L.Rev. 441 (1986).
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Laboratories excluded from participation under this subchapter, see 42 USCA
§ 263a.
Maximum amount available to Saint Elizabeths Hospital from Federal sources,
see 24 USCA § 170a.
Medical care for military spouses and children, see 10 USCA § 1079.
Modification of mortgage insurance of hospital receiving revenue from program
under this subchapter, see 12 USCA § 1715z-7.
National Health Services Corps Programs, see 42 USCA § 254d et seq.
Notice by Secretary describing limited benefits for long-term care services, see
42 USCA § 1395b-2.
Office of Rural Health Policy; determination of effects of policies under this
subchapter, see 42 USCA § 912.
Payment for services in general—
Health care costs incurred by military dependents, see 10 USCA § 1095.
Health maintenance organizations, see 42 USCA §§ 1395mm, 1395w.
Physicians' services, see 42 USCA §§ 1395w-l, 1395w-4.
Reasonable charges, factors considered, see 42 USCA § 1395u.
State imposed higher requirements as condition to purchase of services; like
requirements as condition of payment, see 42 USCA § 1395z.
Veterans' Administration, department of medicine and surgery; acceptance
of payments, see 38 USCA § 4108.
Payment for services to hospitalsAverage reasonable cost per patient-day, sec 42 USCA § 1395tt.
Determination of reasonable costs; development of model systems, see 42
USCA §§ 1320b-3, 1320b-4.
State hospital reimbursement control system, see 42 USCA § 1395ww.
Payments under National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, see 42 USCA
§ 300aa-15.
Peer review; general provisions, see 42 USCA § 1301 et seq.
Period within which State must file claim for expenditures under program, see
42 USCA § 1320b-2.
Pooling of funds for transportation services with State or area agencies on aging,
see 42 USCA § 3026.
Program under this subchapter not health-plan contract for purposes of recovery
of costs of certain veterans' care services, see 38 USCA § 629.
State plan for child and spousal support; determination of paternity of child
born out of wedlock, support from parents for child in foster care, see 42
USCA § 654.
State plan requirements—
Federal-State pilot program to provide medical and social services for
certain handicapped individuals, see 42 USCA § 1382i.
Income and eligibility verification system, see 42 USCA § 1320b-7.
Waiver; disallowance of items, see 42 USCA §§ 1315, 1316.
State planning councils for persons with developmental disabilities; representative of State agency administering program included, sec 42 USCA § 6024.
Student loans with respect to services in certain health care facilities in underserved areas; requirements with respect to facilities, see 42 USCA § 297n.
Utilization and quality control peer review organization, see 42 USCA § 1320c et
seq.

§ 1396.

Appropriations

For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable
under the conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance
on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient
to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilita385

ADDENDUM D

SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1965
For text of Act sec p. 305
House Report (Ways and Means Committee) No. 213, Mar. 29, 19G5
[To accompany H.R. 6675]
Senate Report (Finance Committee) No. 404, June 30, 1965
[To accompany H.R. 6675]
Conference Report No. 682, July 26,1965 [To accompany H.R. 6675]
Cong. Record Vol. I l l (1965)
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE
House Apr. 8, July 27, 1965
Senate July 9, July 28, 1965
The Senate Report and the Conference Report are set out.
SENATE REPORT NO. 401
^ ^ H E Ccrr.:v.i:tee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (H R. 66"5 >
to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social
Security Ac: with a supplementary health benefits program ar.d an expanded prcgrarr. of medical assistance, to increase benefits under the oldage, survivors, and disability insurance system, to improve the FederalState publi: assistance programs, and for other purposes, having considered the sar.-:. report favorably thereon v. ith r-.rr.c\ jmer.ts and re:on*m»:r !

PART I
I.

BRIEF SUMMARY

The overall purpose of H.R. 6675 is as follows:
First, to provide a coordinated approach for health insurance and medical
care for the aged under the Social Security Act by establishing three new
health care programs: (1) a compulsory hospital-based program for the
aged; (2) a voluntary supplementary plan to provide physicians' and other
supplementary health services for the aged; and (3) an expanded medical
assistance program for the needy and medically needy aged, blind, disabled,
and families with dependent children.
Second, to expand the services for maternal and child health, crippled
children, child welfare, and the mentally retarded, and to establish a 5-ycar
program of "special project grants" to provide comprehensive health care
and services for needy children (including those who arc emotionally disturbed) of school age or preschool age.
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6.

I M P R O V E M E N T AND E X T E X S I O X OF KERR-MILLS
MEDICAL A S S I S T A N C E PROGRAM

(a) Background
The provision ci medical care for the needy has long been a responsibility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent years,
the Federal Government has assisted the States and localities in carrying this responsibility by participating in the cost of the care provided.
Under the original Social Security Act, it was possible for the States,
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they could
l - y the medical care they needed. Since 1950, the Social Security Act
has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provided in behalf of the needy aged, bh'nd, disabled, and dependent children—the socalled vendor payments.
Several times since 1/50, the Congress lias liberalized the previsions
c: law under which the States administer the State-Federal program of
m.Mcal assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment was
:n 1950 when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged program
v as authorized. This legislation offers generous Federal matching to
«.• able the States ::- ;r^vidc n cdicr.l care in behalf of aged persons who
V v e enough income for their 1 a.sic maintenance but not enough for
m heal care costs. This program has grown to the point where 40 States
r-.". 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and over 246,000 aged
w:-e aided in March 1965. Furthermore, medical care as a pan of the
cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the years
i.-'ii, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments for some
:t.-r:s of medical care for at least some of the needy.
The committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under which
States operate their medical assistance programs so as to make medical
services fcr the needy more generally available. To accomplish this objective, the committee bill would establish, effective January 1, 1966, a
new title in the Social Security Act—"Title N I X : Grants to the States
for Medical Assistance Programs."
Under the House bill, after an interim period ending June 30, 1967,
all States would have to adopt the new program or lose Federal matching
as to vendor medical payments since the current provisions of law would
expire at that time. Under the committee bill the States will have the
option of participating under the new program or continuing to operate
under the vendor payment provisions of title I (old-age assistance and
medical assistance for the aged), title IV (aid to families with dependent
children), title X (aid to the blind), title XIV (aid to the permanently
and totally disabled), and title XVI (the combined adult program). Programs of vendor payments for medical care will continue, as now, to be
optional with the States.
(b) State plan requirements
(1) Standard provisions
The provisions in the proposed title XIX contain a number of requirements for State plans which are either identical to the existing provisions of law or are merely conforming changes. These are:
That a plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the
State,
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That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing for
any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted
upon with reasonable promptness.
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary
may from time to time require.
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict the use or
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients to purposes directly connected with the administration of the plan.
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness.
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall be
an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the eye or
by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select.
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who arc
residents of the State but who are absent therefrom.
(2) Additions to standard provisions
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above, the
committee bill contains several other plan requirements which are either
new or changed over provisions currently in the law.
The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the State
equal to not less than 40 percent of the non-Federal share of the expenditures under the plan and that, effective July 1, 1970, the financial participation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This provision was included to make certain that the lack of availability of local
funds for financing of any part of the program not affect the amount,
scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration set by the
State. Prior to the 1970 date, the committee will be willing to consider
other legislative alternatives to the provisions making the entire nonFederal share a responsibility of the State so long as these alternatives,
in maintaining the concept of local participation, assure a consistent
statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy.
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance titles
of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such methods
of administration as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the
proper and efficient operation of the plan, with the addition of the requirement that such methods must include provisions for utilization of professional medical personnel in the administration of the plan. It is important that State utilize a sufficient number of trained and qualified personnel in the administration of the program including both medical and
other professional staff.
The committee's bill would add a requirement that the State plan include a description of the standards, methods, and administrative arrangements which affect quality of medical care that a State will use in
administering medical assistance. This amendment would give no authority to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect
to the content of such standards and methods. In this respect it is somewhat analogous to the requirement, which has been in the public assistance titles since 1950 and which is included in the new title XIX, requiring States to have an authority or authorities responsible for establish-
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ing Mid maintaining standards for private or public institutions in which
recipients may receive care or services.
The committee also added an amendment to require that, after June
30, 1967, private and public medical institutions must meet standards
(which may be in addition to the standards prescribed by the State) relating to protection against fire and other hazards to the health and safety of indi\ iduals, which are established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The committee assumes that the standards prescribed by many States at the present time will meet or exceed those prescribed by the Secretary.
The IIruse bill provided that the State or local agency administering
the State plan under title XJX shall be the same agency which is currently r.dmir.istcring cither title I (old-age assistance) or that part of
title XVI (assistance for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and medical
assistance fur the aged) relating to the aged. Where the program relating to the aged is State supervise:, the same State agency shall supervise the a imiristration of title XIX.
The cjr.-.mittee believes that the States should be given the otportun: r y to select the agenc\ they wish to administer the program A number
of witnesses appearing before the committee have expressed the belief
t%at the State health agency should be given the primary responsibility
under thus program. The committee bill leaves this decision wholly to
the States with the sole requirement that the determination of eligibility
for medic-.l assistance be made by the State or local agenc\ administering State plans approved under title I or XVI. The committee agrees
with the snatemcr.t in the House report that the welfare agencies ha\e
'long experience and skill in determination of eligibility."
The committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1965, and on
the date a State submits its title X I X plan, the State agency administering or supervising the administration of the State plan for the blind under title X or title XVI of the Social Security Act is different from the
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the new
program, such blind agency may be designated to administer or supervise the administration of the portion of the title XIX plan which relates to blind individuals. This would include the eligibility determining
function. In such case, the portion of the title XIX plan administered
or supervised by each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan.
Current provisions of law requiring States to have an agency or agencies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for the types
of institutions included under the State plan have been continued under
the bill. Your committee expects that these provisions will be used to
bring about progressive improvement in the level of institutional care
and services provided to recipients of medical assistance. Standards of
care in many medical institutions arc not now at a satisfactory level and
it is hoped that current standards applicable to medical institutions will
be improved by the State's standard-setting agency and that these standards will be enforced by the appropriate State body.
Under provisions of the committee bill, the State plan must include
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of ad-
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ministration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision was
included in order to provide some assurance that the States will not use
unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which have the effect of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on eligibility for
medical assistance or that the States will not administer the provisions
for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the quality of the care to be provided. The committee expects that under this
provision, the States will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive
policies and methods of investigation and that they will develop such procedures as will assure the most effective working relationships with medical facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service ir. order to
encourage their full cooperation and participation in the provision of
services under the State plan.
The committee hopes that there will be continuing evaluation c: ali State
plan requirements in relation to the basic objectives of the legislation.
(c) Eligibility for medical assistance
Under the committee bill, a State plan to be approved must include
provision :;•: medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid or assistance ur.der State plans approved under titles I, IV, X,'XIV, and XVI.
It is only if this group is provided for that States may include medical
assistance tc the less needy.
Under the committee bill, medical assistance made available tc persons
receiving assistance under title I, IV, X, XIV, or XVI must net be less
in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons receiving aid
under any other of those titles. In other words, the amount, duration,
and scope of medical assistance made available must be the same for all
such persons. This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy
aided UH^T the federal';.- aided categories of assistance.
The bill prcvides furthermore that as States extend their pr;i;::.ms to
include assistance for persons who come within the various categories of
assistance except that their income and resources are sufficient to meet
their needs for maintenance, the medical assistance given such individuals
shall not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than that mace available for persons who are recipients of money payments. This was included in order to make sure that the most needy in a State receive no
less comprehensive care than those who arc not as needy.
Under the bill, if a State extends the program to those persons not receiving assistance under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI, the determination of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among
the people who, except for their income and resources, would be recipients of money for maintenance under the other public assistance programs. Thus, the income and resources limitation for the aged must be
comparable to that set for the disabled and blind and must also have a
comparability for that set for families with children who, except for
their income and resources, would be eligible for AFDC. The scope,
amount, and duration of medical assistance available to each of these
groups must be equal.
The committee has amended the House bill, however, so that this provision as to comparability does not apply in the case of services in institutions for tuberculosis or mental diseases. Federal financial participate S Ccrg & A;-.ir.News'6S—127
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t jn is authorized only with respect to recipients aqcd 65 ; 1 o\er in
r e n t a l and tuberculosis institutions so it would not be ; r p opriatc to
•**elude them within the scope of this pro\i*ion.
(d) Determination of need for medical assistance
The committee bill would make more specific a pro\ ision now in the
l.w that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the
p'an, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives
of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources
which indi\iduals may hold and be eligible for aid, thc\ r^-st do so by
maintaining a comparability among the \ a n o u s categorical grours of needy
people. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines to be
:'-at wlrch is applicable for the eligibility of the nced\ aged, fo- e\~i pie,
-"all be comparable to that winch the State sets to determine the cligibil\ for the necd\ bhnd and di«?b>d , and niiist also ha\e a cv^p^rab Jity
*; the s*?* cards used to deter v n c the eligibility of those \ "n~> ?rc to rc*..\<. mec cai assistr r ce as n x d ; child-cn and t u c proems c :*rcr V a \es caring for them
\nothcr pi o\ is on is ncljdcd t r r t requires States to t^kc : *o a;cu v t
'\ such income rnd resources as (determined in acco-dv ce w / h « -r'~'z r~cscr,bed b\ the Stcr<.:~rO, are actua v \ r*: .'ible tD t'.e iy' c,.-t
- r e c o u n t and as would not be disregarded (or set ?* J c fo- iitu-e
• tec-1 m dctcrmirmg the eligibility for and the an-n^nt of f e ?*L C as< -\ince ir the fo-jr of mone\ piuiKnts for ai \ such ppp1 ca^t or rec picnt under the title of the Social Security Act most appropriate 1 } apz. cable to hun Income and resources taken into account f '-thermcre,
- st be rea>on?b'\ c\aluated by the States
These pro\ *s o s a~e dc;
g-cd so that the States \\ Al not assume the ?\ nlab.lit\ of , n o ~ c v hich
r" 3 ) net, in fact be a\ailablc or o\ercvaluate income and re^o ~Cc? vhiCh
are a\aliable Examples of income assumed include support o-J'. r s iron
< s.nt fathers, which ha\c not been paid or contributions fr^m reV*,\es
winch are not in reality recened b\ the needy individual.
The committee has heard of hardships on certain inciudjals by requiring them to provide support and to pay for the medical care needed
by relatives. The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to support each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their
minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled children even though 21 years of age or older. Such requirements for support may reasonably include the payment by such relative, if able, for
medical care. Be>ond such degree of relationship, however, requirements
imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationships among
members of the family group. Thus, States may not include in their
plans provisions for requiring contributions from relatives other than
a spouse or the parent of a minor child or children over 21 who arc blind
or permanently and totally disabled. Any contributions actually made
by relatives or friends, or from other sources, NN ill be taken into account
by the State in determining whether the individual apphing for medical
assistance is, in fact, in need of such assistance.
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under
the current pro\isions of Federal law, some States have enacted pro-
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§rrams which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income
just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided under the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the
limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical assistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the
medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the consideration of an individual's income, the committee bill requires that the
State's standards for determining eligibility for and extent of medical
assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the
Secretary, the cost—whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise—incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligible for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be
sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both
the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the
medical care he requires.
This determination must be made by the agency administering the oldage assistance or combined adult program; i.e., the welfare agency.
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the individual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount.
In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that described below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items
of medical service, may a State require the use of income or rcs'urces
which would bring the individual's income below ihe amount esta: hed
as the test c: eligibility under the State plan. Such action would reduce
the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for
his maintenance.
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or limit
the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similar charge, or of any
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan.
No deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with respect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This provision is related to another provision in the bill which requires States
to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital sen-ices provided under
the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that the hospital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full under the
provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered and that
States may not expect to require the individual to use his income or resources (except such income as exceeds the State's maintenance level)
toward that bill. The reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services shall
be determined in accordance with standards approved by the Secretary
and included in the State plan.
For any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan, a
charge of any kind may be imposed only if the State so chooses, and the
charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his income
and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any enrollment
fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to inpatient hospital
services. The Secretary is given authority to issue standards under this
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pro\ision, which it is expected will protect the income and -csourccs an
mdi\idual has which are nccessan for his nonmedical needs
The hospital insurance benefit program included under other provisions
of the bill pro\ides for a deductible which must be paid :*: connection
with the individual's claim for hospitalization benefits The committee is
concerned that hospitalization be readily a\ailable to need,, persons and
that the necessity of their paving deductibles or cost s h a n r g s'-all not be
a hardship on them o* a factor which may prevent their rcCcvmg the
hospitahz?tion the> reed For this reason, the committee- : ". pruvu,cs
that the States make provisons, for individuals 65 vears c" older who
are included m the new plan, of the cost of an> deductible or CjSt sharing
imposed with respect to individuals under the program e^t**: -hed bv the
hospital insurance provisions of the bill.
\ State medic?1 as= *tance pkn mav piOMde fur the p... ~ . t m u 'I
ci am deductibles or cost sh?nng under the insurance r-:*-?ri established bv part B of t/ue XVIII In the e\ cnt, however, tl >. 5*i*: plan p~oMcies for the individual to assume a portion of such costs, s-ch portion
shall be determined 01 a basis reasonably related to the :~1 \ dual s income, or income ?nc resources and in conformitv with sta-ci'ds .^ucd
bv the Secretary. T^e Secretary is authorized to issue st?~ca-ds—urjcr
tins provision which, it is expected, will protect the income r - c resources
of the individual needed for his maintenance—to guide the Stages Such
standards shall protect the income and resources of the inu , ,GU:.1 needed
for his maintenance and pro\ide assurance that the respon- D. ltv placed
on individuals to share in the cost shall not be an undue burcer on them.
Titles I and XVI authorizing the medical assistance for the aged program now provide that the States may not impose a hen against the
property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical assistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning incorrect payments, and prohibit adjustment or recovery for amounts correctly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death and
that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under the committee bill,
has been broadened so that such an adjustment or recover) would be
made only at a time when there is no surviving child who is tinder the
age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled.
(e) Scope and definition of medical services
"Medical assistance" is defined under the bill to mean payment of all
or part oi the cost of care and services for individuals who would if
needy, be dependent under title IV, except for section 406(a)(2), and
arc under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 4C6(b)
(1) with whom the child is living, or who arc 65 years of age and older,
blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income and resources arc insufficient to meet all their medical care costs. The bill, as
do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in the cost of medical care provided up to 3 months before the month in which the individual makes application for assistance. Thus, the scope of the program
includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children as
defined in State plans, but also children under the age of 21 (and their
caretaker relatives) who come within the scope of title IV, except for

2020

ADDENDA E

PAGE

1

Citation
Mode
Not Reported in F.Supp.
FOUND DOCUMENT
P
(Cite as: 1986 WL 20891 (N.D.Ill.))

Database
DCTU

Bessie FOLEY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Gregory COLER, Defendant.
No. 83-C-4736.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.
Oct. 1, 1986.
Joseph Bomba, Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation, River
Forest, 111., for
plaintiffs.
Barbara L. Greenspan, Attorney General's Office, Chicago, 111.,
for defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ELAINE E. BUCKLO, United States Magistrate.
*1 Plaintiffs, a class of aged, blind and disabled Medicaid
applicants and recipients, seek to enjoin defendant, the Director
of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, from denying Medicaid
benefits to class members solely because their resourcr- exceed the
Medicaid eligibility standard, when the class merv. ..rs' medical
expenses exceed the excess of their resources over - .- eligibility
standard.
Both parties have moved for summary judgment.
I
recommend that plaintiffs' motion be granted and defendant's motion
denied.
I.
Title XIX, 42 U.S.C. ss 1396 et seq. (1985) (the Medicaid
Program) authorizes the federal government to pay part of the cost
of medical services provided through the states to eligible
elderly, blind and disabled individuals.
States choosing to
participate in this program must provide services to all
individuals who are eligible for supplemental security income
(SSI), except that a state may provide services only to those
individuals who would have been eligible under the state's plan
that was in effect on January 1, 1972. 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(f) (the
s 209(b) option). Illinois participates in the Medicaid Program
under the s 209(b) option. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S.
34, 39 n. 6 (1981) .
In addition to providing assistance to those eligible for SSI
(the categorically needy), the states may provide Medicaid benefits
to those individuals whose income and resources exceed the SSI
eligibility standards, but who would be eligible if their medical
expenses were deducted from their income (the medically needy). 42
U.S.C. ss 1396a(a)(10), a(17)(D), a(f). Illinois provides such
assistance.
In Illinois, the Medicaid Program is administered by the Illinois
Department of Public Aid. It is given broad rulemaking power to

determine, within limits, the resource eligibility standards or
cut-offs and the amount of resources to be disregarded in
determining whether an applicant's resources exceed that standard.
111.Rev.Stat. Ch. 23, ss 5-2, 5-4 (1986). Prior to February 1,
1982, its regulations ("old regulations") provided that if an
applicant's assets and income exceeded the standards for
eligibility, the excess assets and income would be applied to
reduce reimbursement of the applicant's medical expenses, but the
applicant would still be eligible for Medicaid. These regulations
thus provided for both income and resource spend-down.
On February 1, 1982, this regulation was amended so that only
spend-down of excess income was allowed.
If the applicant's
resources exceeded the eligibility standard, the applicant would be
ineligible for Medicaid, even if his medical expenses were greater
than his excess resources.
82 I11.Admin.Reg. 2150 (1982).
Plaintiffs challenge this regulation on several grounds.
II.
Initially, defendant argues that in Action Transmittal 80-58 sent
by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to all participating states in August, 1980, the
Secretary interpreted the statute and regulations to prohibit
resource spend-down and that the court should grant deference to
that interpretation.
Generally, an administrative agency's
interpretations of its own regulations and the statute it
administers are entitled to substantial deference and should not be
disturbed unless they are clearly inconsistent with the statute or
regulation.
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); FEC
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981). If
the agency's interpretation is reasonable, the court should sustain
it, even though the court might have interpreted the statute or
regulation differently. Udall, supra, 380 U.S. at 16; Psychiatric
Institute v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 812, 814 (D.C.Cir.1981); see
State of Wisconsin Dept. of Health v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391, 398 (7th
Cir.1986). But where the agency's interpretation contradicts its
earlier position, the interpretation is entitled to little
deference. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 858 n. 25 (1975); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 140-5 (1976).
Under these standards, Action Transmittal 80-58 should not be
given much weight.
Its interpretation of the statute and
regulations is directly contrary to the Secretary's prior
interpretation, and there had been no concurrent changes in the
statute or regulations. The Action Transmittal's justification for
the change in interpretation is that *2 Although Section
1902(a)(17)(D) of the Social Security Act provides this option
[spend-down] with respect to income . . . neither the Act nor Federal
regulations allow for such flexibility with regard to resources.
Id. This argument fails to explain why SSI interpreted the Act and
Regulations otherwise prior to this time.
The court will,
therefore, examine the statutory scheme and regulations adppted by
the Secretary. Accord, Haley v. Com'r. of Public Welfare, 394
Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 577-8 (1985).
III.
42 U.S.C. s 1396a(4)(A) requires state Medicaid plans to "provide

such methods of administration . • • as are found by the Secretary to
be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan."
Id. Pursuant to this provision, the Secretary has promulgated
regulations requiring that the state plan provide for the
establishment of a Medical Care Advisory Committee (MCAC) "to
advise the Medicaid agency director about health and medical care
services." 42 C.F.R. s 431.12(b). The MCAC "must have opportunity
for
participation
in
policy
development
and
program
administration...."
42 C.F.R. s 431.12(e).
The new Illinois
regulation was never submitted to the MCAC for advice.
(Defendant's Response to Interrogatory 15.) Plaintiffs contend
that the regulation is, therefore, invalid.
The language of the federal regulations states that the MCAC
"must" be able to participate "in policy development and program
administration." Id. The MCAC must be consulted before policy
changes are made, Morabito v. Blum, 528 F.Supp. 252, 264
(S.D.N.Y.1981), and 'policy' is to be broadly interpreted, covering
"the entire field of state decision-making with respect to the
Medicaid Program...." Id. Policy changes affecting eligibility
for Medicaid, as well as policy changes affecting the sort of
services provided, must be submitted to the MCAC for advice. Id.
at 263. The discontinuance of the use of resource spend-down in
determining the eligibility of the medically needy is a policy
change, and consultation with the MCAC would seem to be required
before the new regulation was promulgated.
The defendant promulgated the rule, however, because it believed
the amendment was required by federal law. Although the amendment
affected Medicaid policy, it was not, in ^efendant's view,
discretionary. Whatever ad\ _ce the MCAC might :ive, it could not
affect or alter defendant's decision.
Prior review of the
amendment by the MCAC would have been fruitless, and arguably the
regulation should not be invalidated merely because defendant
failed to solicit advice which in its view it was bound by law to
ignore.
The plaintiffs, however, argue that the MCAC could have given
advice on how defendant might mitigate the impact of the amended
rule, for example by recommending that defendant advise applicants
of the importance of promptly applying excess resources to medical
bills. The MCAC must be given the opportunity to participate in
policy decision-making and program administration; decisions about
how to implement the new regulation eliminating spend-down of
resources involve policy or program administration on
which the MCAC must be consulted.
*3 There remains the question of what relief would be
appropriate. The plaintiffs argue that since t>.^ regulation was
promulgated improperly, the court should strike down the
regulation. However, this remedy is not always appropriate. Thus,
where there was not total failure to consult the MCAC, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing -co enjoin the policy
changes. Burgess v. Affleck, 683 F.2d 596, 600 (1st Cir.1982).
Here, the MCAC was not consulted, but its advice would have been
irrelevant to defendant's decision on whether to adopt the,amended
rule.
Where the courts have invalidated or enjoined the new
policy, the policy was usually implemented at the discretion of the

state agency, and presumably that agency, if it had had the benefit
of the MCAC's advice, might not have implemented the new policy or
might have made changes in it. See, e.g., Morabito, supra, 528
F.Supp. at 256-8 (decision by state to switch from giving benefits
to all applicants eligible under SSI to giving benefits to those
eligible under the state's 1972 plan); Becker v. Toia, 439 F.Supp.
324, 332 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (state statute requiring applicants to make
payments on prescription drugs and medical appliances; statute gave
agency discretion in setting amount of payments). Robinson v.
Maher, CCH Medicare & Medicaid Guide P 27,707 (D.Conn. Jan. 19,
1976) (budgetary shortfall required agency to reduce Medicaid
expenditures; "It may well be that such a consultation ... might
suggest to the commissioner alternative ways to reduce expenditures
... avoiding unnecessary hardship.") Since defendant would have
promulgated the amended regulation regardless of any advice the
MCAC would have given it, striking down the regulation on this
ground would be an excessive remedy. If this were the only ground
on which pJaintiffs would prevail, they would at most be entitled
to an order that defendants obtain the MCAC's advice on what
measures should be taken to soften the impact of the amended rule.
IV.
Plaintiffs argue that because their resources were insufficient
to meet their medical expenses, the resources were not "available"
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(17)(B) and (C) and 42
C.F.R. s 435.845.
Plaintiffs misconstrue the meaning of
"available." The statutory and regulatory provisions in question
require that the applicant actually be able to use his resources
and that the value of those resources be evaluated reasonably.
Resources are unavailable when although the applicant has some
right in the resource, he cannot use the resource to increase his
purchasing power. Jackson v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1076, 1086 (7th
Cir.1982) (difference between subsidized rent paid by applicant and
market rent of his apartment not a resource available to
applicant).
These provisions do not, however, deal with the
sufficiency of the applicant's resources to meet his medical and
other needs.
Here, the plaintiffs do not contend that their
resources cannot increase their purchasing power or that the value
of their resources has been incorrectly determined.
Their
resources are, therefore, available.
V.
*4 Plaintiffs argue that the new Illinois regulations are invalid
because they require the medically needy to reduce their resources
below the eligibility standard for the categorically needy. If a
state elects to provide Medicaid to the medically needy, 42 U.S.C.
s 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (III) requires the state to use a single
standard and methodology in determining resource eligibility. In
addition, 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(17)(B) requires the state, in
determining eligibility of the medically needy, to take into
account only such resources as would not be disregarded in
determining eligibility of the categorically needy.
These
provisions limit the freedom of the states to treat the medically
needy differently from the categorically needy. Thus, the state
must use the same income disregards, Calkins v. Blum, 675 F.2d 44,

45 (2d Cir.1982), and transfer of assets rules, Beltran v. Myers,
701 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir.), cert. den. 462 U.S. 1134 (1983), for
both groups.
In the present case, the new Illinois regulation does not treat
the medically needy differently from the categorically needy. The
same resource eligibility level applies to both groups, and neither
group is permitted to spend down their resources in order to
qualify.
The plaintiffs argue, however, that the statute was intended to
prevent states from requiring the medically needy to spend their
resources below the level of eligibility of the categorically
needy. They cite S.Rep. 404, reprinted in 1965, U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 1943, 2019. That report, however, is directed at the
income spend-down provision. Once an applicant has been found
eligible through income spend-down, The State may require the use
of all the excess income of the individual toward his medical
expenses.... In no event, however, with respect to either this
provision or that described below with reference to the use of
deductibles ... may a State require the use of income or resources
which would bring the individual's income below the amount
established as the test of eligibility under the State plan. Id.
The income spend-down provisions were aimed at preventing the
applicant from being determined ineligible when his income was less
than his medical expenses and the categorical assistance level.
However, there was no similar resource spend-down provision. The
report does refer to "resources," but only insofar as spending them
would reduce the applicant's income. The statute does not require
the states to use resource spend-down, even when not doing so
results in the applicants' having to expend their resources below
the resource eligibility level of the categorically needy.
VI.
Plaintiffs argue that since Illinois is a s 209(b) state, its
Medicaid eligibility criteria may be no more restrictive than those
in place in its 1972 plan and that since under its 1972 plan,
Illinois permitted resource spend-down, it may not now prohibit it,
even if the regulations and statute do not allow non-s 209(b)
states (SSI states) to use resource spend-down in determining the
eligibility of the medically needy.
In 197 2, Congress replaced three assistance programs with
Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled
(SSI). 42 U.S.C. ss 1381 et seq. In some states more people were
eligible for SSI than had been eligible for the assistance programs
SSI replaced, and since all individuals eligible for SSI were
eligible for Medicaid, the financial burden of Medicaid on the
states increased. To lessen that increased burden and dissuade
states frcrr. withdrawing from Medicaid, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C.
s 1396a(f, s 209(b)). Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 38
(1981). Tnat statute provides that *5 Notwithstanding any other
provision of this subchapter, except as provided in subsection (e)
of this section, no State not eligible to participate in the State
plan program established under Title XVI of this chapter shall be
required to provide medical assistance to any aged, -blind, or
disabled individual (within the meaning of Subchapter XVI of this
chapter [SSI] ) for any month unless such State would be (or would

have been) required to provide medical assistance to such
individual for such month had its plan for medical assistance
approved under this subchapter and in effect on January 1, 1972,
been in effect in such month.*.. Id.
s 209(b) thus did not authorize states to create an alternative
basis for eligibility but only to further restrict the eligibility
of persons who would otherwise qualify for Medicaid under the SSI
standards. Savage v. Toan, 795 F.2d 643, 645-6 (8th Cir.1986);
Morris by Simpson v. Morrow, 783 F.2d 454, 459-60 (4th Cir.1986).
If Illinois' new regulation is more restrictive than its 1972 plan,
the regulation is nonetheless valid if the 1972 plan provided
eligibility on a broader basis than authorized for SSI states and
the new regulation is required by the Medicaid statute or
regulations. s 209(b) does "not confer authority upon states to
create broader eligibility standards than exist nationally for
SSI."
Id. at 459.
Before concluding that the new Illinois
regulation is invalid because it is more restrictive than Illinois'
1972 plan, it is necessary to determine whether the 1972 plan
violated the social security statute or regulations.
Defendant argues that the Medicaid statute forbids resource
spend-down and that, therefore, the new regulation is valid
regardless of whether it is more restrictive than the 1972 plan.
It might appear that 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(10)(C) (i)(III)
(hereinafter "CIII") would prohibit resource spend-down.
That
provision requires a state providing Medicaid to the medically
needy to employ a single standard ... in determining income and
resource eligibility for all such groups, and the methodology to be
employed in determining such eligibility . . . shall be the same
methodology which would be employed under the supplemental security
income program....
Id.
In determining eligibility for SSI,
resource spend-down is not provided for, [FN1] and so it could not
be used in determining eligibility for Medicaid.
The history of CIII, however, suggests that it may not be
applicable here. Prior to 1981, the Medicaid statute required that
states providing Medicaid to the medically needy determine resource
and income eligibility of the medically needy "in accordance with
comparable standards" to those used in determining eligibility for
the categorically needy under SSI. 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)
(1976); Atkins v. Rivera,
U.S.
, 106 S.Ct, 2456, 2462
(1986). In 1981, the "comparability" requirement was deleted in
order to give states more flexibility in setting eligibility
criteria and scope of services for the medically needy. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, s 2171(a)(3)(C)(i) (OBRA), 95
Stat. 357, 807; Atkins, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2462; H.R.Rep. No.
208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 971, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 396, 1333.
*6 In response to this amendment, in 1981 the Secretary revised
the Medicaid regulations to provide that state plans could use
income and resource methodologies for determining eligibility of
the medically needy that were different from those used in
determining the eligibility of the categorically needy: Section
2171 of the 1981 Amendments revised the Medicaid statute so that
the direct linkage between cash assistance programs' and the
medically needy is no longer explicit.
Therefore, we have

concluded that the State need not adopt the methodology of a
related cash assistance program in treating income and resources of
the medically needy.
Rather, the State may develop its own.
However, Section 1902(a)(17) of the Act has not been amended.
Consequently, these final regulations require that the State must
use a methodology for the treatment of income and resources that is
reasonable. 46 Fed.Reg. 47,980 (1981). The Secretary implemented
the amendment by promulgating 42 C.F.R. ss 435.850-52. The "same
methodology" provision, 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III), was
enacted in response to the Secretary's new regulations. Atkins,
supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2463. The provision reflected Congress' belief
that the 1981 amendments, upon which the regulations were based,
gave states certain flexibility in structuring their medically
needy programs. They were allowed to limit coverage to certain
categories of medically needy individuals, and to vary the services
they offered to the different groups they covered. No change was
made or intended to be made with regard to financial eligibility
policy. H.R.Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1366, reprinted in
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 697, 2054. The "same methodology"
provision was intended to restore the status quo before the
Secretary's 1981 regulations, and "not ... to change policies
governing the income and resource standards and methodologies for
determining eligibility of the medically needy from those in effect
before OBRA. "
Id. at 1367, 2055.
Congress', sole intent in
enacting CIII was to invalidate the Secretary's post-OBRA
regulations.
Atkins, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2463 n. 10. Those
regulations "had nothing to do with the treatment of excess income
for the medically needy or with the calculation of spend-downs."
DeJesus v. Perales, 770 F.2d 316, 325 (2d Cir.1985) (Friendly, J.).
The post-OBRA regulations were intended to give the states freedom
to develop methodologies for determining the financial eligibility
of the medically needy that differed from those used for the
categorically needy; the purpose of CIII was to invalidate those
regulations and require that the methodologies be the Same.
The requirement of uniformity is reasonable in such matters as
calculation of income and resources in which comparable procedures
must be applied to both groups.
Since spend-down of income,
however, *7 has no counterpart in the eligibility methodologies,
it would have been tautologous for Congress to direct that the
states calculate spend-downs using 'the same methodology' as they
use in determining eligibility for those programs. DeJesus, supra,
770 F.2d at 327. Accordingly, CIII has no effect on treatment of
excess income and calculation of spend-downs. Atkins, supra, 106
S.Ct. at 2463.
Similarly, CIII does not prohibit the use of resource
spend-downs. Arguably, since resource spend-down, unlike income
spend-down, is not separately authorized, it could be applied only
as part of the evaluation of resources.
The SSI regulations require the deduction of incumbrances from the
value of assets, 20 C.F.R. s 1201, and presumably could also
require the deduction of unsecured debt, including .medical
expenses, from the applicant's resources; since they do not, the
same methodology requirement would prevent the use of similar
deductions in determining the eligibility of the medically needy

for Medicaid. But resource spend-down, like income spend-down, is
really not part of the methodology for evaluating the applicant's
resources. The resource methodology is the process whereby the
value of the applicant's resources is calculated. See DeJesus,
supra, 770 F.2d at 324. In determining the eligibility of both the
categorically needy and the medically needy, the applicant's
resources are evaluated and measured against the SSI standard. A
resource spend-down would be applicable only after the applicant's
resources had been evaluated, the resource standard applied, and
the applicant found ineligible; it would be applicable only to the
medically needy. It would have no counterpart in the eligibility
methodology of the categorically needy. Consequently, the "same
methodology" provision would not prevent the use of resource
spend-down.
No other statutory provisions forbid the use of
resource spend-down in determining the eligibility of the medically
needy. 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income
spend-down but is silent regarding resource spend-down. Defendant
argues from this silence, and the fact that elsewhere in s
1396a(a) (17) Congress speaks of both income and resources, that the
statute implicitly forbids the use of resource spend-down.
s
1396a(a)(17)(D), however, does not merely permit but requires
income spend-down.
It was included in the Medicaid statute to
prevent states from choosing not to use income spend-down. See
S.Rep. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1965;, reprinted in 1965 U.S.
Code Cong. £ Ad. News 1943, 2018-9. The provision was not needed
to permit states to use income spend-down. See id. It cannot be
held to implicitly forbid states to use resource spend-down.
*8 Resource spend-down is consistent with the goals of the
statute. The Medicaid program was enacted "(f)or the purpose of
enabling each State ... to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf
of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled
individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the
costs of necessary medical services...." 42 U.S.C. s 1396. The
income spend-down provision, 42 U.S.C. s 1396a(a)(17)(D), was
incorporated in the Medicaid statute
to correct one of the
weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged
program. Under the current provisions of Federal law, some States
have enacted programs which contain a cutoff point on income which
determines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an
individual with an income just under the specified limit may
qualify for all the aid provided under the State plan.
Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the limitation adopted
by the State are found ineligible for the medical assistance
provided under the State plan even though the excess of the
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the
medical care needed.
. . . [Under the spend-down provision] before an individual is
found ineligible . . ., the State must be sure that the income of the
individual has been measured in terms of both the State's allowance
for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the medical ,care he
requires. S.Rep. 404, supra, 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2018-9. Resource spend-down serves a similar goal. An individual
may have resources above the eligibility level, but his medical
expenses may exceed the excess. Resource spend-down measures the

applicant's resources in terms of his medical expenses, so that the
applicant is not found ineligible in this situation. A resource
spend-down provision in a state plan would thus further the general
purpose of the Medicaid program of providing medical assistance to
those "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the
costs of necessary medical care." 42 U.S.C. s 1396. See Haley,
supra, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d at 578.
The regulations similarly do not forbid resource spend-down. 42
C.F.R. s 435.845 (1985) provides that in determining resource
eligibility of the medically needy, the agency must—
•

*

*

(d) For aged, blind or disabled individuals in States covering
all SSI recipients, deduct the value of resources that would be
deducted in determining eligibility under SSI;
(e)(1) For aged, blind or disabled individuals in States using
requirements more restrictive than SSI, deduct the value of
resources in an amount no more restrictive than those deducted
under the Medicaid plan on January 1, 1972, and no more liberal
than those deducted in determining eligibility under SSI.
*9 (2) However, the amounts specified in paragraph (e)(1) of this
section must be the same as those that would be deducted in
determining, under s 435.121, the eligibility of the categorically
needy; and (f) apply the resource standards established under s
435.84 3. Id. [FN2] These regulations require that resources be
evaluated in the same way in determining eligibility of the
medically needy as in determining eligibility of the categorically
needy.
However, they do not forbid the states to apply the
resource standard flexibly after the applicant's resources have
been evaluated, by applying a resource spend-down.
Resource spend-down is thus permitted, but not required, by the
Medicaid statute and regulations. Because Illinois is a s 209(b)
state, its Medicaid eligibility requirements may be no more
restrictive than those it used in its 1972 p3an.
That plan
required the use of resource spend-down.
A s 209(b) state
generally has the option of picking and choosing among the SSI
eligibility criteria or the state's 1972 eligibility criteria.
However, if the 1972 criteria are not invalid, the state may not
impose more restrictive criteria, even if those criteria are also
permitted under SSI. See Brogan v. Miller, 537 F.Supp. 139, 144 n.
12 (N.D.111.1982) . Accordingly, since Illinois' 1972 plan was not
invalid and the new regulation, by eliminating resource spend-down,
imposes more restrictive eligibility criteria than the 1972 plan,
the new regulations are invalid.
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment should be granted.
FN1. There is a limited exception. Where the applicant's
non-liquid resources are not more than one-fourth of the statutory
maximum resource standard, the applicant is eligible. He must
liquidate his non-liquid resources within six months, and the
excess of that amount over the standard is applied against his SSI
benefits. 20 C.F.R. ss 416.1240-4,
FN2. The pre-OBRA regulations provided that the amounts

deducted "must be at least the same as those that would be deducted
... under 435.121
" 42 C.F.R. s 435.845(e) (1979).
N.D.Ill.,1986.
Foley v. Coler
1986 WL 20891 (N.D.Ill.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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not have prepared in presenting her evidence
and of which she could not have had notice. The
Tenth Circuit has pointed out that a proposed
rule does not serve as notice of the final rule:
At the point of publication of the proposed
rule the agency is, of course, not bound to the
issuance of the rule in any exact form. .. .
[U]ntil publication is made of the rule actually adopted, the public of course does not
know which course the agency will take or
how to prepare for the regulation. Rowell v.
Andrus, 631 F.2d 699, 702, n.2 (10th Cir.
1980).
Therefore, the ALJ was not restricted to the list
of mitigating factors in the proposed regulation.9
The I.G.'s position seems to be that once a
conviction has been demonstrated, untrustworthiness is sufficiently proved to require a fiveyear exclusion and that any reduction in that
period reflects a "sympathy" standard not
derived from the law. I.G. Br. at 6, 9-12. In
arguing that remorse and personal circumstances are not valid grounds to reduce an exclusion period, the I.G. cited Frank J. Hanev, DAB
Civ. Rem. C-156 (1990). In that case, the ALJ
reduced an exclusion period from five years to
three, also over the I.G.'s objection, despite Petitioner's conviction for a felony. While rejecting
the stress of Petitioner's involvement in a lawsuit as mitigation, because it might recur, the
ALJ considered other factors including character evidence, Petitioner's mother's illness and
death, and Petitioner's otherwise good record.
In Haney, as here, the ALJ determined that a
conviction alone does not end the discussion,
since a "criminal conviction in 1988 does not
necessarily evidence that [Haney] . . . is, at this
time, an untrustworthy individual." Id. at 8. If
anything, the Haney decision suggests that the
ALJ in each case viewed the evidence oi mitigation individually and carefully weighed it

against the factors favoring exclusion. The ALJ
reasonably determined that Petitioner, who
completed a one-year probation for a misdemeanor theft, should not undergo a longer exclusion than Mr. Haney, who was convicted of two
felonies in a tax fraud scheme spreading over
several years for which he was still serving five
years probation.
This does not mean that we would have
reduced the exclusion here as substantially as
the ALJ did if we were making the decision in
the first instance. Our review of the record indicates that there are factors which the ALJ may
not have fully considered (but which the I.G.
did not raise) which lead us to question the
reduction of the period of exclusion to one year.
For example. Petitioner testified that she turned
the patient account books for the Bellmead
Nursing Home over to her sister. Transcript
(Tr.) at 72. It is not clear whether the ALJ
considered the fact that this may have contributed to further thefts and that Petitioner could
have instead set up a system for accounting for
the patient funds such as the system she testified she later used in other nursing homes. Tr. at
90.
We view our role as a limited one, however.
Our guidelines state that our standard of review
on disputed issues of fact is "whether the ALJ's
decision is supported by substantial evidence"
and on disputed legal issues is whether "the
ALJ's decision was erroneous." DAB Guidelines,
Appendix B at 28.29 (1989). The I.G. did not
challenge the ALJ's findings of fact, and we
have concluded that the I.G.'s arguments concerning the legal standard applied are without
merit. Thus, given the limited scope of our
review, we must affirm the ALJ's decision.
Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, wc affirm the
ALJ decision.

[H 39,089] Christine Harriman v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services.
U.S. District Court, District of Maine, Civil No. 90-0046-B, Nov. 9, 1990.
Medicaid: Financial Eligibility
Maine—Resource spenddown.—An individual who (together with her spouse) had over
$10,000 in assets and was in hospital intensive care for about a month in January and Februarv of
9
We also note that the I.G presented nothing which
convincingly shows that application of the factors in the
proposed regulation would have made a difference here The
I G areued that these regulations would have barred evidence of Petitioner's later remorse and of the circumstances
motivating the crime if not appearing in the criminal
record The I.G did not, however, assert that the criminal
record contained no evidence of Petitioner's remorse or the
circumstances considered relevant by the ALJ. As the ALJ
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found, Petitioner was sentenced to one-year probation, not
incarceration. Finally, we note that limiting the ALJ's consideration to on/v those factors listed in the proposed regulations would appear to be unwise, based on our experience in
deciding cases It is extremely difficult to anticipate what
all relevant circumstances might be. The approach in the
existing regulations allows for consideration of "(a)ny other
factors bearing on the nature and seriousness of the program
violations."

f 39,089
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1989 following a pancreatic attack was not entitled to spend down to Maine's Medicaid resourceeligibility level of $3,000' by incurring medical expenses, even though her hospital bill was $42,000.
She received the hospital bill in February, began paying it in March, and applied for Medicaid in
April. As a result, she could not qualify under the state's rules that allow a resource spenddown only
if an individual applies for Medicaid and spends down to the state's eligibility level in the month in
which the expenses were incurred. Although federal law requires states (such as Maine) that cover
medically needy individuals to allow applicants to spend down their income to the state's incomeeligibility level for Medicaid by incurring medical expenses, it allows but does not require a resource
spenddown. Finding that "the plaintiff appears to have all the logic and policy on her side of the
argument, but the Commissioner appears to have the law on his side," the court invited the parties
to consider whether to certify to the Maine Law Court questions of whether a comprehensive
resource spenddown must be allowed and whether refusal to allow it violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
SeeU 14,311.74, 15,594.
have herself declared eligible and an injunction
Memorandum
enjoining the Commissioner to adopt a resource
HORNBY. District Judge:
spend-down policy. The Commissioner
impleaded the United States Secretary of
I.
Health and Human Services. The plaintiff has
The question in this class action is whether a now moved for summary judgment against the
state must consider the amount of accrued medi- Commissioner on all her state and federal claims
cal bills in evaluating whether an applicant's except her claim that the program violates the
personal resources disqualify her for Medicaid— equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
in other words, whether the state must apply a Amendment. The defendant Commissioner has
"resource spend-down" rule as it does in evalu- not contested any of the facts asserted by the
ating income. The plaintiff appears to have all plaintiff, but has disputed her legal conclusions.
the logic and policy on her side of the argument, The third-party Secretary of the United States
but the State Commissioner of Human Services Department of Health and Human Services has
appears to have the law on his side, and I not participated in the arguments on the
conclude that federal law does not require the motion.
state to use a resource spend-down rule. Before
ruling on the question whether state law
II.
requires it. however, I invite the parties to conThe
Medicaid
program
is a joint federal/state
sider whether that question should be certified
to the Maine Law Court pursuant to Maine venture created bv Title 19 of the Social SecuRule of Civil Procedure 76B. The Clerk's office rity Act, 42 U.S.C." § § 1396 et seq. It is designed
shall schedule a conference of counsel to discuss to furnish financial assistance to those whose
"income and resources are insufficient to meet
that issue.
the costs of necessarv medical services." 42
The plaintiff suffered a pancreatic attack in U.S.C. §1396(1).
early January of 1989. and spent nearly one
Applicants who are ineligible for AFDC (Aid
month in intensive care. Upon her release from to Families with Dependent Children) or SSI
the hospital in early February she received a bill (Supplemental Security Income) assistance may
in excess of $42,000. At the time she went into qualify for Medicaid if they meet the definition
the hospital, she, together with her husband, of "medicallv needv" and are disabled like the
had over $10,000 in liquid assets. According to plaintiff. 42 U.S'.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C); 22
her uncontested affidavit, she has spent all but M.R.S.A. §3173. So far as resources are con$500 on the outstanding medical bills, leaving cerned, Maine has provided by regulation that a
her with only the home she owns jointly with her married spouse is eligible as "medically needy"
husband. On April 4, 1989. she sought Medicaid only if the couple's available assets are $3,000 or
coverage to pay the regaining medical bills The less. Maine Medical Assistance Eligibility' ManCommissioner found her ineligible for coverage ual, § 3340.
from January through March because, on the
first day of each of those months, her assets
There is, likewise, an income limit. In the case
exceeded the $3,000 eligibility limitation con- of income, however, eligibility is determined by
tained in the Maine Department of Human Ser- setting off any excess income against the medivices regulations. The Commissioner did find cal bills and then providing Medicaid for the
her eligible for coverage beginning April 1, 1989, remainder of the bills. This procedure is known
but that coverage would not apply to these as the "spend-down" rule. Manual § 5000. The
medical bills. In an administrative appeal, a fair Department regulations contain no comparable
hearing officer upheld the decision.
provision for considering resources.
The plaintiff brought this class action against
the Commissioner of Human Services seeking to

H 39,089

The plaintiff argues that the federal statute
requires the Commissioner to include in the
©1991, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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state program a resource spend-down rule. She
relies upon the stated purpose of the federal
statute—that it is designed to furnish assistance
to persons whose "income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services" (emphasis supplied). 42 U.S.C.
§1396(1). The federal statute specifically
requires the state to have an income spend-down
rule. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D). But there is
no similar requirement in the federal statute for
a resource spend-down rule. There is confusing
language in the Senate Report to the bill that
produced the income spend-down requirement.
Specifically,
[t]he state may require the use of all the
excess income of the individual toward his
medical expenses, or some proportion of that
amount. In no event, however, with respect to
either this provision or that described below
with reference to the use of deductibles for
certain items of medical service, may a state
require the use of income or resources which
would bring the individual's income below the
amount established as the test of eligibility
under the state plan. Such action would
reduce the individual below the level determined by the state as necessary for his maintenance.
S. Rep. No. 404. 89th Cong.. 1st Sess., 78 (1965),
reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News, 1943, 2019 (emphasis supplied). But
whatever the reference to resources might mean
in the Senate Report, the federal statute clearly
deals only with income spend-down. I am satisfied, therefore, that the federal statute does not
require a state to have a resource spend-down
rule.1

25,483

ticipates in the Medicaid program from using
the resource spend down methodology if it
chooses to do so."); Halev v. Commissioner of
Public Welfare. 394 Mass." 466. 476 N.E.2d 572.
578 (Mass. 1985) ("We conclude that, although
Congress did not require use of a resource spend
down, such use is a reasonable method of evaluating resources.") (footnote omitted); Contra,
Ramsev v. Department of Human Services, 301
Ark. 285, 783 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1990) ("The
pertinent federal statutes and regulations and
their application through the Arkansas state
Medicaid Plan establish no authority in any
category for a 'spend-down1 of excess resources
that is similar or identical to the expressly
authorized 'spend-down' of excess income.")
Clearly, if the eoal of Medicaid is to assist
individuals who are medically needy—defined
as having insufficient income or resources to
meet the cost of necessary medical services—the
sensible solution is the spend-down rule, a rule
that has been applied in assessing income by
both the federal and state governments. It
makes no sense to find that someone with
$10,000 in assets, but $42,000 in medical bills is
not needy, while finding that someone with
$2,999 in assets and $3,001 in medical bills is
needy. The Commissioner has advanced absolutely no reason for treating assets differently
from income in considering a spend-down; I
have been unable to conceive of such a reason;
and the only reason I have found in the case law
is this cryptic statement in Ramsey v. Department of Human Services, 301 Ark. 285. 783
S.W.2d361.364(Ark. 1990):
The rationale behind treating resources and
income differently is that income merely
restores resources to their previous levels. It is
accrued day by day in return for labor. On the
other hand, resources in place, or acquired,
are viewed as wealth in hand that increases
the recipient's well-being. A rational basis,
therefore, can be said to exist for this distinction in treating resources and income different!) .

Federal law does, however, permit a state to
adopt a resource spend-down rule. See Westmiller Bv Hubbard v. Sullivan. 729 F.Supp. 260.
263 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Although the Medicaid
Act does not expressly mention a resource
spend-down, it is clear from other sections of the
Act and from the legislative liiatory that tht
states have discretion in utilizing such a
[resource] spend-down in determining eligibility."); Folev v. Suter, No. 83 C 4736, slip. op. at
9(N.D. 111.'1986) (unpublished 1986 WL 20891)
("Resource spend-down is thus permitted, but
not required by the Medicaid statute and regulations."); Hession v. Illinois Department of
Public Aid, 129 IIL2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751, 757
(111. 1989) ("[W)e perceive nothing in section
1396a(A)(17) which precludes a State that par-

Somehow that rational basis still eludes my
understanding.
The remaining question in this case, therefore, is whether Maine statutes and regulations
require the use of a resource spend-down and, if
not, whether the failure to provide such a rule
violates the Equal Protection Clause. The question of state law may be determinative of the
cause. There are no precedents on this issue in

1
The fact that 42 U S.C. § 1396p permits individuals to
give away their resources in order to establish Medicaid
eligibility does not translate into congressional legislation
requiring a resource spend-down rule; nor does the fact that
42 U.S.C § 139cVbXuXDXii) fTEFRA) treats as an erroneous excess payment only the difference between the allowable resource level under the plan and the actual amount of

the family's assets (here, approximately $7,000. the amount
of the resource spend-down if such a rule applied) The fact
that Congress, in providing for federal recovery of erroneous
excess state payments, contemplated that a state might use
a resource spend-down rule and calculated the recovery of
federal funds accordinely does not establish that Congress
mandated the use of such a jrule

Medicare and Medicaid Guide

U 39,oa9

25,484

New Developments

the decisions of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court. It is for this reason that I will meet with
the lawyers to discuss whether this question of
Maine statutory construction should be certified
to the Law Court under Me. R. Civ. P. 76B.2
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The plaintiff's motion for summarv judgment
is therefore DENIED.

[f 39,090] In the Matter of New York State Medical Transporters Association, Inc. v.
Cesar A. Perales.
New York Court of Appeals, 77 NY2d. 126, Dec. 20, 1990.
Before: WACHTLER, Chief Judge, and TTTONE, HANCOCK, JR., BELLACOSA, KAYE, ALEXANDER, and
SIMMONS. Judges.

Medicaid: Transportation Services
New York—Prior authorization for transportation services.—The New York Medicaid
agency was entitled to enforce a state law provision requiring prior authorization as a condition of
payment for nonemergency transportation services, even though its fiscal agent sometimes
responded to an overwhelming number of prior authorization requests by granting "retroactive prior
approval" after the services were provided. The agency had informed providers that prior authorization would be deferred only when providers experienced extreme difficulty in obtaining it by
telephone and that retroactive prior approval requests may never be made more than 30 days after
transportation of a patient. The providers sought to have their claims considered despite their
failure to secure prior authorization or to obtain timely retroactive prior approval. They claimed
that (1) the agency had compromised the provision and should, therefore, be estopped from
enforcing it; and (2) the provision was unenforceable because the agency had, in effect, ratified the
fiscal agent's failure to abide by it. Estoppel and ratification may not be used, however, to keep an
agency from discharging its statutory duties. Since the law is clear that prior authorization is
required and that providers are expected to abide by it, providers could not establish that they had
suffered "manifest injustice" as a result of the agency's refusal to consider all of their claims.
See 11 14.605.89, 14,729.62, 15,620.
Opinion of the Court
estoppel or ratification, we affirm the order of
KAVE. J.: Petitioners, providers of nonemer- the Appellate Division dismissing the petition.
gency transportation services to Medicaid recipBy statute, DSS must provide Medicaid recipients, by this proceeding seek to compel ients with "transportation when essential to
respondent, Commissioner of the Department of obtain care and services1' ^Social Services Law
Social Services (DSS), to process their claims for § 365-a [2] [j]) The statute reauires that such
transportation services rendered to Medicaid transportation be "upon prior approval, except
recipients without the agency's prior approval. in cases of emergency," and the implementing
Petitioners acknowledge that prior agency regulation states that "[pjrior authorization by
approval is a statutory prerequisite but contend the local social services official shall be required
they are nonetheless entitled to have their for * * * transportation when essential to obtain
claims processed because of an informal practice medical care and services, except emergencv
permitting them to obtain "retroactive prior care"(18NYCRR505.10[b]).
approval" after the services were rendered,
which respondent should either be estopped
Petitioner New York State Medical Transfrom contesting, or found to have ratified. In porters Association, Inc. is an association of
that there is no basis here for the application of companies that provide nonemergency invalid
2
Maine does, apparently, permit a spend-down of assets
within the month of application Thus, if an applicant has
$3,000 in the bank on January 1 and applies for Medicaid
assistance on January 5. she may become eligible retroactively, for the entire month, if she spends or gives awav
$2,001 before the end of January Manual § 3340

In this case. Mrs Hamman incurred her medical obligations in Januarv. did not receive the bill until February and
apparently did not begin spending the $10,000 to pay the
bill until March Thus, she is considered ineligible dunne
Januarv and Februarv Since the bill was received in February, her spend-down in March also does not count Manual
§ 1530. example 2 She now cannot obtain Medicaid assis-

H 39,090

tance to pay this bill and may, instead, have to sell her
home (jointly owned with her husband), otherwise an
exempt asset under the Manual, §3310.01. The Maine Law
Court may conclude, as did the courts in Massachusetts and
Illinois, that the state goal of preserving certain assets, such
as a home, from being consumed by medical bills, along with
the statutory requirement that assistance be available to
those who do "not have sufficient income or resources to
provide a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency
and health," 22 M R.S A §3174 (emphasis supplied!,
requires the use of a retroactive resource spend-down rule
But that is solely a question of state law

©1991, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.

ADDENDUM G

deficient because it does not provide a sufficient basis to determine that the appropriate legal standards have been followed
by the hearing officer in reaching her decision. We reverse and
remand for further proceedings because the appealed order fails
to set forth in sufficient detail the five-step analysis required by
20 C.F.R. § 416.920 and the analysis required by 20 CJF.R.
§ 404, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Rule 202.03 (1991), as a predicate to the hearing officer's decision approving the denial of
the claimed benefits. Walker v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 533 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (Walker
I); cf. McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir.1986). In
the absence of the hearing officer's detailed evaluation of the
criteria and questions under the cited regulations, we are unable
to provide adequate appellate review of that decision. Cf.
Walker v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,
554 So.2d 1202 (Ha. 1st DCA 1989) (Walker II).
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

maintain eligibility requirements specified in the
approved state plan in effect as of January 1,1972.
The court noted that the record was totally silent as
to whether or not that state plan contained a resource spend down provision. Second, while the
court disregarded, due to its inconsistency with
prior policy, a 1980 transmittal from the Health
Care Financing Administration prohibiting states
from employing resource spend down, the court
noted that state law effectively prohibited resource
spend down by specifically excluding married couples with more than $2,400 in assetsfromMedicaid
coverage. Third, since both state and federal law
protected an applicant's resources up to $2,400, the
plaintiff realized the same financial loss with or
without resource spend down. On the basis of the
foregoing, the plaintiffs appeal was dismissed.

HOLZBERG, J.
Memorandum of Decision
2 MMLR % 90
Giuseppina MATARAZZO,
v.
Lorraine ARONSON, Commissioner of Income
Maintenance,
No. CV91-0388251
Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of
Hartford-New Britain
June 30, 1992
The plaintiff appealed from an administrative
decision upholding the denial of retroactive Medicaid coverage for medical expenses incurred before
the assets possessed by her and her spouse were
reduced below the $2,400 limit on such assets as
specified by state law. The plaintiff maintained that
the denial of retroactive benefits by refusing to
apply a resource spend down provision was unlawful in that Connecticut, as a § 209(b) state, was
required to maintain the same eligibility requirements in effect as of January 1,1972, including that
of a resource spend down provision. Further, the
plaintiff asserted that a resource spend down provision was necessary for compliance with the disregard of assets provision of state law. Otherwise,
potential beneficiaries would have to be stripped of
all assets before establishing eligibility, argued the
plaintiff.
HELD for the state agency.
The court ruled that the state agency was not
compelled to employ an asset spend down provision. First, § 209(b) states were required only to
Vol. 2, Iss. 7

In this administrative appeal the plaintiff contests the defendant's denial of her application for Title XIX benefits. At
the time of her initial application the plaintiff and her husband
had joint assets, consisting principally of a bank account, of
nine thousand dollars. Because the Medicaid resource limit for
a married couple is twenty-four hundred dollars, plaintiffs
application was denied even though during the three-month
period prior to the application being denied plaintiff had incurred in excess of $150,000 in medical bills. The principal
issue raised in this appeal is whether the refusal of the defendant
to setoff plaintiff s accrued medical expenses against her excess
resources is a violation of state and federal laws governing Title
XIX. Resolution of this issue requires an odyssey through the
labyrinths of the Social Security Act, a statute aptly described
by one court as "an aggravated assault on the English language,
resistant to attempts to understand it" Friedman v. Berger, 409
Fed. Supp. 1225, 1226 (S.D.N.Y.1976).
The relevant facts are as follows. In February, 1990, the
plaintiff, at the age of sixty-two, became seriously ill and was
hospitalized for emergency treatment Because she had no medical insurance she filed an application for medicaid benefits
with the Department of Income Maintenance. As part of the
application Mrs. Matarazzo, who was being assisted by her
daughter, disclosed that she and her husband had a joint savings
account of nine thousand dollars, which represented their life
savings. Title XIX regulations require that a married applicant
have less than twenty-four hundred dollars in assets. Based
on information provided to them by the intake worker, Mrs.
Matarazzo and her daughter reasonably believed that once the
savings account was reduced to less than twenty-four hundred
dollars, plaintiffs application would be approved retroactive to
the date of application such that Title XIX would cover the
approximately $150,000 in medical bills incurred by plaintiff.
However, when plaintiffs application was approved on June
27, 1990, she was informed that it was granted retroactive to
June 1. Consequently, the plaintiff remains responsible for the
substantial medical bills that she incurred in the preceding three
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ble for the state supplement program whose assets as defined
by the commissioner exceed sixteen hundred dollars, or it living
with a spouse, exceed twenty-four hundred dollars." The plain
language of the statute itself prohibits the defendant from granting Title XDC benefits to any married person, such as plaintiff,
whose assets exceed twenty-four hundred dollars. Additionally,
the use of a resource spend down appears, by implication, to
be barred by General Statutes Sec. 17-134b. That provision
directs the Commissioner to grant assistance to individuals
whose income is applied to the cost of authorized medical care:
"Any income in excess of the applicable amounts shall be
applied as may be required by said federal law, and assistance
shall be granted for the balance of the cost of authorized medical
assistance." (Emphasis supplied). Because the enumeration of
a power in a statute impliedly forbids things not enumerated,
State ex. rel. Barlow v. Kaminsky, 144 Conn. 612 (1957), Connecticut law prohibits the use of a resource spend down.
Thus, while federal law may permit use of a resource spend
down, Connecticut law does not. Plaintiffs reliance on Hessian
and Foley is unavailing since both Illinois and Massachusetts
statutes, unlike Connecticut's, specifically authorize a resource
spend down. In Hessian, the court noted that the Illinois code,
"requires that, in the case of single individuals residing alone,
the Department must disregard at least SI500 in assets when
determining Medicaid eligibility." 544 N£.2d at 757. The Illinois court further observed that the lower appellate court,
"agreed with Hessian that the Illinois Public Aid Code requires
the Department to utilize a resource spend down methodology
in determining an applicant's eligibility." Id. at 753.
Finally, petitioner asserts that Connecticut's asset disregard statute requires the use of a resource spend down. General
Statutes §§ 17-82, 17-134b and 17-134c makes ineligible any
married person whose assets exceed $2400. Put differently,
DIM must disregard $2400 of a married person's assets when
considering eligibility for Title XIX. Petitioner argues that without a resource spend down she will have to deplete all of her
resources to become eligible. Because state and federal law
explicitly allow an applicant to retain up to $2400 in resources,
it appears that with or without a resource spend down petitioner
cannot be required to divest herself of the statutorily protected
$2400 as a condition of eligibility. In the absence of any proof
that petitioner was not permitted to retain the $2400 of protected
assets plaintiff cannot prevail in this claim.
While this is a case in which the plaintiff appears to "have
all the logic and policy on her side of the argument, but the
state appears to have the law," Harriman v. Commissioner of
Maine Department of Human Resources, # 900046, F.Supp.
(D.Me. Nov. 9, 1990), our Supreme Court has again reminded
us that policy flaws in the Medicaid statute are a matter for
legislative correction, not judicial modification. Mercado v.
Commissioner of Department of Income Maintenance, supra.
Because this court is not free to substitute its judgment for the
state and federal legislatures, and because it concludes that
neither state nor federal law require the use of a resource spend
down, it declines to reverse the decision of the hearing officer.
The plaintiffs appeal is therefore dismissed.
In summary, this court concludes that the plaintiff has not
sustained her burden of proving that the state plan in effect as
of January 1,1972, authorizes the use of a resource spend down.
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Even if plaintiff had provided proof of that fact she cannot
prevail because, even assuming the HCFA prohibition should
be ignored, state law does not require the use of a resource
spend down. In the absence of any claim that use of a resource
spend down is required by federal law, the defendant did not
act illegally, arbitrarily or capriciously in denying plaintiffs
application. Plaintiffs appeal is therefore dismissed.

1

A resource spend down allows an applicant who is ineligible because of excess resources to obtain retroactive coverage once she
spends down her excess resources. For example, an individual may
have resources above the eligibility level, but her medical expenses
may exceed the excess. Resource spend down measures the applicant's
resources in terms of her medical expenses, so that the applicant is not
found ineligible in this situation.
2

Section 209(b) provides in pertinent part;
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
. . . no State not eligible to participate in the State plan
program established under subchapter XVI of this chapter
shall be required to provide medical assistance to any
aged, blind, or disabled individual (within the meaning
of subchapter XVI of this chapter) for any month unless
such State would be (or would have been) required to
provide medical assistance to such individual for such
month had its plan for medical assistance approved under
this subchapter and in effect on January 1,1972, been in
effect in such month, except that for this purpose any such
individual shall be deemed eligible for medical assistance
under such State plan it (in addition to meeting such other
requirements as are or may be imposed under the State
plan) the income of any such individual as determined
in accordance with section 1396b(f) of this title (after
deducting any supplemental security income payment
and State supplementary payment made with respect to
such individual, and incurred expenses for medical care
as recognized under State law) is not in excess of the
standard for medical assistance established under the
State plan as in effect on January 1, 1972.

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(t) (1982).
3

ACTION TRANSMITTAL 80-58 states:
The current page 6 of ATTACHMENT 2.6-C allows
States to require a "spend-down" of an individual's resources, by indicating that excess liquid resources can be
applied to the cost of medical care. Although section
1962(a)(17)(D) of the Social Security Act provides this
option with respect to income (by taking into account
incurred medical expenses), neither the Act nor Federal
regulations allow for such flexibility with regard to resources. We have, therefore, eliminated this option on
page 6 of ATTACHMENT 2.6-C to correct this error and
reflect Federal law and regulations.
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Christine HARRIMAN, el a!.,

COMMISSIONER, MAINE DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
No. 90-0046-B-H
U.S. District Court. Maine
March 4, 1992
The appellant represented a class of individuals whose level of assets rendered them ineligible
for Medicaid benefits. In an underlying decision,
Maine's Supreme Court ruled that state law did not
require an asset spend down. The appellant filed
another motion, contending that the Commissioner's policy of allowing for income spend down, but
noi asset spend down, violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
HELD: for the Commissioner,
The court, while firing that the policy made
"little economic or logical sense/* concluded that it
met the rational basis standard, and thus did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. In considering
the class of individuals whose assets exceeded the
threshold level, the court opined that this group was
likely, on the whole, to "have greater flexibility in
making alternative ammgements fox their medical
needs," In addition, the court noted that the state
had a legitimate interest in avoiding the costly asset
evaluation process that would accompany an asset
spend down provision. Accordingly, the appellant's
motion for summary judgment was denied.

HORNBY, J,
This class action challenge* the Commissioner of Human
Services' ("Commissioner**) refusal to consider accrued medical bills in evaluating whether an applicant's personal resources
disqualify her for Medicaid.1 i have previously ruled in this
case that the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. $5 1396 et seq., does
not require a state to adopt a so-called resource "spend down"
VoU.lti. 24
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rule. On December 18,1990,1 certified to the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court (sluing as the Law Court) the question whether
22 M.R.S.A. S 3174 required the Commissioner to apply a
resource spend down. In a Mandate dated August 12,1991, the
Law Court held that the Maine statute does not compel an asset
spend down. The parties have now filed cioss-motions for
summary judgment on the sole remaining question: whether the
Commissioner's policy providing for an income spend down
but not a resource spend down is inherently irrational kntl thus
violates the Equal Protection Clause (Plaintiffs' Complaint,
Counts iv and V). Because I conclude that a rational basis docs
exist for the Commissioner's policy, the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment is DEl>nED and the Commissioner's motion
is GRANTED.
An applicant may qualify for Medicaid assistance if she
meets the definition of "medically needy" and is disabled. 42
U.SC. fi l396a(a)(lOXC); 22 M.R.S.A. §ft 3173,3174. In determining whether she is medically needy the Suite evaluates
the applicant's incvxnc and resource*. Income eligibility i* determined by calculating her gross income and applying certain
deductions to arrive at her "countable income* See 42 C.ER.
i 435.831(a); Maine Medical Assistance Eligibility Manual
("Manual") H 3330-3554. She is eligible If her countable
income falls below the State's income limit. Medically needy
applicants may subtract from their income any incurred but
unpaid medical expenses, thus reducing their net countable
income to the eligibility standard. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a<a)(17);
42 CP JL 8 435.831(c); Manual 5 5000, TWs isreferredto as
the income spend down rule and itessentially permits a "special
deduction" for an applicant's incurred medical expenses. Hogan
v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 886,889 (1st Cir. 1985). With respect to
resources, a person is eligible as "medically needy* only if bcr
assets do not exceed the State's asset eligibility limit ($3,000
or less in the case of a married couple). Manual i 3340. Unlike
the case of income eligibility, however, no deductions ate permined and no comparable "spend down" provision exists for
incurred medical expenses unless the resources are actually
spent for such a purpose during the month in Question,2
Hamroan contends that the Commissioner's refusal to consider her (or class members9 lUce her) incurred but unpaid
medical expenses when evaluating herassets, while considering
such expenses when evaluating another applicant's income,
creates inequities and irrationally discriminates against those
with resources. Hanirnan points out that she is in substantially
the same financial position a* those medically needy persons

C1992 LRP Publications; allrightsreserved.
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who have incorce exceeding the Medicaid limits but are found
eligible only by application of the spend down rule; if the State
were to include ha incurred medical expenses in its evaluation
of her assets she would Tall below the $1,000 eligibility limit,5
The Equal Protection Clause dictates that "all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike," Ptylcr v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982X quotbg FJ. Foysitr Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 4tZ 415 (1920). In the area of economics
and social welfare, however* ii is clear that a suite's separate
ucatmcru is not unconstitutional merely because the classification is inequitable ox unwise. Sckwtiker v. ffogan, 457 VS.
569,589 (1982). If there is a rational basis for the classification
related to a legitimate state interest, then the classification doe*
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Dandrid$c i\ Williams,
397 U.S. 471,465 (1970) CTTjhe Equal Protection Clause does
not require that a State must choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. It is
enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination." Id, at 486*87 (citation omitted).)
Although the State's decision to provide for a spend down
when measuring income but not when measuring resources
makes little economic or logical sense and although h is a very
close question* I have concluded that the policy does barely
meet the rational basis standard. Ifogan instructs us that the
validity of a broad classification "is not properly judged by
focusing solely on the portion of the disfavored class that is
affected most harshly by its terms," 457 U.S. at 589—-here,
people like the Harrimans who have minimal income but have
saved some money and now find it offset by a hospital debt.
Instead, a court is to took at the broad category—in this case,
people with accumulated resources. Considering such people
as a class, I conclude that the State could rationally believe that
they "generally are better able to provide for their medical
needs," 457 U.S. at 590, than people vvtio have been unable to
accumulate resources. In other words, people with accumulated
resources, as a group, are likely to have greater flexibility
in making alternative arrangements for their medical needs.
whether it be by previous purchase of insurance, arranging for
loans, family assistance, etc. Thus, it is rational to define need
on the basis of these resources—even though some persons
with resources, like the Harrimans, may actually be in greater
need of assistance because of an accrued medical bill than
persons who receive assistance because they had no resources
to start with, This conclusion isfortifiedby the administrative
convenience arguments the State has made. So long as the State
is evaluating assets only of those applicants who claim to have
less than S3»QO0 (per couple) the administrative task is comparatively light. If, however, persons with substantial assets arc able
to claim benefits because a large medical bill offsets those
assets, the State will be confronted with evaluating many more
assets and the task will not always be simple—for example,
collectibles, stock that does not trade on a public exchange,
etc,4 Use of the spend down to reduce income presents no
comparable difficulties, because in most instances it is simple
to measure the amount of the income stream to an applicant
(except perhaps in instances of some self-employed individuals). Moreover, once that particular item of excess income has
passed, the Commissioner need no longer be concerned with it.
In the case of a spent down resource, on the other hand, once
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used it would presumably be disqualified from a similar use in
the future and it would, therefore, have to be tracked as, for
example, if a particular item were sold and the proceeds used to
purchase a different item. All of these administrative problems
support as rational the decision to draw the line between income
aiid resources for purposes of applying the spend down rule.
The Slate should not bo compelled to use its limited budget to
hire more people to apply a difficult rule where the alternative
is to direct tta funds to people in need even though not all
people in need can be reached
Accordingly, the plaintiffs* motion for summary judgment
on Counts IV and V is DENTED and the defendants* motion
for summary Judgment is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.

1
The Medicaid program is a cooperative federal and state venture
providing financial assistance to those whose "income and resources
arc insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical *ervice&*M 41
U.S.C. ( 1396(1).The applicable federal and sate statutory provision*
regarding * lifiWity are found at 42 U.S.C. f 1396a and 22 M.R.S A .
f 3174 ratpccUvcly,
1

Ccruin aucts are excluded from the asset evaluation, including the
applicant's primary residence, vehicle and household goods. Manual
i J310. Moreover, in ihe case of assets encumbered by debt, the
Commissioner uzily considers the applicants equity in the property
(i.e. the amount by which the fair mark* value of the asset exceeds
ihc debt owed on it}. Manual \ 3300.
' Daring a period of hospitalization from January 1989 to February
1989, Hamrnan incurred over S42,000 is medical bills. At the time
she was hospitalized ihe and her husband had over 510,000 in liquid
ttseu. By April 1989, Haxtiman had spent alt but 1500 of thc*e axscU
on her outstanding medical bills and applied for Medicaid to cover the
remaining bills. The CummUtumer denied Medicaid coverage for the
period January through March, however, became on the first day of
each of those months her available raseu e&pcodod the State's $3,000
elijibil ity limitation. According to H&rrir&an, the Commissioner should
h*vc determined eligibility by spending down her assets by the amount
of her incurred expenses (whether she paid them or not), at the Commissioner does when determining eligibility on the beais of income.
4
Although the applicant most in the fusi initince vital up her resources and preterit their value, the State most review the evaluation
to avoid fraud or erroneous overpayments.
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JEWISH HOSPITAL, I N C ,
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES.
No. C 90-0791-UA)
U.S. District Court, Wcsicm District of Kentucky
March 16,1992
The hospital contested the Secretary* interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1395wwt<JX5)(F)(5Xw)
as it pertained to his calculation of its "dijpropor-

.; all rights reserved.
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